DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 442 709 SO 031 830

AUTHOR Miles, Michael; Schuster, Heidi
TITLE Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources. The Expansion of NATO.
INSTITUTION Denver Univ., CO. Center for Teaching International Relations.
SPONS AGENCY Una Chapman Cox Foundation, Corpus Christi, TX.
ISBN ISBN-0-943804-42-6
PUB DATE 2000-00-00
NOTE 150p.; Series edited by Linda Bongiorno. Documents collected and edited by Karen Volker.
AVAILABLE FROM Center for Teaching International Relations, University of Denver, 2201 South Gaylord Street, Denver, CO 80208-0268; tel: 303-871-3106; Web site: (http://www.du.edu/ctir/); ($19.95).
PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom - Teacher (052) -- Historical Materials (060)
EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Civics; Constitutional History; Constitutional Law; Diplomatic History; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; Government (Administrative Body); High Schools; *International Relations; National Defense; *National Security; Political Science; Presidents of the United States; *Primary Sources; Social Studies; Teaching Guides; *United States History
IDENTIFIERS Europe; *North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ABSTRACT

In this high school U.S. government and U.S. history curriculum unit, students examine in depth the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Detailed activities are provided to teach students about the origins of NATO, its impact on U.S. foreign policy, and its future directions, particularly the enlargement of NATO in the post-Cold War world. The materials include informational handouts for students, background information for teachers, lesson ideas and outlines, black line masters, rubrics, application to civics and history standards, and primary source documents, including the correspondence of key figures in the history and development of NATO, newspaper articles, and transcripts of Congressional testimony. (RJC)

POOR PRINT QUALITY
Pgs 55 To 110

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.

THE EXPANSION OF NATO

ED 442 709

SO 031 830

Teaching **American Diplomacy** Using Primary Sources



PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE AND IN ELECTRONIC MEDIA FOR ERIC COLLECTION SUBSCRIBERS ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

M. Montgomery

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

2A

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

✓ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

Documents Collected and Edited by
Karen Volker

Teaching Materials Designed by
Michael Miles
& Heidi Schuster

A project made possible
by the Una Chapman Cox Foundation

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CENTER FOR TEACHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Teaching American Diplomacy

The Expansion of NATO

Authors
Michael Miles and Heidi Schuster

Editorial Manager
Linda Bongiorno

Executive Director
Mark A. Montgomery Ph.D.

For further information about other CTIR publications and programs please call
303.871.3106 or visit our web site at www.ctrionlinee.com
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
2201 South Gaylord Street
Denver, Colorado 80208

Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources

The curriculum series *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources* is a collaborative project of the Center for Teaching International Relations (CTIR) and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. Through a generous grant from the Cox Foundation, Ms. Karen Volker, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, compiled the documents that make up each of the units in this series. Ms. Volker also wrote the introductions and commentaries for the document sets. In an effort to make these documents more readily accessible to classroom teachers, the Cox Foundation engaged CTIR to create standards-based curriculum units to accompany the documents. These assessments and their accompanying activities were developed by classroom teachers of history and civics.
CTIR has drawn upon the standards outlined by the Center for Civic Education and the Mid-Continental Regional Educational Laboratory. Ms. Linda Bongiorno edited the series for CTIR.

The Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources Series:

- The Monroe Doctrine
- The Annexation of the Philippines
- The Creation of the State of Israel
- The Enlargement of NATO

For further information about the other CTIR publications and programs please call
303.871.3106 or visit our web site at www.ctironline.com
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
2201 South Gaylord Street
Denver, Colorado 80208

NATO Enlargement
Using Primary Sources

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction to NATO Enlargement p. 1 -3

Civics Unit

Introductions and Standards p. 4

Assessment Instructions for Teachers p. 6

Assessment Instructions for Student p. 7

Assessment Rubric p. 9

Suggested Activities to Prepare for Assessment p. 10

Summary of Documents p. 13

Handouts p. 16

Appendix - Other Assessment Ideas p. 22

History Unit

Introductions and Standards p. 23

Assessment for Instructions Teachers p. 25

Assessment Instructions for Student p. 26

Assessment Rubric p. 27

Suggested Activities to Prepare for Assessment p. 28

Handouts p. 30

Summary of Documents p. 37

Appendix - Other Assessment Ideas p. 40

Primary Source Documents

Primary source documents are organized numerically according to document number.
For a list of primary source documents included in this packet, please see the first page of the document section.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

NATO OTAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

CREATION OF NATO/NATO ENLARGEMENT

It was a historic moment when, on July 2, 1997, the sixteen members of NATO invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After over 40 years under Soviet domination, these new democracies had lobbied hard for the opportunity to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- What is the primary purpose of NATO?
- What Article of the North Atlantic Treaty allows for new members?
- Why is Article V considered to be the heart of NATO?
- How does public debate influence policy?
- What other North American country is a member of NATO?
- Are there counterparts to NATO in other regions?
- Would you be willing to go to war to protect Poland? Germany?
- Is NATO still necessary?

If ratified by all NATO member states, this will be the first expansion of NATO in over 15 years.[1] Although a total of twelve countries have announced their desire to join NATO, only the three mentioned above were invited to join in the first wave. The other NATO "wannabes" include the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The decision of NATO member countries to invite only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join NATO was based on the perception that only these three countries had gone the furthest in establishing free, democratic societies based on free markets and the rule of law. By contrast, other "wannabe" states were seen as having a long way to go to meet these standards.

Background on NATO

In 1949, fearing Soviet military domination of Europe, the United States joined eleven other nations in signing a commitment to defend their common values and civilization against outside threats. According to the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Parties

reaffirmed:

> *"their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments."*

were:

> *"The basic objective of the treaty is to assist in achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations – the maintenance of peace and security."* From the 1949 Senate Committee Report on the North Atlantic Treaty

[1] The twelve original members of NATO were: The United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

NYT 7/24/49

"determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"

sought:

"to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."

and resolved:

"to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."

The text of the North Atlantic Treaty, negotiated in just over a year, is remarkably clear and concise. The treaty -- essentially a collective defense arrangement – had a decisive impact on American diplomacy for the remainder of the 20th century. With this treaty, the United States broke its 150 year-old policy of avoiding peacetime alliances with European nations.

Although NATO troops were not called into action during the Cold War, by creating a latent military capability the Treaty was successful in deterring military aggression. In fact, NATO never had to use its military forces throughout the entire Cold War. The first real NATO military operation was in 1995 to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia.

The Expansion Debate

According to the U.S. Constitution, before the President can ratify a treaty, he must first obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. In the case of NATO enlargement, the Senate must also give its advice and consent because the Protocols of Accession fundamentally change the treaty obligations of the United States.

Prior to the current expansion, NATO had increased its membership three times before -- adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. On each of these occasions, an overwhelming majority of the Senate supported expansion, arguing that it would decrease the defense burden of the United States and, at the same time, add to the security of Europe. On none of these occasions did the debate consider whether NATO itself was necessary.

By 1997/1998, however, the situation had changed. With the Cold War having ended in 1989, some Senators went so far as to question NATO's continued existence. Others doubted whether adding the three new countries would in fact enhance the security of Europe.

> *"If [NATO enlargement] should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound blunder made since the end of the Cold War."* Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10/30/97.

Those who opposed NATO enlargement also argued that expansion could play into the hands of ultra-nationalists in Russia and would cost more than claimed by the

proponents of expansion. What's more, because it could create problems with Russia, many opponents of expansion argued that inclusion of these countries in NATO would decrease, rather than increase, stability in Europe.

Expanding NATO is "*an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe.*" Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2/24/98

The Administration and other supporters of expansion, however, argued that an expanded NATO would, in the words of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united." Others saw the inclusion of the three Central European countries as the natural extension of the Cold War, arguing that this (protecting freedom) is "what we fought the Cold War for."

The arguments in favor of expansion are inevitably premised on the belief that Europe is vital to U.S. security and that NATO is and will continue to be an effective tool for promoting stability in Europe. The Clinton Administration argued that not only is NATO still an integral part of the United States' national security policy, its function would be enhanced by the inclusion of the three new members.

On April 30, 1998, after several days of floor debate, the Senate voted to approve NATO expansion by a vote of 80 to 19, 13 votes more than the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification. (This ratio is remarkably similar to the vote in favor of the creation of NATO in 1949: 83 for and 13 against.)

During the course of the Senate debate several resolutions were debated and defeated. Among other things, these resolutions sought to delay entry of the three countries into NATO until they become EU members, tried to put a three year moratorium on any further expansion of NATO, attempted to link NATO expansion to a Congressional vote on keeping U.S. troops in Bosnia, and sought to keep NATO from taking on military missions beyond mere defense of its members. One sense of the Congress resolution that did pass states that Senate authorization is necessary for any spending on NATO enlargement that exceeds a predetermined amount.

Forty-five Republicans and 35 Democrats voted in favor of NATO enlargement. Nine Republicans and 10 Democrats voted against. One senator (Jon Kyl, a Republican from Arizona) did not vote. Those voting against NATO enlargement were:

Republicans: Ashcroft, Mo.; Craig, Idaho; Hutchinson, Ark.; Inhofe, Okla.; Jeffords, Vt.; Kempthorne, Idaho; Smith, N.H.; Specter, Pa.; and Warner, Va.

Democrats: Bryan, Nev.; Bumpers, Ark.; Conrad, N.D.; Dorgan, N.D.; Harkin, Iowa; Leahy, Vt.; Moynihan, N.Y.; Reid, Nev.; Wellstone, Minn.; and Wyden, Ore.

NATO ENLARGEMENT
A Civics Unit
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

The fighting in the Balkans in 1999 underscores the importance of understanding the U.S. interests in that area and in Europe generally. Similarly, an informed public should seek to understand how NATO helps to secure those interests and how that international organization may evolve to meet the challenges of the next 50 years. This assessment uses NATO enlargement as the vehicle for students to demonstrate an understanding of the purposes of NATO and U.S. interests connected with NATO's continued existence. In preparing for the assessment, students will use a number of primary source documents regarding the creation of NATO and NATO enlargement. Preparing for this assessment will also enable students to investigate NATO's changing role as discussed at NATO's 50th anniversary Summit in Washington. While Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have already been accepted into NATO, the question of enlargement promises to occupy our foreign policy leaders for several years to come.

Inquiry Question:

How has NATO's purpose evolved as a result of the end of the Cold War?

Grade level: 10th -12th grade

Time Allotment: The assessment requires 1½ hours to complete. It is recommended that students receive approximately 15 hours of instruction to be able to meet the civics standards upon which the assessment is based.

Standards being assessed: This assessment checks student proficiency in the following standards for civics and government:

International organizations

Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on the purposes and functions of international organizations in the world today – specifically, NATO.

The ends and means of United States foreign policy

Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles.

Making and implementing United States foreign policy

Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how United States foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out.

Students will be prepared to take this assessment and meet the standards when they are able to do the following:

- describe the original purpose of NATO and describe the historical context of its genesis
- evaluate the success of NATO in accomplishing its stated goals
- describe the present context of NATO enlargement and compare the rationale for NATO enlargement with the original purpose of NATO
- analyze possible consequences of NATO enlargement
- analyze NATO's new strategic concept and evolving purpose
- describe the U.S. role in maintaining the viability of NATO
- explain the idea of the national interest
- evaluate U.S. national interest in NATO enlargement
- explain powers the Constitution gives to the president and Congress in foreign affairs and how these powers have been used with regard to NATO enlargement
- describe the process by which U.S. foreign policy is made, including the role of federal agencies, the public, and the media

ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS

This assessment provides a vehicle for students to demonstrate understanding of the standards with regard to the purpose and evolving role of NATO, U.S. national interests, and some of the institutions that play a crucial role in the development of U.S. foreign policy. The assessment scenario requires students to apply their knowledge to a new situation – the possible addition of Ukraine to NATO. While neither the teacher nor the student needs to have more than the rudimentary information presented in the "Background" paper, preparation for the assessment should include the contemporary context of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe as well as some geographical information regarding this area.

Distribute the "Background" paper. Allow students a few minutes to read this paper. Draw their attention to the fictional date for this exercise. Field any questions students might have regarding the background. Then distribute the "MEMORANDUM." Read the instructions out loud with them. You may have to expand on the term "position paper." Again, specific knowledge of the format for a position paper is not necessary – focus on the standards and the items the paper should address.

Allow students approximately 75 minutes to complete the assessment. You may want to provide them with a copy of the scoring rubric if you haven't done so already. The rubric will help to keep the students' responses focused. You may also want to provide a few of the primary source documents that the students studied during the course of the unit. Documents 33, 36, and 40, as well as the excerpts from Mr. Vershbow's speech, may be the most helpful.

MEMORANDUM

Date: November 8, 2000
To: You
From: Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Subject: Position paper

The new Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs will arrive tomorrow. I am preparing a briefing book for her on issues that will require her immediate attention. I want you to draft a position paper concerning NATO enlargement – specifically, adding Ukraine. (See the attached background paper). We'll include your paper in the briefing book.

At a minimum, your position paper should address the following:

- whether or not the U.S. should add Ukraine to NATO at this time and the rationale for our position
- how enlargement will affect NATO's original purpose and whether adding Ukraine fits the evolution of NATO's purpose
- whether or not adding Ukraine is in our national interest (you should be specific about what our interests are)

Additionally, the new Under Secretary will want to meet with the key players on this issue sometime early next week. Please provide a list of agencies or organizations with which the Under Secretary will want to meet to discuss our position and lay the groundwork for our foreign policy with regard to NATO enlargement. Briefly describe why each agency or organization is important to the process.

I have also provided several primary source documents for your possible use. They are attached.

Background

It has been a year and a half since NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit, which was held in April 1999. During that meeting in Washington, NATO members reaffirmed their 50-year old commitment to NATO's original mission. However, they also outlined a vision of how NATO would have to deal with new challenges. Recognizing that many of the threats to the security of the Allies result from instability or conflicts outside NATO territory, the Allies agreed that NATO should be prepared to respond to crises that go beyond defense of Allied territory, such as the military operation in Kosovo in 1999. There was some discussion that NATO would prepare its militaries to *make* peace, not just *keep* peace. The Allies also made a commitment to add new members to NATO in the not too distant future.

Now, several of the Allies want the United States to agree to admit Ukaine into NATO. These NATO members argue that the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO in March 1999 has advanced democratic processes in those countries. Over the last several years, democracy and the market system in Ukraine have progressed to the level Poland enjoyed in 1999. Supporters of enlargement argue that adding Ukraine to NATO would further solidify the gains made as a result of the Cold War and would provide additional guarantees that the continued instability in the Balkans and in some provinces in Russia would not spread to other countries in Europe.

This proposal promises to be much more contentious that the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. Already many members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have expressed concern. They believe NATO has now moved far beyond its original purpose. Some believe the inclusion of Ukraine might actually harm our interests.

Rubric for NATO Assessment

Criteria (weight)	Pre-basic (1 point)	Basic (2 point)	Proficient (3 point)	Advanced (4 point)
Understands the evolution of NATO's purpose x 3	Student explains the original purpose of NATO. Student has a weak or rudimentary understanding of the current purpose of NATO as described by current foreign-policy leaders in the primary source documents.	Student explains the original purpose of NATO and lists some of the arguments for NATO enlargement. However, the response provides little context, failing to address the evolution of NATO's role or the reasons behind change.	Student explains the original purpose of NATO as well as the arguments for NATO enlargement. Response demonstrates understanding of how NATO's role is evolving due to different political and military realities.	Student understands the role of NATO over time. Response further demonstrates understanding of how the role is evolving due to different political and military realities. Student also understands possible future direction of NATO as discussed by Vershbow or others.
Evaluates NATO's success in securing U.S. interests in Europe x 2	Student is able to define "national interests" and cites examples of U.S. interests in Europe. The response fails to explain how NATO serves or fails to secure those interests.	Student describes U.S. interests in NATO and in Europe generally. Student demonstrates only rudimentary knowledge of NATO's ability to secure those interests.	Student understands the concept of national interests and evaluates NATO's success in securing our interests in Europe. The response is supported, but is not closely tied to the assessment scenario – the addition of Ukraine.	Student understands the concept of national interests and evaluates NATO's success in securing our interests in Europe. Within the context of the assessment scenario, student explains the connection between enlargement and U.S. interests.
Analyzes the effect of adding Ukraine to NATO x 1	Student is able to list general consequences of enlargement. However, the response is vague and indicates confusion over the historical context, U.S. interests, or NATO's purpose.	Student describes consequences of adding Ukraine by rote or in very general terms. Response demonstrates only limited understanding of how the addition of Ukraine serves or jeopardizes U.S. interests in Europe.	Student explains how the addition of Ukraine serves or jeopardizes U.S. interests in Europe. However, the response makes little connection to how adding Ukraine affects NATO's purpose or evolving role.	Student describes reasonable consequences of adding Ukraine. Student analyzes the impact such an action might have on the role and purpose of NATO and how the addition of Ukraine serves or jeopardizes U.S. interests in Europe.
Describes the key players involved in this foreign policy issue x 1	Student lists several agencies or institutions involved in foreign policy decision-making. Student shows weak understanding of these institutions and does not demonstrate understanding of the role the agencies play in NATO issues.	Student identifies several key agencies or institutions that would be involved in foreign policy decision making. Student demonstrates some knowledge of these institutions, but shows only limited understanding of the role the agencies play in NATO issues.	Student identifies several key agencies or institutions that would be involved and explains how they are important to the process. Student understands Constitutional powers in the foreign policy arena.	Student identifies several of the key players involved and explains how they are important. Student understands Constitutional requirements and demonstrates adequate understanding of the process by which U.S. foreign policy is made, including the role of federal agencies, the public, and the media.

Activities

Unit activities to prepare for this assessment should focus on primary source documents. Three suggested activities are provided below:

Suggested Activity 1

The purpose of this activity is to help students determine NATO's purpose, U.S. interests in NATO and NATO enlargement, and arguments against NATO enlargement. Prior to this activity, perhaps the day before, teachers should discuss the historical context for the creation of NATO and the present-day context of NATO enlargement. Based on that instruction, students should fill in the column entitled 'historical context" of the graphic organizer (Handout 1). Also, prior to the start of the activity, students should read primary source documents as described below.

JIGSAW: use the jigsaw method to review and discuss several primary source documents. Form four to six groups of students with at least three students in each group. Groups 1 and 2 will focus on U.S. interests. Groups 3 and 4 focus on arguments against NATO and NATO enlargement. If the class has more than 12 students, form Groups 5 and 6 which will focus on the purpose of NATO and the rationale for NATO enlargement. Students read the following document the day before:

- Group 1 - documents 18 and 21
- Group 2 - documents 6 and 8
- Group 3 - documents 16 and 17
- Group 4 - documents 2 and 28
- Group 5 - document 40
- Group 6 - document 30

- Each group meets separately for approximately 15 minutes. Students ensure everyone in the group understands the main points. Members of the group fill out the appropriate section of the graphic organizer (Handout 1).
- Next, members of Group 1 and 2 meet to share information about U.S. interests during the two historical periods under study. Members of Groups 3 and 4 likewise meet and share information regarding the arguments against NATO and NATO enlargement. Similarly, members of Groups 5 and 6 meet. Students fill in the appropriate section of the graphic organizer. This part of the activity takes approximately 20 minutes.
- Finally, the teacher forms new groups of three or four students (one student from Group 1 or 2, one student from Group 3 or 4, and one student from Group 5 or 6). Students then take turns explaining U.S. interests, arguments against, and the rationale for NATO and NATO enlargement to the other members of the group. This should take 20-25 minutes. By the end of this third round, students should have completely filled in the graphic organizer.

Suggested activity 2

This issue of NATO enlargement lends itself to classroom debates and scored discussions. A scored discussion enables the students to explore several key concepts without the artificial constraint of having to "win" an argument. The purpose of this activity is to help students analyze the rationale for NATO enlargement and its possible consequences. Additionally, students will evaluate U.S. national interests in NATO enlargement.

Assign reading the day before. Split the class in half. Give half the class documents 33 and 36 to read. Give the other half documents 35 and 37. [If two documents seem like too much reading, you may have the students work in pairs, with each student reading only one document].

Scored discussion: For the first scored discussion, have eight students (or four pairs) who read documents 33 and 36 sit in a circle in the center of the classroom. The other students sit around these students and take notes. They will not participate in the discussion, except eight of them will score the participants using the discussion scoresheet (see Handout 2). The teacher also scores the students, but awards points only when students refer to the assigned primary source document or another primary source document on NATO enlargement. Start the discussion off with either a statement or a question, such as: an enlarged NATO will entangle the U.S. in many more Kosovos. Students are then free to take the discussion in any direction. However, they must continually refer to the primary source documents if they are to receive a good score from the teacher. Allow students approximately 15 minutes to discuss the articles. The teacher might have to prompt students with other questions or statements if they get stuck. One might ask:

- Has NATO outlived its usefulness?
- Will an enlarged NATO undermine our relations with Russia?
- Have U.S. interests in Europe changed over the last 50 years?
- Should the U.S. extend NATO membership? How would that serve our interests?

After the first group, select another eight students to conduct a scored discussion over documents 35 and 37.

Suggested Activity 3

The purpose of this activity is to help students understand how NATO's role and purpose is changing. Conduct this activity only after students have learned NATO's original purpose and the arguments for enlargement that were advanced upon the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This activity takes a close look at excerpts from a speech delivered by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Handout 3). Use Handout 4 to guide students in their study of this primary source document.

- In groups of three or four, ask students to list possible threats to the security of Europe and to U.S. interests in Europe. (All the students should complete this first question on Handout 4).

- Have the same groups determine whether NATO as currently configured and with its present mission is able to meet those threats.
- Students then consider how they might change the structure or purpose of NATO to meet possible security threats or threats to U.S. interests.

Hand out the speech from Vershbow. Students read the excerpts and then complete the following questions (on Handout 4):

- According to Vershbow, in what way is NATO evolving?
- How does this compare with your changes for the structure or purpose of NATO?
- What are the implications of NATO's evolution?

Summary of Documents

Purpose of NATO

Document 40, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, April 4, 1949: The North Atlantic Treaty itself provides the best summary of the purpose NATO was supposed to fulfill. The preamble, Art. 1, Art. 3, and Art. 5 explain that the purpose of NATO was to safeguard freedom, the principles of democracy, and the rule of law in the North Atlantic area; promote stability and strengthen free institutions; provide for the collective defense of member states; encourage economic collaboration among the treaty members; develop the countries' individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack; and, in the event of an armed attack against one or more of the treaty members, to act in concert with one another to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Purpose of NATO in 1999

Document 30, Letter from Secretary of State Albright to Senator Helms, not dated: Albright emphasizes that the primary mission of NATO remains the collective defense of the territory of the NATO members. She made clear, however, that NATO recognizes that Allied security is linked to all other states of Europe. Therefore, NATO could commit itself to the maintenance of stability in Europe, including areas beyond the borders of its own members. She further claimed that NATO's decision to accept missions beyond its own borders did not represent a radical departure from its original purpose.

U.S. interests in the creation of NATO

Document 18, "Pact in Perspective," from the *Washington Post*, April 27, 1949: The *Washington Post* argues that the creation of NATO is "an act of joint self-defense." The treaty would 1) deter Soviet aggression, 2) benefit the U.S. because it would bolster Europe's economic recovery, and 3) strengthen the militaries of the treaty members, whose defense is vital to our own.

Document 21, "The Pact Ratified," from the *New York Times*, November 22, 1949: The *New York Times* believed NATO would serve the U.S. interests if it became more than a paper instrument. The biggest advantage it would have for the U.S. would enable Western Europe to develop its own defense resources. Also, NATO would help prevent war, and U.S. involvement in war, by coordinating the separate foreign and economic policies of the treaty members.

Arguments against the creation of NATO

Document 16, "We Assume World Role, But Cost Bothers Us," from *New York Times*, April 3, 1949: The author describes why Congress in 1949 might only begrudgingly support the creation of NATO. According to him, critics of NATO 1) feared a rise in taxes to support the alliance, 2) were distrustful of any organization that rests on military power, 3) believed the treaty might provoke the Russians into aggressive action, 4) feared a diversion of money and materials from the economic recovery of Europe to an arms program that would have a questionable effect.

Document 17, "Alternative to the Pact," from the *Washington Post*, April 17, 1949: The authors detail four reasons why they are against the creation of NATO. The creation of NATO would 1) weaken the United Nations, 2) interfere with the constructive work of the European Recovery Program, 3) make war more likely, and 4) increase the military control of U.S. foreign policy.

U.S. interests in NATO enlargement

Document 6, "A Go for NATO," from the *Washington Post*, January 4, 1994: Political analyst Robert Zoellick describes NATO enlargement as a strategic imperative. He outlines U.S. interests in being engaged in Europe and in enlarging NATO. NATO enlargement, he argues, would accomplish at least three goals of the U.S.: 1) it would consolidate democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, enabling the new members to contribute to the larger transatlantic community, 2) it would provide new partners for the United States to deal with the next generation of problems such as threats of terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 3) it would enable the United States to more easily to reach out to and build cooperation with countries further east, including Russia.

Document 8, "The Case for NATO Expansion," from the *Chicago Tribune*, March 13, 1998: In making the case for NATO expansion, the author outlines what America will get for its investment. Primarily, the U.S. would receive the peace resulting from an expanded zone of stability. The author also suggests that the new allies would contribute to purposes outside Europe, such as Allied assistance in the Persian Gulf. The author also rebuts the claim that expansion will undermine relations with Russia.

Document 33, Excerpts from the testimony of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 14, 1998: Albright discusses U.S. interests in NATO enlargement, especially in light of a changed status quo in Europe brought about by the end of the Cold War. First, an enlarged NATO would mean that more countries in a potentially unstable part of Europe share our values and would work with us to solves problems posed by ethnic conflict or the proliferation of dangerous weapons. Second, the prospect of being a member nation of NATO has given nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to strengthen democratic institutions and peacefully resolve conflicts with their neighbors. This, she argues, would prevent the U.S. from being dragged into conflict in the region. Third, NATO enlargement would make NATO more cohesive, suggesting that the U.S. would continue to play a prominent role in Europe. The new members would add "strategic depth" to the Alliance.

Document 35, Testimony of James A. Baker, III before the Senate Budget Committee, October 29, 1997: The former Secretary of State's states that enlargement enhances stability in Central Europe, which is vital to American national interests (however, he offers little evidence to make his case). NATO enlargement would help ensure that American values take root in the new democracies of Central Europe. Baker further argues that rather than straining the relations between the U.S. and Russia, enlargement might actually convince Russian reformers to tie their country's future with the West.

Arguments against NATO enlargement

Document 2, "Save NATO: Stop the Expansion," from *Newsday*, July 3, 1997: Political analyst Michael Mandelbaum argues that NATO expansion is unnecessary. He argues that the Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not being threatened, and that their continued embrace of democracy is not dependent on admission to NATO. According to Mandelbaum, enlargement would be costly. It would also raise questions about our policy towards the Baltic countries and strengthen the anti-democratic forces in Russia. Mandelbaum expands on these themes in **Document 37**, his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 1997.

Document 28, Letter from multiple Senators to Senate Majority Leader requesting postponement of vote, Mar 5, 1998: Senators argue that NATO enlargement has too many unanswered questions. In particular, the Senators believe enlargement might require NATO to commit to intractable and open-ended missions such as the intervention in Bosnia. The Senators also believe enlargement increases the potential for internal friction, making NATO less unified.

Document 36, Testimony of Jack Matlock before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1997: This former U.S. Ambassador to Russia focuses on the effect NATO enlargement may have on our relations with Russia. Essentially, he believes it will undermine our ability to influence Russia on nuclear questions. Since responsible control of weapons of mass destruction is one of our most vital interests, maintaining close cooperation with the Russian on this issue is key. According to Matlock, current and future discussion about NATO enlargement will distract us from dealing with real threats to our security.

Graphic Organizer for Jigsaw Activity

	Historical context	Purpose of NATO	U.S. interests in the creation of NATO	Arguments against the creation of NATO
Creation of NATO				
	Historical context	**Rationale for enlargement**	**U.S. interests in enlargement**	**Arguments against enlargement**
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic				

DISCUSSION SCORE SHEET

Positive	Negative
♦ Taking a position on a question. (2)	Not paying attention or distracting others (-2)
♦ Making a relevant comment. (1)	Interruption. (-2)
♦ Using evidence to support a position or presenting factual information. (2)	Irrelevant comment. (-1)
♦ Drawing another person into the discussion. (1)	Monopolizing. (-3)
♦ Asking a clarifying question or moving the discussion along. (1)	Personal attack. (-3)
♦ Making an analogy or giving an example. (2)	**General observations/ comments.**
♦ Recognizing contradictions or irrelevant comments. (2)	

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Excerpts: New Challenges for the Transatlantic Alliance

[The following excerpts were taken from a speech delivered by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. The speech was given at the European Institute in Washington D.C. on March 16, 1999.]

While the United States clearly has global interests that go well beyond Europe, the relationship that we have with Europe – nations that share our values and vision for democracy, peace, and prosperity – is truly unique.

. . .

We know that the simple, old, East-West divide is gone, and with it the kinds of clear military threats that we spent 40 years deterring. We know that there are new challenges and risks and we can say in general terms what they are – regional instability, often related to ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism, to name a few. But by their very nature, these new risks are harder to pin down and address than a conventional military threat to an Ally's territory.

Nonetheless, we know that it is NATO's job to deal with these risks and challenges, and so we are working hard to make sure that NATO has the right stuff for the next 50 years, just as it did for the past 50 years.

This is the number one U.S. objective for the Alliance – getting NATO ready for the next century. It is an objective fully shared by our Allies. And it is an objective that we believe the Washington Summit will go a long way toward achieving, recognizing that no one can fully anticipate the challenges NATO will be called upon to address in the coming years.

In terms of explaining NATO's role, Allied leaders will issue a brief declaration at the Summit that reaffirms their 50-year old commitment to common values and common defense, and lays out their vision of how NATO will deal with the new challenges of a new century. This "vision statement" will be important for Allied publics – and especially the U.S. beyond the beltway. It purpose is to make clear that America's connection to Europe through NATO will not just whither away in the absence of the Cold War. It will reflect both NATO's success in achieving its original mission and its extraordinary transformation over the past decade in promoting peace and security across a newly undivided continent.. . .

At the Summit, the participation of the three new allies - and the commitment of all 19 allies to continuing the enlargement process in the future - will send a clear message: that Stalin's division of Europe is truly over. Moreover, the Summit will make equally clear that continued enlargement is a key part of NATO's strategy for creating a democratic, prosperous and secure Europe in the next century. The first round of enlargement will not be the last. For the United States, enlargement remains a strategic imperative.

NATO enlargement does not merely extend security to the new members. It also promotes the adoption of democratic norms and peaceful relations with countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and brings additional strength to the Alliance in carrying out its missions, new and old.

To help pave the way for future enlargement, we expect that Summit leaders will approve a package of measures - which we have proposed calling the "Membership Action Plan" - in which NATO will commit to helping aspiring members become the strongest possible candidates for joining the Alliance.

. . .

Enlargement, however, is far from the whole story. Perhaps most important in addressing the new challenges of the 21st century will be the Summit's approval of NATO's revised Strategic Concept - NATO's overarching roadmap for ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This document will lay out in some detail the nature of the Alliance, the challenges of the new security landscape, and NATO's approach to security and defense.

. . .

The U.S. has long believed that one of the most important, new elements of the revised Strategic Concept must be a recognition that one of the fundamental tasks of the Alliance is to carry out so-called "non-Article 5" missions - operations in response to crises that go beyond defense of Allied territory.

This is not to say that collective defense is no longer NATO's job one or, on the other hand, that NATO is going to turn into some form of "globo-cop," set to intervene in every crisis both in Europe and out. Rather, it is merely a recognition that many of the threats to the security of the Allies emanate from outside NATO territory - whether through weapons of mass destruction or regional conflict - and NATO must be prepared to deal with these kinds of threats whenever there is an Alliance consensus to do so.

. . .

In practical terms, NATO has already taken on these kinds of missions through the Bosnia and Kosovo operations. By raising the profile of this type of action in the Strategic Concept, we will be giving guidance to NATO's defense planners to prepare the mobile, sustainable, and survivable forces necessary to carry out these types of missions in the future, whether they be high-intensity or low.

A further step to be taken at the Summit will be to articulate new and closer operational ties between NATO and Partner countries in responding to crises in Europe. As we have seen in Bosnia and in Kosovo, when NATO acts to deal with instability outside its borders, it will usually seek the participation of non-Allies as contributors to a NATO-led operation.

. . .

Thus the Summit will make clear that NATO is not merely the Alliance of 19 members. it is, to quote Secretary of Defense Cohen, the core of a larger "cooperative security network" that links all of Europe's democracies in tackling the security problems of the entire continent.

. . .

The biggest challenge we all face is maintaining the transatlantic commitment to our common values and common cause. Here I am addressing both the United States and Europe. . . On the U.S. side, we have to remind ourselves that security in Europe is linked directly to our own security. Not because a small place like Kosovo or Bosnia has a direct effect on the most vital U.S. interests, but because problems like these have an enormous effect – both tangibly and intangibly – on our strategic objective of building a Europe that is democratic, prosperous, secure and a key partner of the United States.

The United States cannot expect to be a leader, or to reap the benefits of a strong transatlantic partnership, if it tries to deal with European security problems on the cheap and a la carte. U.S. leadership and commitment is still essential – for U.S. interests as well as for Europe's.

. . .

New Challenges for NATO

- List current possible threats to the security of Europe and to U.S. interests in Europe.

- Can NATO as currently configured and with its present mission meet these threats? Explain.

- How might you change the structure or purpose of NATO to meet possible security threats or threats to U.S. interests?

- According to Vershbow, in what way is NATO evolving?

- How do Vershbow's suggestions compare with your changes for the structure or purpose of NATO?

- What are the implications of NATO's evolution as described by Vershbow?

Appendix – Other Assessment Ideas

- **In-basket exercise.** This assessment idea challenges the more advanced students. Students assume the role of a senior staff assistant for a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The staffer's portfolio includes NATO issues. Give the student an "in-basket" with up to ten items – memoranda, articles, copies of e-mail, letters from other staffers, etc. Students respond to as many documents as possible in an hour and a half, demonstrating understanding of the national standards. The in-basket could include, for example:
  - A letter from a State Department official seeking the Senator's support on further NATO enlargement.
  - A request from the Senator to suggest several people who should testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the possible admission of Ukraine.
  - E-mail from a newspaper in the Senator's home state asking for the Senator's view of NATO's evolving role.
  - A request from the Senator to provide a list of questions he could use in an upcoming committee hearing on NATO's new strategic concept.
  - A memorandum from another staffer asking for talking points on key NATO issues to place in a briefing book for the Senator.

- **Summit display.** Students are asked to design a display for the *60th* anniversary of the creation of NATO. Students use pictures and text to show the evolution of NATO's role and to highlight key events in NATO's history. The scenario requires the students to imagine NATO at 60 years of age and predict how it will evolve in the next ten years. As a separate task, students should justify (orally or in writing) why they chose the events featured in the display and the rationale for their prediction of the future of NATO.

- **Four person role-play.** This is a group assessment. Students write a script for a discussion among four people during an informal meeting just prior to the Washington Summit celebrating NATO's 50th anniversary. The four people might be a Russian diplomat, a political analyst from Ukraine, a member of the U.S. State Department, and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is against expanding NATO's role. Students act out the conversation for the class, ensuring they demonstrate understanding of the standards. Teachers could modify the rubric developed for the full assessment contained in this packet.

NATO ENLARGEMENT
A History Unit
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

The military conflict in the Balkans in the spring of 1999 demonstrated that students need to thoroughly understand the position of the United States within NATO, historically and in the present global context. The students must understand the past, including the formation of NATO, in order to comprehend and respond to the present. Therefore, in this assessment, students are given a real world scenario involving the expansion of post cold war NATO. The students must employ their knowledge of the formation and purpose of NATO to advise a United States Ambassador on the question of NATO's expansion in the 21st century.

Inquiry Question:

Based on present global issues and historical analysis: Should NATO be enlarged?

Grade Level: Upper level high school - 11th to 12th grade. This assessment can be used in a World History, American History, AP History or a Current Events class

Time allotment: 180 minutes for the assessment. Each Activity will take ninety minutes (including instructional background time. Additionally, there should be a minimum of 15 hours of background reading and teacher-generated instruction including the development of a Timeline from 1917 to present.

History standards being assessed: This assessment checks student proficiency in the following standards for history.

Historical Comprehension

Students should be able to reconstruct the literal meaning of a historical document; evidence historical perspectives; identify the central question(s) the historical document addresses; draw upon visual and literary sources such as cartoons etc. to clarify or elaborate information; utilize graphic organizers to clarify or illustrate information.

Historical Analysis and interpretation

Students should be able to consider multiple perspectives of various peoples; differentiate between historical facts and historical interpretations; compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values etc.

Historical Issues - Analysis and Decision-Making

Students should be able to identify issues and problems in the past; marshal evidence of antecedent circumstances and contemporary factors contributing to problems and alternative courses of action; formulate a position or course of action on an issue by identifying the nature of the problem, analyzing the underlying factors contributing to the problem and choosing a plausible solution form a choice of carefully evaluated options

Students will be prepared to take this assessment and meet the standards when they are able to do the following:

- Identify the primary purpose of NATO
- List the member countries belonging to NATO
- Create a timeline to graphically organize historical events, people and relationships from 1914 to present
- Demonstrate a thorough understanding of the historical reasons regarding the social, economic and political reasons for the foundation of NATO
- Summarize the ideology that influenced the creation of NATO
- Compare and contrast the historical social, economic, and political reasons for NATO with the present day social, economic, and political reasons for NATO

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Assessment Instructions for Teachers

The rubric should be given to the students at the beginning of the NATO unit. Make sure the students understand the rubric and what will be expected of them at the time of the assessment.

The three activities should be done in the classes preceding the Assessment - they may be mixed in with a variety of background reading and teacher instruction or they may be given during the class periods immediately preceding the Assessment.

On the day of the assessment pass out "The Task" explanation and the packet of background information (prepared by the research staff). Go over the instructions and make sure the students understand exactly what they are to do.

The first day of the assessment should be spent going through the research packet and organizing the information into an outline and or graphic organizer in preparation for writing the final recommendation.

On the second day of the assessment, the student should actually analyze the pros and cons of NATO enlargement and give their personal recommendation for enlarging/not enlarging NATO to the Ambassador.

Students may not use notes or books; the assessment relies solely on the Document Based research package and the students background knowledge.

Assessment Instructions for Students

You are a political officer assigned to Moscow. The American Ambassador to Russia has been asked to prepare a written report focusing on the historical context of NATO and it's relevancy within the present expansion dialogue. He will address the Senate Foreign Relations committee shortly after the 50th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Ambassador has asked you to prepare a background summary and recommendation paper for him. The embassy staff has put together a packet of primary source documents. This packet includes a selection of past and present news articles, editorials, congressional debate documents, the text of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland.

You may organize these documents graphically or in any other form that you deem appropriate. This organization is extremely important to the Ambassador. He must be able to reference these documents at a glance. It may be wise to write a short synopsis of each document in your graphic organizer.

Next, you should prepare a comprehensive report for the Ambassador. This report should outline the historical context of NATO and it's relevancy in the present expansion dialogue. The ambassador has asked that you attach to the summary your personal recommendation regarding the expansion of NATO. This recommendation should be based on your historical expertise of political and international relations within the last century.

You have a total of two hours and 45 minutes in which to complete this task. The Ambassador must catch a plane at 08:00 hours. Remember; incorporate the documents and your historical expertise to make a logical recommendation to the Ambassador. His reputation depends on your knowledge and ability - Do not fail him.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Rubric for Enlargement of NATO Assessment

Criteria weight	Pre – Basic (1 point)	Basic (2 points)	Proficient (3 points)	Advanced (4 points)
Historical Inquiry x 1	Demonstrates a vague or confused understanding of a complex body of material. There is little attempt to reconstruct the literal meaning of the documents. There is little or no attempt to make connections among a diverse source of historical data. Did not draw upon nor utilize graphic organizers to clarify the information.	Demonstrates a general understanding of a complex body of material. There is an attempt to find and reconstruct the literal meaning of the documents. There are limited connections drawn among a diverse source of historical data. Incorporates some of the significant information into an appropriate and somewhat organized forum	Demonstrates a complete understanding of a complex body of material. The student is able to reconstruct the literal meaning of the documents. There are logical connections among a diverse source of historical data. The student incorporates most of the significant information into an appropriate and organized forum.	Demonstrates a sophisticated synthesis of a complex body of material. Is able to fully reconstruct the literal meaning of the documents. There are logical and complex connections drawn among a diverse source of historical data. The student incorporates all of the significant information into an appropriate and highly organized forum.
Historical Analysis & Interpretation x 2	The response suggests confusion regarding historical issues and their implications. The final assessment is does not demonstrate the student's ability to consider the multiple perspectives of different peoples, ideas, and values. The summary is vague and does not differentiate between historical fact and historical interpretation.	The response demonstrates a limited level of understanding regarding historical issues and their implications. The final assessment demonstrates a limited ability to consider multiple perspectives of different peoples, ideas, and values. The summary is underdeveloped with limited support from the primary source documents. The response demonstrates the student's limited ability to differentiate between historical fact and historical interpretation.	The response demonstrates a solid level of understanding regarding historical issues and their implications. The final assessment demonstrates a general ability to consider multiple perspectives of different peoples, ideas, and values. The summary is developed incorporating support from the primary source documents. The response demonstrates the student's general ability to differentiate between historical fact and historical interpretation.	The response demonstrates a high level of understanding regarding historical issues and their implications. Demonstrates a sophisticated ability to consider multiple perspectives of different peoples, ideas, and values. The summary is developed incorporating appropriate and accurate support from the primary source documents. The response demonstrates the student's strong ability to differentiate between historical fact & interpretation.
Historical Issues – Analysis And Decision Making x 3	The student is unable to apply the historical implications of NATO to the questions of expansion. Answers the question of expansion without explaining the reasoning behind the decision. There is little or no evidence the student has analyzed the underlying factors contributing to the problem. The student has not evaluated options not implemented a plausible solution.	The response attempts to analyze the historical implications of NATO, but identifies few connections. The student answers the questions of expansion with limited details and weak support. There is limited evidence the student has analyzed the underlying factors of the problem. The response overlooks critical details. The student has made an attempt to evaluate options but the final solution is isolated and not realistic to the document scenario	The response analyzes the historical implications of NATO and answers the question of expansion by analyzing the underlying factors that contribute to the problems faced in the present global world. Gives considerations to more than one idea or viewpoint and chooses a plausible solution from carefully evaluated options. The response is supported with limited facts and examples. The final solution is relevant and is closely tied to the document scenario.	Response provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical implications of NATO, answers the questions of expansion by extensively analyzing the underlying factors that contribute to the world's current problems. Considers all of the document's relevant information and chooses a plausible solution from carefully evaluated options. Supports his/her argument– citing relevant facts. Has an efficient, thorough solution, directly tied to scenario

34 BEST COPY AVAILABLE 35

Activities

Unit activities to prepare for the assessment should focus on primary source documents. Three suggested activities are provided below:

Suggested Activity 1

Compare & Contrast/Venn Diagram:

The purpose of this lesson is to help the students understand how the ideology of the past and the present compare and contrast to each other. Many of the arguments being made today with regard to the enlargement of NATO incorporate the same basic ideology that was made during the formation of NATO in the 1940's. Additionally, many of the arguments have changed based on the global world as it appears today. We are indeed a different world today than we were at the close of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

In this activity, the students compare and contrast six (three past and three present) articles and/or editorials written in the late 1940's and in the 1990's. The students are asked to read each set of articles (There are three sets with one past and one present article in each set). The students are to fill out a chart on each set of articles (handouts #1A - 1C). The students then incorporate the information into a Venn Diagram showing only the major comparisons and contrasts between the ideologies of the past and the ideology of the present. The student's Venn Diagram is self-generated. The Venn Diagram will be used as reference for Activity #2.

Articles used in this Activity:

Set 1

Document #4 - *Is US Ready for the Consequences of Expanding NATO?* This document appeared in The Christian Science Monitor in October of 1997.

Document #12 - *The Atlantic Pact: Present Hope.* This document appeared in the Christian Science Monitor in March of 1949.

Both these editorials/articles ask many hard hitting questions that need to be considered regarding the development of NATO in the 1940's and the expansion of NATO in the 1990's.

Set #2

Document #2: Newsday; 1997 *"Save NATO: Stop the Expansion"*

This article was written by Michael Madelbaum. In this article Mr. Mandelbaum argues that NATO expansion is unnecessary. He argues that Poland, Hungry, and the Czech republic are not dependent on NATO in order to continue down the democratic road. The author contends that expansion would actually strengthen anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Document #17: Washington Post; 1949 *"Alternative to the Pact"* - In this article the authors lay out four specific reason explaining why they are against the creation of NATO.

Set #3

Document #10: New York Times; 1998 "*The Senate's Duty on NATO*" This is an editorial that proposes the argument that the Senate has dropped the ball - *so to say* - regarding the seriousness of NATO expansion. The editorial professes that the enlargement of NATO is in reality a military commitment with financial and political costs at stake.

Document #20: New York Times; 1949 "*Public Debate on Treaty Far Short of Expectation*" This editorial proposes that the general American public in 1949 did not understand the impact of the creation of NATO and therefore, had dropped the ball - *so to say* - regarding the seriousness of the Creation of NATO. The essence of the article professes that the creations of NATO are in reality a military commitment with financial and political costs at stake.

Document #40: The North Atlantic Treaty; 1949 This is the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Compare and Contrast - Present and Past

Similarities

Differences

Compare and Contrast - Present and Past

Similarities

Differences

Compare and Contrast - Present and Past

Similarities

Differences

Suggested Activity 2

Lessons from History : The purpose of this activity is to help the students apply knowledge of the past in order to help them analyze present day issues and events from multiple perspectives. The students will identify the central ideology, perspective and point of view of the author. The student will then analyze a "lesson from the past" and apply the present day ideology to the quote. This lesson will be done in small groups. Each group will consist of four - five members. Each member of the group will have read and highlighted the assigned primary source documents as homework. The historical "lessons" will be given to each group member and the entire group will have 30 minutes to discuss and apply the documents. After the allotted time, two members from each group will exchange results with two members from another group for approximately 20 minutes. The original groups will then reconvene and finalize their opinions and interpretations in writing referencing the primary source documents as support. This group interpretation will be turned in at the end of the block for a grade.

This activity utilizes:

Document 34 - Statement of Jeane Kirkpatrick - dated Oct. 9, 1997
This document states Kirkpatrick's arguments for enlarging NATO utilizing historical and present day ideology. Kirpatrick also answers specific questions. The document is clean and easy to read.

Document 33 - Excerpts from Statement of Madeleine K. Albright - dated Feb. 24,1998
This document discusses the enlargement of NATO within the historical changes of Europe after the Cold War. The document reflects the ideology that nations in central and eastern Europe have an incentive to influence their neighbors - peacefully and democratically - therefore, sparing the United States undue conflict intervention.

Document 1, 1993 - This article by Michael Mandelbaum reflects the attitude that the enlargement of NATO would bring about peace and stability in a once volatile world setting.

Document 2, 1997 - This article was written by Michael Madelbaum four years after he wrote document #1. In this article Mr. Mandelbaum argues that NATO expansion is unnecessary. He argues that Poland, Hungry, and the Czech republic is not dependent on NATO in order to continue down the democratic road. The author contends that expansion would actually strengthen anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Document 9, 1998 - This article written by Baker, Frye, Nunn and Scowcroft presents a case for not expanding NATO. The article points out that a "Russia that feels cornered in the West will look East and South for strategic partners...." The article looks at expansion within a strategic military view - both past and present.

Document 39 - This is a statement that was issued in January of 1998 by the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE). This is a document the stands against NATO expansion. The document explores the strategic, political, and financial implications of a NATO enlargement. This document analyzes the historical and present implications involving Russia.
Document 40: The North Atlantic Treaty; 1949 This is the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Ideas attributed to the Watson Institute for International Studies

In groups of four or five read the following "Lessons from History." Using your historical knowledge of World War One & Two, the Cold War, the Fall of Russia (along with any other historical information you deem relevant), the primary source documents you have read and highlighted, and your Venn Diagram from activity #1, discuss the relevance and accuracy of those lessons from history with regard to the present implications surrounding the expansion of NATO. Please take individual notes - as you will be changing groups and discussing your ideas.

1. Instability in Europe has drawn the United States into war twice in this Century. To prevent another global conflict, we must take the lead in establishing a sound world order based on our values of freedom.

2. Hitler taught us that appeasing aggressors does not achieve lasting peace. It only postpones the confrontation and makes it more costly. Therefore, aggression must be stopped when it happens.

3. While the Soviets have sought to take advantage of vulnerable nations along their border, they have ceased their actions when the risks became too great. The Iran crisis of early 1946 showed that the Soviets would back down when faced with determined opposition.

4. Just as the United States has been historically dominant in the Caribbean and has reacted strongly to other powers meddling in the area, so the Soviet Union has been historically dominant in eastern Europe and has interests in some areas of the Middle East. This is natural behavior for a powerful state.

5. The wartime collaboration showed that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together on common areas of interest, even though they have very different political and economic systems.

6. The aftermath of World War One showed that we couldn't remake the world according to American ideals. American ideals cannot be exported or imposed upon others.

7. From the Roman Empire to Nazi Germany, history shows us that militaristic governments tend to repress the liberties of their citizens.

8. The United States has prospered for 170 years because we have avoided foreign commitments and the high level of military expenditures that such commitments require.

Suggested Activity 3

Political Cartoon: The purpose of this activity is to allow the students to study and analyze political cartoons from the 1940's and from the 1990's regarding the origination and proposed enlargement of NATO. The students will work in pairs while analyzing the cartoons and the messages they portray. The students will then create their own political cartoons - one regarding origination and one regarding expansion. The students will create their cartoons individually - not as a team. The students will be graded on the content of their cartoons both on a historical and present understanding of the issues. The students will also be graded on their effective use of symbolism. The students will not be judged on their artistic ability.

This activity utilizes document 42 (political cartoons)

CARTOON TIMES

Part A: With a partner analyze the cartoons on the following pages and write a sentence or two summarizing the main idea of each cartoon.

Part B: Individually create your own cartoons. One cartoon needs to be created from the perspective of an American Citizen in the 1940's regarding the creation of NATO. The other cartoon needs to be created from your own perspective - as a citizen of the United States regarding the enlargement of NATO.

You will be graded on your content - you must show you have mastered both historical and present understanding of the issues. You will also be graded on your use of symbolism. Make sure some aspects of your cartoon are symbolically represented.

You will be graded for creativity, imagination, neatness, and presentation - but you will NOT be graded for your artistic ability.

Carpe Diem - and have fun!

Summary of Documents

Document 1, "Open Ranks to Eastern Europe" by Michael Mandelbaum -*Washington Post*, 1993: This article reflects the attitude that the enlargement of NATO would bring about peace and stability in a once volatile world setting.

Document 2, *Newsday*; 1997 "Save NATO: Stop the Expansion": This article was written by Michael Madelbaum. This article argues that NATO expansion is unnecessary. The author argues that Poland, Hungry, and the Czech republic are not dependent on NATO in order to continue down the democratic road. He contends that expansion would actually strengthen anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Document 4, "Is US Ready for the Consequences of Expanding NATO?" *The Christian Science Monitor* , October of 1997.:

Document 9, "Will Expansion Undercut the Military?", *Las Angeles Times*, 1998: This article written by Baker, Frye, Nunn and Scowcroft presents a case for not expanding NATO. The article points out that a "Russia that feels cornered in the West will look East and South for strategic partners...." The article looks at expansion within a strategic military view - both past and present.

Document 7, "Ducking the Hard Questions on NATO's Endgame," *New York Times*, March 4, 1998: The article takes a hard look at the questions that are not being asked in Congress and then proposes what the average college student might ask. The article answers the student questions are answered in a humorous - yet haunting way that opens the readers eyes to the some real and valid concerns regarding NATO expansion.

Document 8, "The case for NATO Expansion," *Chicago Tribune*, March 13, 1998: This article outlines the benefits of expansion to the United States. Peace is cited as a result of and expanded zone of stability, new allies and increased/expanded allied assistance. The article details the interests of the Russian public - which are centered around the economy and the quality of life for the Russian people.

Document 10, *New York Times*; 1998 "The Senate's Duty on NATO": This is an editorial that proposes the argument that the Senate has dropped the ball - *so to say* - regarding the seriousness of NATO expansion. The editorial professes that the enlargement of NATO is in reality a military commitment with financial and political costs at stake.

Document 12, "The Atlantic Pact: Present Hope." *Christian Science Monitor* March of 1949: Both these editorials/articles ask many hard hitting questions that need to be considered regarding the development of NATO in the 1940's and the expansion of NATO in the 1990's

Document 13, " Full Cycle" *New York Times*, March 22, 1949: This article is a historical review of America's climb out of isolationism into the very threatening world that appeared after World War II. The article is pro NATO creation as it reviews the lessons America learned from 1914 to

1949. The article does an excellent job of weaving the past to create a post war present that considered the world smaller and more vulnerable than ever before.

Document 17, *Washington Post;* 1949 "Alternative to the Pact": In this article the authors lay out four specific reason explaining why they are against the creation of NATO.

Document 18, "Pact in Perspective" *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1949: The Post argues that the creation of NATO would deter Soviet aggression, bolster Europe's economic recovery and therefore, the United States would benefit, and strengthen the militaries of all NATO members - also a benefit to the United States

Document 20, *New York Times*; 1949 "Public Debate on Treaty Far Short of Expectation": This editorial proposes that the general American public in 1949 did not understand the impact of the creation of NATO and therefore, had dropped the ball - *so to say* - regarding the seriousness of the Creation of NATO. The essence of the article professes that the creations of NATO is in reality a military commitment with financial and political costs at stake

Document 25, A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement, dated February 11, 1998 and signed by an entire list of military commanders: The document outlines a military point of view regarding the expansion of NATO. It reminds the students that the situation in Europe if very different than during the Cold War but that does not diminish the need for NATO. The document claims that the enlargement of NATO will "eliminate a source so instability that contributed to two World Wars ... and will ultimately facilitate a closer relationship between Russia and the United States."

Document 26, Letter from Patrick Moynihan and John Warner and attachment Letter from Ambassador Paul Nitze. The letter from Ambassador Nitze cautions that "If we want a Europe that is whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble." Nitze also addresses the concern that NATO expansion will distract both the United States and Russia from a common goal regarding the development of Russia
becoming a "democratic, market oriented society." The letter outlines arguments against the expansion of NATO in an easy to read and easy to understand manner.

Document 31, Letter from Jimmy Carter to Trent Lott, March 18, 1998: This letter is pro expansion and addresses the very real concern Mr. Carter had about potentially negative reactions within Russia. The letter addresses the concerns in short order and then gives his full endorsement for expansion.

Document 33, Excerpts from Statement of Madeleine K. Albright - dated Feb. 24,1998: This document discusses the enlargement of NATO within the historical changes of Europe after the Cold War. The document reflects the ideology that nations in central and eastern Europe have an incentive to influence their neighbors - peacefully and democratically - therefore, sparing the United States undue conflict intervention

Document 34, Statement of Jeane Kirkpatrick - dated Oct. 9, 1997:

This document states Kirkpatrick's arguments for enlarging NATO utilizing historical and present day ideology. Kirpatrick also answers specific questions. The document is clean and easy to read

Document 36. Testimony of Jack Matlock before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1997: This testimony focuses on the relations between the United States and Russia and the effect the enlargement of NATO may have regarding that relationship. Matlock believes that discussions regarding NATO enlargement will distract and undermine our ability to deal with threats to our security. Matlock does not thing that adding members to NATO will do anything to truly protect us and it may cause us real problems with a Russia that is in an economic downward spiral.

Document 39. NATO Expansion (CANE Document 39 - This is a statement that was issued in January of 1998 by the Coalition Against**).** This is a document the stands against NATO expansion. The document explores the strategic, political, and financial implications of a NATO enlargement. This document analyzes the historical and present implications involving Russia.

Document 40, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, April 4, 1949: The full text of the North Atlantic Treaty provides the students with the best summary regarding the formation of NATO and it's original purpose.

Document 41. *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland*, December 16, 1997: The full text of the addition of the Republic of Poland into NATO.

Document 42. Political cartoons

Appendix – Other Assessment Ideas

- **History Mystery.** This activity is challenging and fun. Teacher generates fifty to sixty individual clues regarding the history and formation of NATO. Each clue is then put into an envelope and given to a group of four students. The students must work together to put the clues into a chronological or social, economical, and political format. Once the students have organized their clues they must answer teacher-generated questions using only the clues. It is best to make this a contest and award the group with all the correct answers in the shortest amount of time extra credit points.

- **Reading Guide.** This activity is done on an individual basis and helps the student get through a large and complex body of material with better understanding. The students follow a teacher-generated guide that allows them to vary the different types of learning as they take a diverse and challenging pathway through the material. This allows the students to really concentrate on certain concepts and simple touch other information for background understanding.

- **Design a brochure or visual display.** Students are asked to produce a brochure, a visual display or a video advertisement for an upcoming NATO exhibit at a local museum. The project needs to address the historical concepts of NATO and bridge the connection to the present day questions regarding the enlargement of NATO. The students are asked to address the role of NATO not only as a defense alliance but also as a humanitarian/peacekeeping force within the global world. The scenario could be set in the future, the past or the present.

NATO - Document List

Articles/Editorials - NATO Enlargement

1. "Open the Ranks to Eastern Europe," Michael Mandelbaum, *Washington Post*, 9/6/93
2. "Save NATO: Stop the Expansion," Michael Mandelbaum, *Newsday*, 7/3/97
3. "The Cost of Not Expanding NATO," Mike DeWine, *Washington Post*, 8/19/97
4. "Is US Ready for the Consequences of Expanding NATO?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 10/8/98.
5. "NATO Weal," Adrian Karatnyky, *National Review*, 11/10/97,
6. "A Go for NATO," Robert Zoellick, *Washington Post*, XXXX
7. "Ducking the Hard Questions on NATO's Endgame," Thomas L. Friedman, *NYT*, 3/4/98
8. "The case for NATO expansion," editorial, *Chicago Tribune*, 3/13/98
9. "Will Expansion Undercut the Military?," Howard Baker Jr., Alton Frye, Sam Nunn, and Brent Scowcroft, *Los Angeles Times*, 3/26/98
10. "Senate's Duty on NATO," (con), *NYT*, 4/28/98

Articles/Editorials - Creation of NATO

11. "Atlantic Pact," *Washington Post*, 10/30/48
12. "The Atlantic Pact: Present Hope," *Christian Science Monitor*, 3/18/49
13. "Full Cycle," *NYT*, 3/22/49
14. "Reporters Differ on Atlantic Pact," George Eckel, *NYT*, 3/24/49
15. "After 173 Years, a Step Into Europe," *Newsweek*, 3/28/49 (not included)
16. "We Assume World Role But Cost Bothers Us," *NYT*, 4/3/49
17. "Alternative to the Pact," *Washington Post*, 4/17/49
18. "Pact in Perspective," *Washington Post*, 4/27/49
19. "Strategy of Candor is Used by Acheson with Senators," James Reston, *NYT*, 4/28/49
20. "Public Debate on Treaty Far Short of Expectation," *NYT*, 5/19/49
21. "The Pact Ratified," *NYT*, 7/22/49

Congressional Debate

22. Dear Colleague Letter from Senators Biden and Helms, pro
23. Dear Colleague letter from Senator Bingaman offering amendment
24. Dear Colleague letter from Senator Harkin offering amendment
25. Dear Colleague letter from Senators McCain and Lieberman, pro
26. Dear Colleague letter from Senators Moynihan and Warner, con
27. Dear Colleague letter from several Senators urging vote against any amendment imposing a freeze on process of NATO enlargement
28. Letter from multiple Senators to Senate Majority Leader requesting postponement of vote
29. Letter from President Clinton to Senator Kerry, pro
30. Letter from Secretary of State Albright to Senator Helms, pro
31. Letter from former President Jimmy Carter, pro
32. Letter from former President Gerald Ford to Senate Majority Leader Lott, pro
33. Excerpts from the testimony of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, 2/14/98, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
34. Testimony of Jeane Kirkpatrick, 10/9/97, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pro
35. Testimony of James Baker, III, 10/29/97, Senate Budget Committee, pro
36. Testimony of Jack F. Matlock, Jr., 10/30/97, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, con
37. Testimony of Michael Mandelbaum, 10/9/97, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, con
38. Statement of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms at Hearing on February 24, 1998

39. Founding declaration of the Coalition Against NATO Enlargement

Other

40. Text of North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4/4/49)
41. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland (signed 12/16/97)
42. Selection of ***cartoons*** regarding creation of NATO and NATO enlargement

The U.S. Foreign Service:

- The number of Diplomatic Posts and Consular Posts has grown from 4 and 3 respectively in 1781 to 74 and 179 respectively in 1950 and 162 and 75 respectively in 1997.
- There have been 64 Secretaries of State since Thomas Jefferson was appointed to the position on September 26, 1789.
- Benjamin Franklin was the first U.S. diplomat. He was appointed in 1776 as part of a commission charged with gaining French support for American independence. Later, he was appointed Minister to France in 1778 with double accreditation to Sweden in 1782-1783.
- The rank of Ambassador was first used by the United States in 1893; prior to this date the highest-ranking U.S. diplomats were Ministers.
- The last U.S. Legations (a legation is the office of a Minister) to be elevated to the status of Embassy were in Bulgaria and Hungary in 1966.
- Students wishing to learn more about the State Department and the U.S. Foreign Service are encouraged to visit the State Department's web site at www.state.gov

DOCUMENTS 1-10

Articles and Editorials about NATO Enlargement

Documents 1-10 are articles or editorials reflecting the debate over NATO enlargement. As you will see, prominent historians and current and former politicians came down on both sides of the issue. The arguments often centered around whether NATO enlargement is indeed in the national interest of the United States. Many of those who were opposed to NATO enlargement were concerned about what it would mean for the relationship between the United States and Russia. Several wrote about the cost of expansion. Those supporting enlargement argued that NATO expansion is the natural extension of the United States' Cold War policy.

The public debate over NATO enlargement, as represented in newspaper articles and editorials, took place primarily after the United States Government had announced its support for enlargement and before the Senate vote on ratification. During this period, the Senate held several hearings on enlargement. These hearings helped to generate the public debate that manifested itself in the newspapers. Nevertheless, the interest in NATO enlargement was far greater in Washington, D.C. than in other parts of the country. Local papers rarely covered the debate, especially outside of large cities.

Articles 1 and 2 are interesting because they are written by the same author – several years apart – with one supporting NATO enlargement and the other opposing it. Aside from the New York Times and The Washington Post, you will find articles from the Chicago Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times, the National Review, and Newsday.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DOCUMENTS 11 - 21

Articles and Editorials about the Creation of NATO

Although the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty took place largely in secret, there were still several articles written at the time about the creation of NATO. Most of these articles supported the concept of a North Atlantic Treaty, arguing that the United States needed to remain involved in Europe after the end of World War II and recognizing that Europe's security was intricately linked to that of the United States. Those opposing the creation of NATO were, among other things, concerned that it would lead to the further division of Europe and detract from the work of the United Nations.

Throughout all of these articles, there is no doubt about whether the United States should continue to play a key role in world events. As a matter of fact, many felt that it was the *responsibility* of the United States to sign the Atlantic pact. Others, such as the members of the Women's International League for Peace an Freedom (see Document 17), felt that the United States should use the mechanisms available through the United Nations to build peace and freedom throughout the world rather than enter into a military alliance. In 1949 as in 1998, many complained that there had not been enough public debate and that the potential costs of NATO (or the expansion thereof) were too large.

DOCUMENTS 22 - 39

Letters and Testimony representing the Congressional Debate

This collection of letters and other documents relating to the Congressional debate should give the readers an idea about how the debate over NATO enlargement was conducted. Although several committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate held hearings, the testimony collected here comes from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Budget Committee.

Only after the Committees had conducted their hearings, did the debate take place on the Senate floor. And then, only after the open floor debate, did the Senators vote on enlargement. Nevertheless, as you saw in some of the above articles and will see in some of the following documents, many criticized the fact that there was not "enough" debate over enlargement.

Much of what you will see in the following documents is an effort of one or more senators to influence the vote of another. Several Senators wrote to their colleagues in an effort to win support for their position for or against enlargement – documents 22-28 represent a sampling of these letters. Some, like that of Senators McCain and Lieberman, attached copies of declarations (in this case supporting NATO enlargement) signed by some of America's most distinguished military and foreign policy leaders. Others, such as those of Senators Bingaman and Harkin, enclosed copies of amendments they planned to propose.

In addition to senators trying to influence each other, you will also see that the President, Secretary of State, and even former presidents (documents 29-32) also tried to sway the vote one way or another. Then, in the course of the committee hearings, there were also official statements given in the form of testimony. Samples of these have also been included (documents 33-38). Document 39 is the Founding Declaration of the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE). This document outlines the reasons the organization opposes NATO enlargement, specifically, concerns over military commitments, alienating Russia, and unnecessary cost.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DOCUMENTS 40 - 42

NATO Treaty, Accession Protocol, and Cartoons

The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is contained in Document 40. The treaty, which has only 14 articles, is remarkably concise considering that it provided the fabric for European security in the post-World War II era. Understanding this treaty is key to understanding the significance of NATO and NATO enlargement. The preamble, for example, sets out the principles that NATO members agree to *unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security*. Article 10 provides for the addition of new members.

Document 41 is the Accession Protocol for the Republic of Poland. Similar Protocols were also signed for Hungary and the Czech Republic in order to officially start the process of this latest round of NATO enlargement. These Protocols are what must be ratified by all NATO member countries in order for these three countries to become members of NATO.

Finally, Document 42 is a collection of cartoons that appeared in the late 1940's and late 1990's related to the creation of NATO and NATO expansion respectively. These cartoons provide a good springboard for a classroom discussion regarding NATO and NATO expansion. It is interesting to note how similar some of the cartoons are from the different time periods.

Document 1
Washington Post, 9/6/93
© The Washington Post

Michael Mandelbaum

Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe

An event of symbolic significance took place in Warsaw last month when President Boris Yeltsin became the first Russian to visit Poland as the leader of a free and equal country rather than as an imperial master. The Polish government used the occasion to advocate a measure with practical consequences for the future, especially for the United States. Polish President Lech Walesa issued a joint statement with Yeltsin noting Poland's desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western security alliance that had opposed the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and stating Russia's "understanding" of this desire.

The idea is a good one. The inclusion of Poland—and of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the two other formerly Communist countries most firmly committed to democracy and free markets—would be good for them, good for the West and good for Russia too, provided that it is accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward the former Soviet Union.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic seek full participation in NATO along with membership in the European Community as a way of anchoring themselves firmly and irreversibly in the West. Their pro-Western governments wish to strengthen the forces within their countries committed to consolidating democracy and building market economies.

Poland, the largest and strategically most important of them, faces no immediate threat: It is on cordial terms with its historical adversary to the west, Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union means that, with the exception of the detached Baltic fragment of Kaliningrad, it no longer shares a border with Russia, its great imperial tormentor to the east. Membership in NATO is, for the Poles, a way to ensure that no threat will arise in the event that Russian political forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin and democracy and interested in recreating the Soviet empire should take power in Moscow.

Because Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic face no imminent threat, the West would not risk war by admitting these countries to NATO. Nor would their membership saddle the alliance with internal territorial and political disputes of the kind that set Greece and Turkey at odds with each other during the Cold War.

Including the three Eastern European countries in NATO would bring benefits not only to them but to the West as well. It would ensure stability on Germany's eastern border. It would extend the zone of stability and democracy in Europe eastward, thereby consolidating some of the gains of the Cold War. Perhaps most important, NATO membership for these three countries would begin the long, complicated and necessary process of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance against a threat that no longer exists into a broader security community capable of contributing to the establishment of democracy and the maintenance of peace from the English Channel to the Pacific coast of Russia.

Part of that process may well involve undertaking "out of area" missions, such as policing a negotiated settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Here Poland could be particularly useful. As a country with a proud military tradition and a strong sense of international responsibility, Poland would likely be more willing to furnish troops for such operations than many Western European members of the alliance.

NATO's European members are not unanimously enthusiastic about opening their ranks to Eastern Europe. Many in Western Europe want the alliance to remain exactly as it is, as an insurance policy against the revival of a threat from the east and as a mechanism for preventing the "renationalization" of defense policy, by which they mean independent German foreign and defense policies.

The only way to perpetuate NATO ... may be to change it.

The only way to perpetuate NATO, however, may be to change it. Unless the alliance adapts to the new circumstances of the post-Cold War world, public support for it, especially in North America, may wither. As Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the most influential Republican voice on foreign policy and a supporter of expanding alliance membership, recently put it, "The choice is not between the current NATO and a new NATO but rather between a new NATO and no NATO."

Were it to accept the three Eastern European countries, the alliance would have to establish a timetable for their accession to membership. The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.

An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.

There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

The writer is a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and director of the Project on East-West Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 2
Newsday, 7/3/97

Save NATO: Stop the Expansion

By Michael Mandelbaum

AS THE leaders of NATO's member countries prepare for a meeting in Madrid Tuesday and Wednesday at which they are expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join the alliance, the original arguments in favor of expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe are giving way to one that is the last refuge of an advocate with a weak case.

Tacitly conceding that NATO membership is not necessary to promote democracy or stability in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the proponents are beginning to assert that it is now too late to stop. To end expansion, they say, would damage NATO and America's credibility. In fact, the opposite is true. Stopping expansion would have only modest consequences; pushing forward could destroy NATO itself.

The assertion that stopping NATO expansion would be harmful is a relic of the Cold War. Then it was plausible to fear that a show of irresolution in one part of the world would have dangerous repercussions elsewhere. In international communism, the United States confronted a militant, heavily armed global adversary.

Thus, in 1950, President Harry Truman chose to fight in Korea, a place of no intrinsic importance to the United States but where a defeat could, he feared, have adverse effects in areas that were important. This was also a rationale for standing firm in West Berlin and fighting in Vietnam. But the circumstances that made America's Cold War preoccupation with global credibility plausible have disappeared. Militant communism in Europe is gone; the Soviet Union has disintegrated; the armed forces that made them both dangerous have collapsed.

If NATO expansion were to stop, the countries that expect membership would be disappointed, but they would be no less secure because they are not now threatened. They would be no less democratic or internally stable because democracy and stability in Central Europe do not depend on NATO membership. More important, the political forces within Russia favoring democracy and cooperation with the West would be strengthened.

If expansion proceeds, however, someone will have to pay for it. The prospective new members are unable to pay; they are already struggling to fill the so-

— *Continued on Page A58*

Michael Mandelbaum, a professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, directs the East-West Project of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Thomas Kerr

Save NATO: Stop Growth

— *Continued from Page A55*

cial welfare obligations they inherited from the Communist period. The Western European NATO members will be unwilling to pay: They are under pressure to reduce public spending in connection with the single Europe currency. So the United States will be stuck with the bill. Because the Clinton administration says that more countries will be added after the initial three, that bill could be huge, ultimately running into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The American public will rightly resent having to pay. The result will be a bitter transatlantic fight that will erode support for what is genuinely important: American participation in NATO. Thus NATO expansion risks adding Poland while subtracting the United States.

Moreover, expanding NATO would raise the problem of membership for the three Baltic countries — Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Starting expansion without a plan for them is like taking off on a transatlantic plane without landing gear. The Clinton administration has been evasive about this problem because there is no good solution to it.

Excluding the Balts would make a mockery of expansion. They are democracies, have market economies and are making good-faith efforts to deal with ethnic minorities. Moreover, unlike Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Balts share borders with Russia and so would be directly threatened by a resurgence of Russian imperial behavior toward the west.

But including the Balts would bring NATO to Russia's borders, and the Russians have made it clear that they would reject this. Thus it would not be possible to include the Balts without stationing American troops and nuclear weapons on their territories — while cutting American defense spending. And because the Western Europeans understand this, they would balk at Baltic membership, triggering a major, perhaps terminal, crisis within the alliance. NATO would thus run the risk of gaining Estonia while losing Germany, France and Britain.

Ironically, NATO expansion is not only dangerous; it is also unnecessary. Russia is far too weak to threaten its neighbors to the west, and Europe already has an exemplary security system in place. The arms-reduction agreements negotiated by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush have dramatically reduced the danger of the kind of aggression that caused the two world wars of this century. The administration's Partnership for Peace provides a forum for security cooperation in which every European country can participate. NATO is worth retaining as insurance against the return of a Russian threat.

The right thing to do with NATO, therefore, is to do nothing; and it is never too late to do the right thing.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 3
Washington Post, 8/19/97, p13.
© The Washington Post

Mike DeWine

The Cost of Not Expanding NATO

Sens. John Warner and Kay Bailey Hutchison ask: Is NATO expansion good for America? [op-ed, July 24]. My conclusion—based on the past success of the NATO alliance—and reinforced by a recent visit to Europe with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and several of my colleagues—is that NATO expansion is the right thing to do, right, now.

Certainly no one questions the goals of NATO expansion—the advancement of regional security, peace and prosperity for European nations once held captive by the Soviet Union. Today, near decade's end, we have witnessed some positive developments, but uncertainty and political instability remain, and they represent potent roadblocks to the goals of peace and prosperity.

Fifty years ago our victory over Hitler left Western Europe free from Nazi tyranny but uncertain in its future direction. This uncertainty, fueled by the rise of Soviet communism, made it difficult to rebuild the region's economy and infrastructure and firmly establish the foundations of democracy and free markets.

President Harry Truman's solution was the creation of NATO. Prior to NATO, Western Europe struggled through two world wars, economic depression and political chaos. Since NATO, Western Europe has enjoyed the longest period of sustained peace and economic development in centuries.

Now the time has come to apply the same formula to three countries in Europe that were held back by communism. This expansion would fill a dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. It would cement European security and integration by uniting East and West Europe, creating an environment of stability never seen before in Europe.

An expanded NATO would advance democratic and free-market reforms.

The three nations invited to join NATO had to demonstrate a commitment to reform their political and economic systems as well as improve relations with their neighbors. In response, Hungary and Romania signed a bilateral treaty last year that resolved territorial and ethnic disputes that had existed for generations. And Poland has created joint peacekeeping battalions with old rivals Ukraine and Lithuania.

Taking Exception

NATO's success clearly demonstrates the interactive relationship between security, democracy and prosperity. The still-developing free-market economies in Eastern and Central Europe—growing markets for U.S. exports—will attract greater foreign investment and promote greater consumer spending if there is confidence about regional stability.

Critics who label NATO an obsolete Cold War relic miss the point. Military conflict is fueled by economic and political instability. NATO was created to foster stability through collective security. NATO expansion furthers that goal, making sure that conflicts either never materialize or are quickly contained.

NATO critics also are quick to complain about the cost. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the costs to the United States of NATO expansion range from $5 billion to $19 billion over 15 years. Given the incredible costs our nation has paid when Europe was not operating under a collective security agreement, costs that include being drawn into two world wars, the price for extending peace and security into Central Europe is a small one to pay.

If this century has taught us anything it is that we cannot turn a blind eye to Europe. Sooner or later European instability becomes our problem. We paid a heavy price to fight and win two world wars in Europe. We also paid a price to prevent a third, but in so doing, we reaped enormous dividends that advanced peace, democracy and prosperity across half a continent. By expanding NATO, we can expand these dividends of productive and peaceful coexistence to a level unprecedented in modern history. And that, no one can doubt, is in the national interest of the United States.

The writer is a Republican senator from Ohio.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Is US Ready for the Consequences of Expanding NATO?

As key issues of keeping US troops in Bosnia and NATO expansion converge, Washington foreign policy conversations are taking on an unreal quality.

Officials involved in decisions on Bosnia insist that progress is being made in the implementation of the Dayton accords. Responses to specific questions, however, are often vague: "Obviously, there are difficulties." "Certainly, greater progress will require dealing with issues of war criminals and the resettlement of refugees." "US troops will not stay one minute longer than needed."

Proponents of NATO expansion avoid precise answers to two key questions: the cost to the US and the effect on Russia's cooperation in nuclear arms control. "These will not be problems," is the standard reply.

Further, although an expanded alliance will obviously place greater burdens on the US military, Pentagon planners and budgeteers, at least in public, are silent. And no one appears to see the irony of congressional unwillingness to face risks and commitments in Bosnia while considering far greater potential obligations in Eastern Europe.

Clearly, those pressing for objectives they believe to be in the national interest – a prolonged presence in Bosnia and NATO expansion – are stressing the positive. They fear that to do otherwise will only provide ammunition to opponents. Proponents of admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic alliance, in particular, are apprehensive about too many questions being raised on the eve of Senate consideration of the ratification of the extension.

But the questions need to be asked. In the case of NATO expansion, presidential commitments to prospective new members have gone too far for the US to turn back without seriously eroding European confidence in Washington. The Senate hearings and possible amendments, as part of the ratification process, however, provide the opportunity to examine these questions if members and executive branch witnesses are serious; mere emotional references to Munich and Yalta will not suffice. At present, estimates of the costs to the US, to European members, and to future members vary widely. Assumptions are made regarding European contributions at a time of belt-tightening on the continent. These estimates and assumptions need to be challenged and assessed in the hearings.

Other issues also need to be examined. The Russian Duma is delaying the ratification of START II, a significant step in nuclear disarmament. To what extent is Russian concern over NATO enlargement a factor in this delay? The derailing of years of effort to reduce the nuclear threat would be a high price to pay for alliance enlargement. On the military side, what kind of contingencies might involve the US in an extended NATO? Have military plans and budgets taken these into account?

DAVID D. NEWSOM

New members of NATO will fully expect that US troops will be part of their protection.

Finally, Senate hearings should find some way to bring home to risk-averse Americans the true implications of the enlargement commitment. The new members of the alliance will fully expect that, in the event of a threat to their territory, US troops will be part of the response. Bosnia has demonstrated that NATO actions are not feasible unless the US is prepared to share the risks with other members. Europeans will not agree to face fire on the ground while Americans supply logistics and air cover.

Foreigners take seriously commitments made by the US. Yet on countless occasions, whether to besieged Shiites in Iraq, southern Vietnamese, or Bosnian Muslims, US diplomats have had to explain why the US was not honoring what others saw as commitments.

Perhaps it is in American interests to stay in Bosnia until peace prevails or to expand NATO, but the full implications for the US in both cases need to be acknowledged. Such acknowledgment would reduce, although probably not eliminate, the possibility that, at some future Eastern European crisis, US envoys may need to explain to beleaguered and disappointed Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles that the US president and the Congress, while recognizing obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, do not see a sufficient US national interest to justify putting the lives of American men and women at risk. Let Europeans do the job.

■ *David D. Newsom, former undersecretary of state, is Cumming Memorial Professor of International Affairs at the University of Virginia.*

Document 4
Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1997, p19
Reprinted with permission of the author

Document 5
National Review, 11/10/97, p16.
© by National Review, Inc.

NATO Weal

Even before NATO officially spreads eastward, it is already producing positive effects.

ADRIAN KARATNYCKY

ON July 8 the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Madrid to announce that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had been invited to begin a process leading to membership in the alliance. Commenting on the decision to enlarge, NATO's Secretary General, Javier Solana, pronounced these "fantastic times," a period of "profound transformation" of the "whole security environment of Europe."

While we expect hyperbole from political leaders, there already is significant evidence that Mr. Solana is not exaggerating: the decision by the Atlantic Alliance to expand is a landmark development in European history. Indeed, the very expectation that NATO would move eastward has contributed to dramatic improvements in the security of Central and Eastern Europe.

For the past year, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity among the countries of East-Central Europe, driven by their desire to join the Alliance and other Western institutions. This diplomacy has resulted in treaties that have resolved longstanding border issues and ethnic disputes that were the source of instability and tension, and that could have led to armed conflict.

In the hope of strengthening their case for entry into the Atlantic Alliance, Hungary and Slovakia have signed and ratified a comprehensive treaty. The treaty establishes mechanisms for dealing with the half-million-strong Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and it allows for limited local self-government in southern Slovakia, the area where most of the ethnic Hungarian minority lives. Hungary also has settled its border issues with Rumania through a far-reaching Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1996 and ratified by both parliaments by May of 1997.

Meanwhile, under President Emil Constantinescu, Rumania has worked with Ukraine to resolve some potentially destabilizing border and minority issues. Despite opposition from the ex-Communists who ruled Rumania until this year, the two countries initialed a basic treaty May 3 confirming the inviolability of existing borders and renouncing the threat or use of force. The document also provides for measures to protect the culture and preserve the rights of Ukrainian minorities in Rumania and Rumanian minorities in Ukraine. While improved relations between the two states reflect propitious internal developments—including the growing influence of reform-oriented forces—they were also influenced by the process of NATO enlargement. As the Rumanian Foreign Ministry's Dumitru Ceausu noted, the settlement with Ukraine was achieved quickly "to demonstrate that Rumania has no problems with its neighbors"—a precondition for NATO membership.

Poland, meanwhile, has signed a document on Ukrainian–Polish reconciliation that addresses the mutual recriminations stemming from the 1930s and 1940s. In May, the legislatures of Poland by creating an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly designed to strengthen cultural relations and protect minority rights.

ACCOMPANYING these important treaties, which have resolved decades-old disputes, there also has been a spate of agreements designed to deepen trade and economic cooperation in the region.

As some of these examples indicate, in the course of serving their own interests vis-à-vis NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are playing a critical role in promoting security in the countries to their East that are not in the first wave of NATO enlargement. The three new prospective members of NATO understand that although the Alliance is the cornerstone of regional security, it cannot solve all the regional problems. Poland, in particular, has taken the lead in promoting regional cooperation through a process known as the meetings of "the Five Presidents." The Five Presidents are those of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; they will meet regularly to discuss economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and regional security. The Five Presidents represent a population of over 90 million, nearly four-fifths the population of European Russia.

IN A part of Europe that has seen bitter inter-ethnic enmities and border claims exploited by Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, the new cooperation represents a dramatic change for the better in the political climate. And while the deepening of democratic and free-market transformations is a major factor, there is no doubt that it was helped greatly by the understanding that NATO, anchored by the U.S., the predominant economic and military presence in the region, a force that can intercede when ethnic tension or border

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

disputes threaten peace.

Nor has this positive trend been limited to Central Europe. While Russia remains cool toward NATO expansion, its conduct toward its neighbors is improving. This suggests that as NATO enlargement moves forward, Moscow is awakening to the reality that Russia's diminished economic and military power means it will perforce play a more limited role in the region. And so Russia is participating in the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and has signed a basic document outlining cooperation and consultation with the Alliance. And in recent months, Russia has sought to improve relations with states it has threatened and bullied in the past.

Nearly six years have passed since the collapse of the USSR, but it was only on May 30, a month before NATO's Madrid summit, that Ukraine and Russia agreed to a treaty of friendship that confirmed their borders and resolved the potentially incendiary issue of the division of the Black Sea Fleet. The agreement signed by President Yeltsin and President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine is expected to be ratified this fall. President Kuchma, who has strongly supported NATO enlargement, declared that the treaty with Russia had been influenced by the climate of "favorable changes under way in Europe."

Similar progress has occurred in Russia's relations with other neighbors. In late May, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov sent a letter to his Latvian counterpart, Valdis Berkavs, expressing hope that a border agreement between the two countries could be signed in the fall. And on July 3, Russia signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Security with Azerbaijan that provides protections for the territorial integrity of both countries.

Nor are the Russians backsliding on the issue of nuclear proliferation within the former Soviet Union. On June 30, Russia's Foreign Ministry reported that the last Russian strategic forces had left Belarus, the final stage of removing all nuclear arsenals and infrastructure from that country. Similarly, NATO's enlargement has not led to the radicalization of moderate forces within the Russian establishment—*vide* the recent 2 to 1 vote in the Federation Council (Russia's upper legislative house) lifting embargoes against Iraq and Libya. Nor has NATO enlargement caused Russian leaders to abandon their plans to radically scale back the size of their armed forces.

Despite claims by U.S. opponents of NATO enlargement that it would undermine pro-Western reformers, in fact, advocates of free-market ideas and democratic change are gaining in strength within the upper reaches of the Russian government, as demonstrated by the growing power of the reformist First Deputy Prime Ministers Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais. Hardliners, meanwhile, are being driven out of office. In recent months, the hawkish and anti-reform Defense Minister Igor Rodionov has been dismissed and Russia's Justice Minister and its Minister of Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (both of whom had come into government service from the hardline Communist Party) were removed from their posts.

To see how the new balance of power in Europe has contributed to Russia's new realism, under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, NATO together with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic commands a total of 80,000 tanks, army field vehicles, and artillery pieces, compared to 24,000 for Russia. Adding the 10,000 heavy weapons of NATO aspirants Bulgaria and Rumania and the 13,000-strong arsenal of pro-NATO Ukraine makes the conventional balance even clearer. Furthermore, Russia's GDP is roughly 6 per cent that of the enlarged NATO.

But strong though the West is, it is crucial to bear in mind that there is no single European country that has sufficient conventional military power to deter an aggressive Russia. That role can only be played by a cohesive alliance backed by the conventional and nuclear deterrent of the United States.

The trends of recent months make it difficult to overstate the importance NATO enlargement already has had on the region's security climate. But can this momentum be sustained?

Clearly, setbacks cannot be ruled out. No one can guarantee that Russia's democracy will not falter or that some reckless demagogue may not seize power in some East European country now on the path toward democracy and the free market. But most signs point to a continuation of the progress already witnessed in the region. NATO's new members must continue taking the economic, political, and security steps needed to link Eastern Europe to the West. □

Mr. Karatnycky is President of Freedom House and co-editor of a new study, Nations in Transit 1997: Democracy, Civil Society and Economic Change in East Central Europe and the New Independent States *(Transaction Books, 1997).*

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 6
Washington Post, 1/4/94
© The Washington Post

Robert B. Zoellick

A Go for NATO

This week the Senate will decide whether to enlarge NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This choice is a strategic one for the future, exactly the type of determination the United States should be making at this point in history. With the end of the long era of the Cold War and amid today's peace and prosperity, the United States should be using its unparalleled strength to shape the structure of international relations for decades to come. NATO's enlargement is a wise investment that promotes both America's security interests and its democratic values.

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO had evolved into a unique alliance. The original defense commitment was always complemented by a political compact among countries that treasured their freedom. Over time, this partnership became a vehicle for promoting common transatlantic interests and ideas. Today NATO is both an alliance of democracies and a valuable integrated military organization. It is the primary channel through which the United States influences the politics and security of Europe. And NATO offers forward bases for U.S. forces that may need to deploy to other quarters, including the troubled Persian Gulf and Middle East.

A vote for NATO's enlargement will help the United States prepare for the future in three ways. First, the United States has a strong interest in consolidating the security of and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. With the unification of Germany, Europe's center of political gravity has shifted east. For centuries, these lands have been the fields of contest among large neighboring powers, especially Germany and Russia.

It is time to end this tragic history. The way to do so is by securing the young Polish, Hungarian and Czech democracies within the frameworks of NATO and the European Union. Together these compacts have enabled Western Europe to reconcile old animosities, protect the peace, build prosperity and promote higher aspirations. Central and Eastern Europe should no longer be the borderland within some power's sphere of influence; the region should be an equal and contributing part of a larger transatlantic community.

Second, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians will be good partners for the United States and NATO in dealing with the next generation of problems. They know the value of freedom, recognize that the price of security is vigilance and appreciate that America's power and friendship are vital for freedom and security.

Over time, Polish, Hungarian and Czech troops, resources and ideas will strengthen NATO's capabilities. I suspect they will also be among the most ready European partners to help the United States, and even NATO, to address new missions, whether to protect energy security in the gulf or to counter the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, one U.S. colonel, who will be part of the next generation of senior officers, said recently that before long he expected to count more on steady Polish brigades than ambivalent French friends.

Finally, by incorporating these three countries into NATO and building their confidence in a secure future, the United States will be strengthening the shoulder from which it can reach out to those farther east, including Russia. No one can say for certain what course Russia will follow, or even what will happen after Boris Yeltsin passes from the stage. Some of those competing to succeed Yeltsin—for example, Moscow's Mayor Luzhkov—have tried to bully Russia's western neighbors. So it is no wonder that the new democracies want the firm security NATO provides. It would be a grave mistake to concede to the demands of old Soviets now parading as new Russians. Russia's leaders can be counted upon to make their calculations based on assessments of Russia's interests, and of America's strength.

Yet it would also be a mistake to ignore the possibilities of cooperating with Russia and the potential of a truly democratic Russia. To succeed in building a new Russia, however, the Russians must decide whether they will embrace the logic of the 21st century or persist with the perspectives of the 19th century. In that earlier age, powerful countries preferred weak neighbors that they could dominate. Today, as the United States and the European Union have learned, troubled neighbors are a liability, not an advantage. They may contribute to economic and environmental problems, political instability, disruptive immigration, transnational crime and narcotrafficking, perhaps exacerbated by terrorist possibilities.

Russians know that Poland and a democratic NATO pose no threat, as some recent polls have shown. In fact, Russia will be better off if Central and Eastern Europe are stable, prosperous and confident enough in their own security to work with Russia. The real questions for a new generation in Russia are whether the country will abandon its imperial past, concentrate on building democracy and free markets domestically and accept the opportunity for cooperation offered by the United States and NATO.

The decision to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is based on a strategic logic. This vote is about America's plan for shaping the future of Europe within a transatlantic relationship. NATO's enlargement secures the heart of Europe while strengthening America's influence and promoting its values. It gives the United States and Europe a stronger foundation from which to assist the Baltic states, Ukraine and Russia. It gives NATO new members that will contribute to America's broader security interests and their own well-being. It is the right choice.

The writer was an undersecretary of state and White House deputy chief of staff in the Bush administration.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 7
New York Times, 3/4/98
Reprinted with permission of the New York Times

Ducking the Hard Questions on NATO's Endgame

By Thomas L. Friedman

WASHINGTON — Last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee put on a shameful performance. Senators Jesse Helms, Joe Biden & Co. rolled over like puppies having their bellies rubbed when Clinton officials explained their plans for NATO expansion by dodging all the hard questions.

It's too bad CNN couldn't entice the Clinton team to go out to Ohio State University again and hold a "town meeting" on NATO expansion. If they did, it would sound like this:

Student: "I've got a question for Secretary of Defense Cohen. When you were here before, you had a hard time defining what the endgame would be if we bombed Iraq. What's the endgame of NATO expansion? I mean, if we just admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all we will be doing is redividing Europe slightly to the east. And if we actually do what you advocate, expand NATO to the Baltic states, up to Russia's border, we will be redividing NATO, since the British, French and Germans are not ready to go that far because they know it would be treated by Russia as a strategic threat."

William Cohen: "Son, we've got our NATO endgame figured out just like we do on Iraq. It's called kick the can down the road and hope it all works out in the end."

Student: "National security adviser Berger, you now say NATO expansion will only cost $1.5 billion over 10 years, when just last year the Pentagon said it would be $27 billion over 13 years, and the Congressional Budget Office said it could be $125 billion over 15 years. How come NATO expansion gets cheaper every day it gets closer to a Senate vote? And how does it get cheaper when France says it won't pay a dime and the Czech Republic doesn't own a single advanced fighter jet, so it will need to buy a whole new air force?"

Sandy Berger: "Our NATO numbers were prepared by the same accountants who said the U.S. budget was balanced. I rest my case."

Student: "Secretary Albright, you say we have to bomb Iraq because Saddam has all these weapons of mass destruction. But the Russians have 7,500 long-range nuclear missiles, loose warheads falling off trucks and a bunch of Dr. Strangelove scientists looking for work. And we have a nuclear reduction treaty that the Russians have signed but not implemented because of resistance in Parliament to NATO expansion. How could you put a higher priority on bringing Hungary into NATO than on working with Russia on proliferation?"

Madeleine Albright: "Oh, please. You want to blame everything on NATO expansion, like it's El Niño."

Student: "I'm sorry, Madame Secretary, but that's not an answer. You keep dodging this question. You can say that the Russians can't stop NATO expansion. And you can say that it's worth risking a new Cold War to bring these three countries into NATO. But you can't deny that NATO expansion has contributed to Russia's refusal to ratify the START-2 treaty, which is an enormous loss to U.S. national security."

War veteran: "Secretary Cohen, I thought we fought the Cold War to change Russia, not to expand NATO. But now that we've changed Russia and should be consolidating that, you want to expand NATO?"

Mr. Cohen: "NATO expansion is not directed against Russia. It's meant to secure the new democracies in Eastern Europe."

Heckler: "If it's meant to secure democracy in new democracies, isn't the most important new democracy Russia? And why is your P.R. campaign for expansion being funded by U.S. arms sellers, who see NATO expansion as market expansion for their weapons?"

Student: "I just got the spring issue of The National Interest magazine. It contains a letter from George Kennan, the architect of America's Cold War containment of the Soviet Union and one of our nation's greatest statesmen. Kennan says NATO expansion is a historic blunder. What do you all know that he doesn't?"

Mr. Berger: "I have the greatest respect for Mr. Kennan, but our team has its own Russia expert, Strobe Talbott, who speaks Russian, has written books about Russia and some of his best friends are Russians. He couldn't possibly be anti-Russian, and he's for NATO expansion."

Student: "Excuse me, but didn't Talbott write the first memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher opposing NATO expansion because . . ."

Bernard Shaw: "Sorry to interrupt. We've got to close."

The New York Times

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 8 Chicago Tribune, 3/13/98
Reprinted with the permission of the Chicago Tribune

The case for NATO expansion

It is no small thing for a nation to enter into an alliance, agreeing to treat an attack on the ally as if it were an attack upon itself. But that's what the United States has done with its 15 allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Neither is it a small thing for a newspaper to change its mind on an issue as momentous as NATO expansion—the proposal to add to the alliance three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Yet, mindful of the historic opportunity this moment offers, that is what we do today.

We urge the Senate to approve the NATO enlargement treaty when it comes before it, possibly as early as next week. At the same time, and every bit as important, we urge the Clinton administration, the European Union and policymakers in all the NATO member states to redouble their efforts to foster ties with Russia and to aggressively assist its still-precarious venture in free-market democracy.

For it is Russia, woefully underdeveloped, perpetually insecure and still in possession of a huge nuclear arsenal, that is key to this historic opportunity.

An expanded NATO can be the foundation of an enduring structure of peace and stability in historically fractious Europe, but only if Russia's fears and anxieties are allayed and its nascent democracy nurtured to maturity.

■■■

Thanks to NATO, the good guys won the Cold War. The combined might of the Western allies contained the Soviet Union and Communism—and ultimately led to their collapse as a military force and a political system. Thanks to NATO, freedom and democracy carried the day in Europe, not totalitarian repression.

Also thanks to NATO, France and Germany have been harmonious neighbors for the last five decades instead of contentious rivals; Greece and Turkey have remained at peace rather than going to war. In other words, besides being a shield against aggression from outside, NATO has been a source of stability within.

Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO's ranks would expand that zone of stability eastward, giving these now-independent nations the security of full membership in the West's most successful multinational structure.

Poland, especially, is eager for membership and deserving of it. No doubt because of their history of being trampled alternately by Germany from the west and Russia from the east, the now independent Poles are obsessive about national security and NATO as the means to it. As one Western official in Warsaw said recently, "They've learned that if you neglect [security], the country gets taken away."

Except among their elites, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been far less eager about NATO membership. The real ardor in these nations seems to be for the European Union and the economic benefits that would flow from membership in it. With Russia in eclipse, the NATO security blanket seems less urgent but is part of the process of becoming certifiably Western.

From the American perspective, the ideal would be to admit Poland now and let others wait, along with all the other East European countries that would like, for different reasons and with different degrees of intensity, to join NATO. But that is not what is on offer now. The Senate is asked to ratify three new members, and that is what it ought to do.

■■■

There will be costs, of course. Costs to current members and costs to new ones. Costs that can be reckoned in financial terms and costs that can be reckoned only psychically or emotionally. What price, for example, can one put on security for Poland? Or insecurity for Russia? Or on European stability for the United States, which twice this century has had to go to war to help restore peace there when the Europeans could not?

Estimates of the financial costs have ranged from as little as $10 billion to as much as $125 billion over the next dozen years, with most analysts rejecting the higher of those numbers as unrealistic, given the current quiescent state of things in Europe.

The *incremental* financial costs—i.e., those over and above what NATO would spend anyway to remain in business as a vital, viable, 16-member alliance—are unlikely to be much more than $20 billion and will depend to a great extent on how many bells and whistles get added to the basic machinery of the alliance. Estimates of the U.S. share of that range from 10 percent to 50 percent—hardly a pittance but far from prohibitive when measured against current NATO-related spending of about $120 billion per year.

And what does America get for its investment? What we have gotten is peace, with an end to the Cold War and the nuclear balance of terror. We have gotten allies who are allies for more than just NATO purposes—recall the Persian Gulf. And we have gotten stability in a part of the world that historically claimed far more American time, energy, blood and treasure than its intrinsic importance would warrant.

Not to be flip about it, but NATO expansion offers the chance, for a few dollars more, to expand that zone of stability substantially.

■■■

But there is another consideration as well: Russia.

Our previous opposition to NATO enlargement centered on Russia—specifically, on the danger that it would feel threatened by the encroachment of the U.S.-led alliance toward its borders. That, it was feared, could produce two results, both of them bad.

One was that Russia would retaliate in the only ways available to a prostrate former superpower—by subverting the U.S. diplomatically wherever it could and refusing cooperation on such vital issues as arms reduction and nuclear weapons security. To be sure, the Russia Duma has so far not ratified the Start II arms control agreement, but that seems unrelated to any upset over NATO enlargement. And on other issues where the U.S. and Russia have clashed—Iraq being the most notable example—the disagreements appear to have been motivated by legitimate differences of national interest, not by smoldering grievance over NATO enlargement.

The other feared response was that Russia's democrats would be placed on the defensive by rabid nationalists of the Zhirinovsky stripe who would use appeals to bruised national pride as a bludgeon. That also appears not to have happened. NATO was not an issue in the 1996 presidential election. And while Russia's elites of all stripes profess their distaste for NATO enlargement, the Russian public gives no indication that it cares at all.

What the Russian public does care about is the price of food, clothing and shelter; about the difficulties of getting a living and keeping what they earn; of contending with an increasingly bold and out-of-control *mafiya*.

And that is where the U.S. and the rest of the West *must* help. Indeed, mounting a substantial, concerted program of assistance to Russia—financial, technical and otherwise—is an indispensable concomitant of NATO enlargement.

Only Wednesday, for example, The Wall Street Journal reported the Russians have asked the help of the U.S. and other foreign nations in building housing for discharged Russian army officers. Under Russian law, officers cannot be discharged unless given a residence.

This is the sort of thing for which Germany and Japan have come up with cash in the past. The U.S. cannot be in the position of waiting for George Soros to do our part. Our government must be proactive and creative—and ready to spend some money—in situations like that.

To their credit, the U.S. and NATO have made a number of wise and constructive overtures to Russia already. The agreement of cooperation signed last year between NATO and Russia was one such. The regular meetings between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin are another.

But those do not begin to exhaust the possibilities for building confidence and trust—and dispelling suspicion and resentment—between Russia and the West. It is up to the West, with the U.S. in the lead, to look for and exploit every such possibility.

In the last analysis, what the U.S. Senate is asked to approve is an invitation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to exercise the right of any free nation to choose its friends and allies.

What the U.S. and its current allies must do is, by judicious policies of assistance, make it possible for Russia to graciously accept that exercise of their rights by its three former satellites.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 9
Los Angeles Times, 3/26/98
Copyright, 1998, Los Angeles Times Syndicate. Reprinted by permission

PERSPECTIVE ON NATO

Will Expansion Undercut the Military?

By premature action on new members, the Senate could condemn a vital alliance to creeping impotence.

By HOWARD BAKER Jr., ALTON FRYE, SAM NUNN and BRENT SCOWCROFT

The debate on NATO expansion is generating many more questions than answers. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has identified a number of such questions bearing on the proposed admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, the committee calls for approving those admissions before the answers are available.

Among conditions the committee has prescribed for admitting these new members is a requirement for elaborate reports to be filed after they take their seats in NATO. Looking toward the formulation of NATO's new strategic concept, the committee mandates a study of the concept's implications for U.S. military forces not only in Europe, but worldwide. The committee demands analysis of threats to be faced by the United States and its allies to the year 2010. It cites the growing menace of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as the prospect of cruise and ballistic missiles in unfriendly hands. Furthermore, the resolution requires preparation of "alternative system architectures" for ballistic missile defense in Europe.

It makes sense for the Senate to offer guidance on NATO's future strategic concept. But no one, in or out of the Senate, can responsibly judge how expanding NATO relates to a concept that has not yet been defined or submitted for evaluation.

Continued on Column one, Document 10, p2

ring" around their country. To tell a country scarred by repeated invasions from the West that NATO expansion is good for it only spurs nationalist sentiment. It weakens the reformers with whom we must forge cooperation.

Other issues cry out for scrutiny. A Russia that feels cornered in the West will look East and South for strategic partners. Early signs of a marriage of convenience between China and Russia point toward mounting resistance to U.S. policy in other regions. Russia also holds cards in the global energy game. We cannot assume that, if tensions mount, it will swallow its pride and refrain from pressure on its neighbors' energy supplies or from complicating access to oil and gas resources in Asia. Russia will gauge its strategic options in light of how we exercise ours.

Far from suggesting a Russian veto over NATO decisions, these considerations underscore the absolute necessity of clearly calculating our own interests and priorities. It will be no service to American or European security if the course we set undermines democratic trends and political stability in Russia. Still less will it serve our interests if the process induces more dangerous military postures and interrupts arms restraints in Russia.

The pending Senate resolution has other problematic features. In an extravagant reading of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty—which provides merely that allies will consult when any of them is threatened—the resolution authorizes NATO to "engage in other missions," without defining those missions or setting criteria for them. A strong NATO is surely necessary for flexible coalitions of the willing to meet crises like Saddam Hussein's aggression in the Persian Gulf. Even those convinced of that proposition, however, question how far the Senate should go in preauthorizing such efforts.

There is a great and essential tradition by which senators seize the occasion of historic international agreements to shape high policy. In 1972, Sen. Henry Jackson persuaded his colleagues to require that agreements on strategic forces include equal limits for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Jackson provision proved crucial in

'Russians perceive NATO expansion as replacing the iron curtain with an "iron ring" around their country.'

bargaining with the Soviets. Similarly,

Continued on column two, Document 10, p2

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Continued from column one
Document 10, p1

What is possible—and urgent—is to anticipate the strategic consequences that would flow from expansion. The administration advertises that process as open-ended and continuing. It has encouraged the expectations of many countries—the Baltic states, Bulgaria and others—that they, too, will become members of NATO. Yet it has not begun to confront the military requirements that would impose.

Military professionals accept that defending the Baltics, for example, would almost certainly entail the use of nuclear weapons in the event of attack by a resurgent Russia. Including Poland would already bring NATO to the edge of Russian territory at Kaliningrad. There and elsewhere, the combination of its deteriorating conventional forces and fear of unbounded NATO expansion is moving Moscow toward increased reliance on nuclear weapons—a doctrine that might at best be called "inflexible response," at worst a "hair trigger." If deterrence fails and armed conflict erupts, avoiding escalation could be difficult.

Most worrisome is the contradiction between open-ended NATO expansion and our gravest security priority, mastering the threat of weapons of mass destruction. That task begins with controlling the vast strategic arsenal still present in Russia. That mission and the collateral effort to stem proliferation of scientists, technology and hardware depend on active cooperation with the Russians.

In Sen. John Warner's phrase, Russians perceive NATO expansion as replacing the iron curtain with an "iron

Continued on column two
Document 10, p1

Continued from column two
Document 10, p1

Sen. John Glenn took the lead in demanding thorough examination of the SALT II treaty's verification provisions. The Senate's attention to surveillance needs paid major dividends in later agreements on nuclear and conventional forces.

Those precedents commend themselves as senators weigh NATO expansion. Now is the moment to modulate this process, and a key to doing so lies in another policy endorsed by the Foreign Relations Committee. The committee states that U.S. policy is to encourage expansion of the European Union as essential to creating an undivided Europe. That is the premise of the proposal by Warner and Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan to synchronize the three candidates' entry into NATO with their accession to the European Union. This would steer policy toward a sensible emphasis on economic and trade development in Europe, rather than premature, costly security undertakings. It would also lower expectations of a rush toward further NATO expansion.

With so many questions hovering over NATO expansion, the imperative for senators is evident: Get answers before you give consent. Otherwise, the Senate may condemn a vital alliance to the creeping impotence of excessive commitments and clogged decision-making.

Howard Baker Jr. and Sam Nunn are former U.S. senators. Alton Frye is senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. Brent Scowcroft was national security advisor to Presidents Ford and Bush.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 10
New York Times Editorial, 4/28/98
Reprinted with permission of the New York Times

The Senate's Duty on NATO

The Senate has betrayed its obligations with its pitiful performance on NATO expansion. Instead of illuminating the complex issues involved in extending the alliance eastward, and weighing the potentially grave consequences, the Senate has treated the matter as a legislative afterthought, flippantly fitting a few hours of debate between other bills. With discussion soon to resume on whether to approve membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Senate can redeem itself by taking an exacting look at the most important foreign policy decision America has faced since the end of the cold war.

That is the Senate's constitutional duty, and it must not be forsaken just because Trent Lott, the majority leader, does not seem to appreciate the difference between amending an international treaty and debating a highway bill. The reason the Constitution requires a two-thirds Senate majority to approve or revise a treaty is that vital American security interests are usually involved. In this case, the Senate must decide whether to commit American military forces, including nuclear weapons, to the defense of Warsaw, Budapest and Prague.

That alone should give the Senate pause. For all the White House's smooth talk about expanding democracy and prosperity in Europe, the enlargement of NATO comes down to a military commitment. The movement of armies and weapons around Europe has financial and political costs, none of which can be predicted with any certainty today. The Senate has no idea whether NATO expansion will cost $1.5 billion, as the Pentagon predicts, or $125 billion, the price once cited by the Congressional Budget Office. Nor does it know how much of that burden Washington will have to bear.

The White House has provided no military rationale for expanding NATO eastward while Europe is at peace and democracy and free markets are taking root in Russia. Instead, the ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate.

Astonishingly, the Senate is being asked to approve all this without even the most basic analysis of potential threats in Europe or a description of how expansion is likely to affect American military forces. That information should have been the subject of intensive review by the Senate Armed Services Committee, but was not. It is to be provided by President Clinton no later than 180 days *after* the Senate votes. That is no way to run a government.

Mr. Lott may be content to tell his constituents that he approved NATO expansion after a few hours of perfunctory debate without knowing the cost or the military and political implications, but other senators ought to take their obligations and the nation's security more seriously. The matter should be referred back to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees for the careful analysis it should have received in the first place.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 11
Washington Post, 10/30/48
© The Washington Post

Atlantic Pact

The trouble with the problem of winning the peace is that the problem has been consistently underrated. It took our policy-makers till February of 1947, when Britain informed the United States that it had to pull out of Greece, to realize that the entire fabric of Europe had been shot to pieces: spiritually, economically and politically. To be sure, the problem has been complicated by the unsleeping effort of the Russian Bear to gobble up the shattered fragments of the Old Continent. But there was a mental lag in appreciation of the dimensions of the reconstruction problem, anyway. To the task of winning the peace, since we realized what was entailed, this country has mobilized, first the Truman Doctrine, then the Marshall Plan, and, finally, the pledge of the military counterpart of the Marshall Plan called the Atlantic Defense Pact. Undersecretary Lovett says the spadework on a putative pact has been completed, and there seems little doubt that no such announcement would have been made if the plan, whatever it is, had been hatched without Republican cooperation. The question in our minds is whether the plan is equal to the problem out of which it arose.

This problem is not simply the need growing out of the Russian menace for shoring up the nations of western Europe with arms, but is primarily the assumption of American leadership in tying western Europe to this continent. National armaments would be the equivalent of a modern Maginot Line. Some of the more far-sighted statesmen in Europe say that the United States would be inviting another Operation Rathole, similar to the one in China, by providing individual countries with arms. They plead for a real general staff and a continental army under it. At present, however, there is no general staff in sight, only a military committee sitting in London—a system, or rather the lack of it, which even an amateur strategist will tell you is worse than useless. These realists go further. They say that even if it were possible to set up a European general staff, such a body would not be able either to unify or to direct, since the nations are still traditional and particularistic, and unable militarily to cohere. This is shown in the reaction on the continent of Europe to the appointment of General Montgomery as a paper sort of continental commander in chief. Montgomery is a hero in England—though even there we suspect he has been kicked upstairs—but nowhere else; and, indeed, is actively disliked by every nation in the wartime coalition. This is a fact, not an indictment. Western defense, if it is to jell, has to be based upon realities, and the reality is that no continental commander has enough prestige, either through his personality or through his own country, to integrate Western defense.

It would be an invitation to war in the present urgency to act on the belief that all that Europe needs is the military shot in the arm coming from a supply of arms on lend-lease. France is prostrate, talking of such things as a European parliamentary system as a way out of its own impotence, and Britain is overburdened. This is the stark reality confronting the negotiators of an Atlantic Defense Pact. In Europe the leaders realize that weakness leaning on weakness does not add up to strength, but to weakness. As for the United States, as General Eisenhower says, though not in this connection, you cannot cooperate with weakness. But you can galvanize it, share your strength with it, act as the *deus ex machina*, and that is the role that has been thrust upon this Nation, whether we like it or not. The time has gone for half-measures, and, if the nettle is not grasped, a disillusion will be risked, and our very security, let alone Europe's, endangered.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 12
The Christian Science Monitor, 3/18/49
Reprinted with the permission of the Christian Science Monitor

Editorials

The Atlantic Pact: Present Hope

The long-awaited moment has come. The terms of the Atlantic Pact are now public knowledge. The text discloses no major surprises. Rather it confirms the view that the American people have been kept quite well informed, through press, radio and public platform, as to the general shape of things to come.

The touchiest points in the pact have indeed been debated to considerable extent already, even in the Senate. What sort of military commitment the United States can make to the other members of the Atlantic defense system has already been thought through.

We may nevertheless hear more about this when the Senate begins formal consideration of the pact. We hope we shan't be forced to hear too much. It is the Congress' prerogative to declare war. It is the President's to take military action in defense of American security.

A too-exclusive interpretation of the war powers of either the executive or legislative branch of the government involves a trespass on the powers of the other. What is needed now is not an effort to make a clearer demarcation between these powers, but a fusing of them to give full force to the Atlantic Pact. For that pact must be a clear warning to any potential aggressor that the United States is completely committed to the defense of freedom and peace.

Another vital point which has been subjected to informal debate already, and has to our way of thinking been pretty well disposed of, concerns the impact of military planning on Marshall planning. The United States' policy on this question has been clearly stated. It is, moreover, exactly in line with the desires of other key countries in the proposed defense system. This is that the economic defenses of the West are still to have top priority.

Related to this decision is a question raised only recently by Senators George and Hickenlooper. That is, what will be the cost of the arms necessary to equip European members of the pact? The cost, these senators may be assured, will be considerable.

There may be still a few isolationists in senators' clothing who hope that the cost can be proved prohibitive. The Kremlin hopes so, too. These hopes will not materialize. The negotiators of the pact have not been starry-eyed. They know that most of its sinews must come out of American war surpluses. They know it will not prepare Europe for war tomorrow. But that is not what they want. They want Europe to be better prepared to help maintain peace today.

Even such rehabilitation of European military establishments as will be immediately possible, however, will have important effects on the internal stability of European countries. And the knowledge that any future aggressor will find Europe standing on a one-for-all-all-for-one basis instead of falling on a one-by-one schedule will strengthen all European countries both internally and externally.

Despite Moscow's machinations, both through diplomatic methods and fifth-column infiltrations into the political life of most countries involved in the pact making, the job has been completed with impressive dispatch. In debating the draft treaty the Senate should keep in mind one fact above all others: The attitude the Senate shows can in a considerable measure impair, or can greatly strengthen, this best present hope for peace.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 13
New York Times, 3/22/49
Reprinted with the permission of the New York Times

FULL CYCLE

The United States is about to agree to a treaty under which an attack on any member of the North Atlantic community of nations will be considered as an attack on us. Thus we come to a turning point in the long road back from the isolationism into which we fell when the Senate rejected the League of Nations thirty years ago. The North Atlantic Pact contains promises not even dreamed of by Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson indeed in his war speech of April 2, 1917, looked forward to "a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." But Mr. Wilson in time of peace would not have dared ask the Senate to commit itself, as Mr. Truman and his advisers are now doing, to go to war if any one of eleven or more nations is attacked. We should not quibble on this point. The defense pact means that or it means nothing.

This country's conversion from isolationism has been slow. One can understand why. Destiny seemed to have given us a privileged position between two vast oceans. Many millions of immigrants came here because they thought they might thus escape from the constant turmoil of Europe. Democracy, it was thought, might flower here as nowhere else on earth, exempt from foreign threats.

Even after the First World War this illusion persisted. It was never broken down by argument. Only fourteen years ago thirty-six Senators voted against our adherence to the World Court—as harmless an institution as high-minded men have ever erected. Only twelve years ago President Roosevelt had to abandon the stand he took in his famous "quarantine" speech in Chicago. The American people did not even then admit that when anarchy stalks the earth "there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality." In that same year the Permanent Neutrality Act required us to lend no money, ship no goods, arm no ships, give no private contributions to any nation engaged in war or any faction in any civil war. Under that act we treated the legal and democratic Government of Spain on even terms with the Nazis and Fascists who helped to overthrow it. There were only six adverse votes in the Senate, only twelve in the House of Representatives.

When war broke out in 1939 between Hitler and the Western European Powers, we had our second lesson in the folly of isolationism. We learned a little at a time: in 1939 we repealed the arms embargo. In 1940 we put Selective Service into effect and President Roosevelt traded fifty old destroyers for bases in the North Atlantic. In 1941 the Lend-Lease Act was passed and the noble but as yet unrealized principles of the Atlantic Charter enunciated. But not until we were forced into it did we go to war.

The lesson we thus received was taught us by three dictatorships. That was their unintended service to world civilization. They made us see that the remote farmhouses on the Nebraska plains was not safe if we turned our back on the world. They made us see that liberty here was not safe if liberties elsewhere were destroyed. They taught us by the most advanced methods of education—in a rain of hell on Pearl Harbor, in torture and death in the Philippines, in the light of burning ships clearly visible from our Atlantic shores, in the heavy toll of wounds and death that our sons had to pay. Even as we fought this war through to victory we hated it. We hated not only what we had to suffer but what we had to do. We struggled through to peace as a nation emotionally, as well as intellectually, committed to making peace just and lasting. When the Charter of the United Nations came before Congress four years ago only two votes in the Senate, only fifteen votes in the House, were cast against it.

The three dictatorships that declared war on us in 1941 have vanished. Another dictatorship overshadows a considerable part of the earth. We cannot in self-respect appease it by surrendering our principles. How we shall try to keep peace by strength—by strength which we never intend to use except in the common defense of the free nations' territory and liberties; strength that is otherwise no menace to Russia or any other country. It is thus in no warlike mood that this nation takes up the North Atlantic Pact. This is our pacifism, using the most effective means we know to avoid bloodshed and the destruction of civilization. We have not changed in our ultimate desires. We have come full cycle only in the methods we now believe necessary to realize those desires. We stand, as President Wilson did thirty-two years ago, for "a concert of free peoples."

Across the Atlantic and Pacific and all oceans and continents, as these words are written and read, there is an increasing flow of air traffic. The oceans and the vast spaces of the world, measured in terms of time, have nearly vanished. We and our associates are now neighbors defending our neighborhood against intruders. This is the real meaning of the North Atlantic Pact.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 14 New York Times, 3/24/49
Reprinted with permission of the New York Times

REPORTERS DIFFER ON ATLANTIC PACT

Two Favor It, One Is Opposed in Chicago Forum—Dulles Stresses Peace Aims

By GEORGE ECKEL
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

CHICAGO, March 23—The North Atlantic pact was opposed and defended here tonight at a forum of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in which three newspaper men took part.

The instrument was advocated by Edgar Ansel Mowrer, veteran foreign correspondent and Washington columnist, and James Reston, diplomatic correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Opposition was expressed by Kenesaw Mountain Landis II, columnist of The Chicago Sun-Times.

The question on which they spoke was: "Does the Pact Mean War or Peace?"

Mr. Reston led off with a description of the pact, and called for a full debate on it at the time it came up for Senate ratification. A course of deferring debate on its real meaning to this country until an occasion arose to implement the pact would be "disastrous," he argued.

"I don't think any President in the future is likely to wait for Congress to declare war after the Congress has passed and the world has accepted our signature on Article 5 (the implementing article)," Mr. Reston said.

This likelihood is attributable in part to the President's responsibility in the country's security and in external relations, and partly to the rapid action necessary in modern war, he added.

He said that he believed the pact was "a pretty good gamble," since pacts made nothing certain in human affairs, and that "Stalin may not have the assurance that Hitler had, and may not march as Hitler did."

Question Posed For Kremlin

Citing the pre-1939 Neutrality Act as an apparent assurance to Hitler that the United States would not interfere on behalf of either aggressor or victim, Mr. Reston concluded:

"The North Atlantic pact tries to make the Politburo ask, 'If we do this, is this likely to invoke the North Atlantic pact and bring the combined forces of the Atlantic community against us?'"

Mr. Landis called the pact a "galloping extension of the Truman Doctrine," that the Soviet Union could regard only as a threat to its security, with pact bases as close as Spitsbergen, off Norway, being considered.

He made it clear that he had no sympathy with the Soviet Government, but said the pact, though proclaimed as being developed within the charter provisions of the United Nations and embracing heritage, was open to inclusion of Italy, not in the United Nations, and presumably not closed to "Fascist Portugal," which had been invited to join.

He advocated an "open end" security pact in the United Nations General Assembly, that Russia might be free to join, but which no aggressor would dare defy.

Mr. Mowrer said the pact did not deepen the East-West division, but only made it more visible.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 15

Newsweek
The Magazine of News Significance

March 28, 1949

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE REPUBLIC:

After 173 Years, a Step Into Europe

The United States last week put a tentative, exploring foot into a realm of world leadership which, in the word of its Founding Fathers and by tradition, it had forgone throughout the 173 years of its existence.

In Washington, the State Department made public the final draft of the Atlantic Pact, a document designed deliberately and skillfully to void the policy laid down by George Washington in his Farewell Address, Sept. 17, 1796, against entangling alliances with European nations.

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

"Why forgo the advantages of so peculiar a situation? . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?"

But the year was no longer 1796. It was 1949 and no longer was the United States "detached and distant" from Europe. The miles that separated one from the other were not the miles of the schooner and the horse but the miles of supersonic planes and atomic engines of war.

The return to history was an abrupt one. Of the 15 states Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee had joined the original thirteen, but a great giant sprawled across a continent with fleets of planes and ships covering the earth with a vast share of the world's riches in its possession, and with a world leadership role more thrust upon it than sought.

Policies, like the times, had to change.

What It Means

What D'Artagnan pledged in seven words—"one for all and all for one"—the North Atlantic democracies of America and Europe last week said in 1,040. After eight months of tête-à-tête talks,

Acheson and Bonnet: Entangling alliances with some

between the State Department and top foreign diplomats including Ambassadors Henri Bonnet of France and Sir Oliver Franks of Britain, they made public on Friday, March 18, the official text of the twelve-nation North Atlantic Treaty. The foreign ministers signed it in Washington on April 4. Its core was Article 5:

"An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. If such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Condensed to a cliché, these words meant that America's frontier now lay on the Spree in Berlin and on the Danube in Vienna.

The Answers: But no easy cliché could answer all the questions that were raised. It took the full text of the Atlantic Pact, plus the surgical precision of Secretary of State Dean Acheson at his press conference, plus Acheson's nationwide broadcast whose every word had been approved in advance by President Truman, to offer the preliminary answers.

What nations are covered? The eight negotiators—the United States, Canada, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway—and four other nations requesting invitations to join: Italy, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal. Their total population: 330,000,000. Conspicuously omitted: Franco Spain.

What area is guaranteed? The member nation's territory in Europe and North America (including Alaska), their occupation forces in Europe, their islands in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer* (including Greenland and the Azores), French Algeria in Africa, and their vessels and aircraft anywhere in this area. Example: If an airplane engaged in the Berlin airlift were shot down, this could be deemed an armed attack.

Would America be committed to war? Since only Congress constitutionally can declare war, that word is not mentioned. Yet, more bluntly still, Acheson pointed out that it would not necessarily mean war. "If you have some little fleury on the border somewhere, you don't take a sledge hammer to kill a fly. . . . You take what exact action is necessary. . . . A new Japanese attack on the gunboat Panay would not precipitate war, but a new Pearl Harbor would. An all-out armed attack such as was directed against France in 1914 and again in 1940 would have only one real answer."

How about congressional action? My own

*Which covers only Alaska and not Alaska and Hawaii.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

view," said Acheson, "is that a purely internal revolutionary activity would not be considered an armed attack. However, an internal revolutionary activity armed, directed, or assisted from the outside might very well be an armed attack." Example: Greece.

What other commitments are made? The member nations promise to settle any disputes peacefully, to encourage economic collaboration, to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," to "consult together whenever . . . the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any is threatened," and to establish a council and defense committee to implement the alliance. While Acheson said the pact would not "bind the United States to any arms program," he added: "We expect to ask Congress to supply our European partners some of the weapons and equipment they need to be able to resist aggression."

Would the United Nations be bypassed? On the contrary, Acheson said, the Atlantic pact "is aimed at coordinating the exercise of the right of self-defense specifically recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is designed to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations." Its text invokes the UN Charter or machinery in six different places.

Does the pact mean war on Russia? Only "malicious misrepresentation" or "fantastic misunderstanding," Acheson said, could see aggressive designs in it. "This country is not planning to make war against anyone. It is not seeking war. It abhors war. It does not hold war to be inevitable. Its policies are devised with the specific aim of bridging by peaceful means the tremendous differences which beset international society at this time."

The Rio Model: However tough the North Atlantic treaty was, it was hardly unprecedented even for the once isolationist United States. It was modeled after the Rio de Janeiro treaty of 1947 which contained similar pledges covering the Western Hemisphere. As such, it seemed headed for easy ratification.

Chairman Tom Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee predicted it would win the Senate's "overwhelming support," and Republican Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan called it "a powerful insurance policy against World War III." Most other senators who were willing to commit themselves agreed, although economy-minded Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, among others, hedged by saying: "I'm for the pact providing it contains no commitment to arm participating nations." Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, for one, felt it didn't go far enough. He called for, eventually, "a federation of democracies" such as ex-Justice Owen J. Roberts's Atlantic Union Committee was plugging.

SERVICES:

Air Marshal Vinson

He was known as "the Admiral," "Mr. Navy," and "the father of the modern Navy." He used to sit in his office surrounded by pictures of admirals, with a cigar butt clamped between his teeth or a wad of tobacco in his mouth, and boast: "I built the United States Navy right here in this room."

It was true. As chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee for fifteen years, Carl Vinson of landlocked Milledgeville, Ga., was more responsible than anyone

Acme

Vinson: "The Admiral" jumped ship

else for making the United States Navy the largest and most powerful in the world.

But he was never a stooge for the admirals. As far as Vinson was concerned, the Constitution gave Congress the power to run the Navy, not the Navy power to run Congress. He didn't simply introduce bills for what the Navy Department asked. He figured out for himself what the Navy needed and then made the Navy want it. He badgered the Navy into getting ready for war as far back as Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term. He forced the Navy to start building up its air force when the admirals were still pleading for battleships.

In appreciation, the Navy named an escort ship the Milledgeville, a dirigible the Macon, and two cruisers the Augusta and the Macon.

When the Republicans swept into control of Congress in November 1946, the late Walter G. Andrews of New York took over the chairmanship of the new House Armed Services Committee created by the Legislative Reorganization Act, and Vinson stepped down to ranking minority member. A huge portrait of Vinson, with the battleship Georgia in the background, was taken down from the committee-room wall and packed off to Annapolis. The cluster of Navy brass usually found outside Vinson's door jammed Andrews's office instead. One committee member suggested that Vinson was now "obsolete." And Vinson himself mused: "Those admirals are so busy worrying about that 65,000-ton carrier, they've forgotten all about old Carl."

Winning His Wings: Last spring despite GOP control, "Old Carl" gave them reason to remember him with a bang that knocked the Navy brass right out of their gun turrets. He suddenly introduced a bill to expand the Air Force to 70 groups and shoved it through the House, 343 votes to 3. It was tabled in the rush of the Senate to adjourn for the conventions, but friends started calling Vinson "the Air Marshal" instead of "the Admiral."

Last January, when Vinson took Andrews's place at the head of the committee, he redecorated his office. Down came the pictures of the admirals. Up went those of Air Secretary W. Stuart Symington (inscribed "With my high regards"), Air Force chief Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg ("With warm personal regards and great admiration"), a B-36, and a P-86 jet. Hastily, Navy chief Admiral Louis Denfield arranged to have Vinson's portrait shifted back from Annapolis to the committee room. Hearing about it, Vinson put his foot down. "Leave it where it is," he ordered.

"Old Carl" wasn't obsolete, but long talks with his friend Democratic Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas had sold him on the idea that past concepts of the place of seapower in national defense were. He explained:

"For about fifteen years I was chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee and there I got interested in helping the Navy. Now I'm chairman of all three services, and I have to think of them all . . . Being a continental power, with broad oceans separating us from the brawlings of Europe on the one side and the brawlings of Asia on the other, we were bound to maintain and did maintain sea power . . . Now that situation has changed . . .

"On the seas we have the greatest Navy in the world . . . We must recognize that Russia has not traditionally been a naval power . . . In the air we are capable of competing with the Russians and they are capable of competing with us . . . As I have studied the military situation of the country, I am driven again and again to the conclusion that we will be gambling with our national existence if we do not provide funds for a great Air Force."

In Spite of Truman: Then he announced that he would block any more big carriers for the Navy and reintroduced his 70-group Air Force Bill. Last

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 16
James Reston, New York Times, 4/3/49
Reprinted with the permission of the New York Times

WE ASSUME WORLD ROLE BUT COST BOTHERS US

Congress Backs Atlantic Pact and Aid For Europe, but It Would Like to Cut Down Outlay of Dollars

ISOLATIONIST VOICES HEARD

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, April 2—The Senate will probably give its consent to the ratification of the North Atlantic treaty in much the same way as a grumpy father consents to the marriage of his beautiful daughter to the wily foreigner.

The old man is reluctantly willing to agree that he can't very well oppose the facts of life and maturity—though wouldn't it have been swell if we could have all stayed young together?—but he's bridling a little about paying the whole bill.

In fact, with all the bride's relations gathering for the ceremony Monday, Father Congress was in a distinctly waspish mood all week, complaining about the high cost of security, lecturing his daughter about the goose that lays the golden eggs, and proposing a flat 10 per cent cut in the bridegroom's Marshall Plan allowance.

If any of the visiting North Atlantic treaty Foreign Ministers had been in the Senate Thursday they might very well have feared that this engagement would ever be fulfilled.

The isolationist claque was in full cry. Every cliché from "war is evil" to "peace is wonderful" was hurled across the floor. And there was serious talk about cutting the Marshall Plan funds and rejecting the Administration's proposed arms program for Western Europe. Despite the Senate's action yesterday in rejecting proposed cuts in ECA authorizations, the appropriations themselves have yet to undergo "Taberizing" in the House.

Complex Factors

The explanation of this legislative growling is complex and diverse, but among the factors are the following:

(1) Senators Walter F. George, Democrat, of Georgia, and Robert A. Taft, Republican, of Ohio, fear higher taxes and deficit spending almost as much as they distrust the Russians.

They sincerely believe that if taxes are raised or if the Administration spends more than it earns in time of peace, the economic structure of this country will be seriously impaired, and foreign policy as well as its domestic policy will suffer.

(2) Some legislators on Capitol Hill, among them Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, of Michigan, feel that the political commitment of the United States to consider an armed attack on the North Atlantic community as an attack on the United States is the really important deterrent to war and that if this does not deter the Politburo, no arms program for Western Europe will do it.

Mr. Vandenberg is said to believe that the arms program will contribute so little to the actual cause of security in Western Europe that it was unwise of the Administration to risk defeating the pact by insisting on implementing it with military equipment. Since that risk has been taken, however, he will probably support a limited arms program in the long run.

Groups Opposed

(3) Powerful organizations in this country, including many church, United Nations and world government groups, instinctively tend to oppose any organization which rests on military power and which is regional in scope rather than universal.

"Military" is a negative word on Capitol Hill, unless it is restricted to the idea that the United States should itself be strong. Similarly, and paradoxically, many persons here who swear by the United States constitutional system of "balancing the powers" of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, nevertheless reject the theory that the "balance of power" is a valid and useful principle in preventing the Russians from establishing a "preponderance of power."

(4) Other powerful groups are out of sorts with the Administration, the European Recovery Program and the North Atlantic Treaty because they have not been able to get the Administration to spend its foreign-assistance money to buy their surplus products.

Special-Treatment Requests

Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator, has received requests from more than 150 different groups in the United States, urging special treatment in the purchase of their surplus products for distribution under the Marshall Plan.

If these products happen to be necessary to the recovery of Europe, Mr. Hoffman is, of course, delighted to comply, but most of the time he is forced to observe that he is running a European recovery program and not merely providing a market for dumping surplus United States commodities.

Mr. Hoffman's correspondents or endear them to the Administration and its programs.

(5) Finally, there are other critics of the Administration here and elsewhere—among them John Foster Dulles—who believe the defensive advantages of having Norway and Denmark in the pact are outweighed by the possibility that their adherence to the pact will provoke the Russians into aggressive action.

And these critics are allied to others who fear that emphasis on an arms program for Western Europe will diminish the men, money and materials that are employed in the economic recovery of the Continent.

Even with strong, well-informed and inspired leadership, these criticisms from such critics would have been extremely hard to handle, but the leadership of the Administration at the White House and Capitol Hill has been disappointing.

Foreign-Policy Decisions

It is one of the most interesting paradoxes of the present Administration that under President Truman the United States has taken more vital decisions in the realm of foreign policy than under any other peacetime administration in modern United States history, and yet Mr. Truman has very little influence on his old Senate cronies in this field.

Similarly, the influence of Senator Tom Connally, Texas Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is not what it used to be.

Nevertheless, the most remarkable fact of all is that while many influences are opposing little bits of both the Marshall and the Atlantic pact policies, nobody but the handful of confirmed isolationists is willing to attack the whole policy outright.

The Administration has failed to do in months what Winston Churchill managed to do for a few minutes on Thursday night: give the people a sense of participating in events without precedent in the history of the Western world.

And yet, despite the longings for a simpler past, the frustrations of the present and the fears for an unknown future, Father Congress will no doubt kick in at the end with a grumpy blessing—and a fairly handsome dowry.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 17
Washington Post, 4/17/49
© The Washington Post

Alternative To The Pact

The present confict between East and West is considered to be a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism. Yet a treaty deeply affecting all our lives has been composed in secret and has been signed a little more than two weeks after announcement of its text to the American people. It is difficult to see how this procedure can be considered democratic.

The national board of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom opposes the North Atlantic Treaty for the following reasons among many others:

1. We believe it will further divide and weaken the United Nations. Mr. Trygve Lie, on February 11, said, "If people generally began to accept alliance as a substitute for genuine world-wide collective security, then the hope of a lasting peace would be gravely endangered."

2. We believe that it will interfere with the constructive work of the European Recovery Program and by diverting men, money, and strategic materials necessary for economic recovery to military purposes will delay, if not prevent entirely, the coming of the day when Europe will be back on its feet.

3. We believe that military alliances would make war more likely. There is a great deal of evidence from history to show that defense treaties have not prevented wars nor insured victory once a war began. A war in Palestine has recently been ended by negotiation. No one is suggesting that it would have been better had other nations entered this war as allies and thus enlarged the area and destructiveness of the conflict. Yet under the proposed North Atlantic Treaty any attack on any signatory nation might be considered an attack on all of them and would be apt to involve them all in war.

After the First World War, Viscount Grey wrote, "Armaments were intended to produce a sense of security in each nation—that was the justification put forward in defense of them. What they really did was to produce fear in everybody. Fear causes suspicion and hatred; it is hardly too much to say that, between nations, it stimulates all that is bad and depresses all that is good."

4. We believe the treaty will increase the military control of our foreign policy. Because of the nature of the alliance, many of the decisions concerning our foreign policy will naturally fall into the hands of the Secretary of Defense, and of generals and admirals. Our relations with the rest of the world will deal primarily with the effect they have on the alliance—keeping it together and building up its strength.

We would suggest as alternatives:

1. The building up of democracy in our own country through adequate housing, educational facilities, health programs, and safeguards for civil liberties.

2. Supporting the United Nations Assembly's proposal for world disarmament under international law which means getting rid of all weapons of mass destruction and of big national armies and navies and providing instead an international police force and equipment suitable for genuine police duty.

3. Using the United Nations and its specialized agencies to their fullest capacities for cooperative policies to meet the economic and cultural needs of the world's peoples. If we were saved the expense of arming ourselves and our allies, we could afford to carry out the President's proposal for building up the undeveloped areas of the world.

EMILY GREENE BALCH,
Honorary International President, Nobel Peace Prize Winner;

GERTRUDE C. BUSSEY,
Chairman, Policy Committee, U. S. Section;

ANNALEE STEWART,
President, U. S. Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Washington.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 18
Washington Post, 4/27/49
© The Washington Post

Pact In Perspective

The start of public hearings this morning will give Mr. Acheson and other Administration officials a chance to put the North Atlantic Treaty in clear perspective. The Senate and the entire American public badly need a calm restatement of the case. Judging from some of the chatter that has come from Capitol Hill, one would imagine the treaty to be an act of charity by the United States. It is no such thing. It is genuinely an act of joint self-defense, made necessary by Soviet obstruction and by the danger of Soviet aggression against ourselves as well as others. It tells Russia very quietly, without bombast, that an attack against any of the Western nations will in all probability mean war against all. The treaty is thus designed to end the jitters that have been holding back Europe's economic recovery and, indirectly, our own. If it fulfills its peaceful purposes, the United States will benefit as much as any other signer.

The same two-way relationship exists in the military assistance program which Congress will be asked to approve later under the general sanction of Article 3 of the treaty. We hope Mr. Acheson will not retreat into legalistic hair-splitting if he is asked—as he is sure to be—whether the treaty commits us to provide military aid. The treaty is a serious commitment to help make our treaty partners ready to resist attack. The Administration will propose what kind of help, and how much, it thinks necessary; the final determination will be left to the "honest judgment" of Congress. Here again, as in the case of the treaty, our military help will not be an act of charity, but rather a recognition that the defense of other countries is vital to the defense of the United States. An authoritative Government spokesman said on Tuesday that the European treaty partners would provide for most of their rearmament through their own efforts. If we supplement their efforts with military equipment, raw materials or military missions, we shall also get tangible and intangible help in return—help in knowing, above all, that we have allies willing and able to resist an aggressor.

The treaty is a serious commitment to help make our treaty partners ready to resist attack. The Administration will propose what kind of help, and how much, it thinks necessary; the final determination will be left to the "honest judgment" of Congress. Here again, as in the case of the treaty, our military help will not be an act of charity, but rather a recognition that the defense of other countries is vital to the defense of the United States. An authoritative Government spokesman said on Tuesday that the European treaty partners would provide for most of their rearmament through their own efforts. If we supplement their efforts with military equipment, raw materials or military missions, we shall also get tangible and intangible help in return—help in knowing, above all, that we have allies willing and able to resist an aggressor.

Mr. Acheson should not have to devote much time to military assistance in his statement today unless, of course, myopic Senators compel him to. It would be a pity if the strong, clear affirmation of the treaty were to be drowned out by clamor over the cost of military aid. The worth of this treaty cannot be measured by double-entry bookkeeping. Its value will be precisely what the Congress and the people of the United States choose to make it. There is a tide in the affairs of men which has led 12 nations to avow their common interest and common purpose. If the tide is taken at its flood, if the treaty is used to hasten a closer union of the countries involved, its ratification can be a turning-point in world affairs.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 19
New York Times, 4/28/49
Reprinted with the permission of the New York Times

Strategy of Candor Is Used By Acheson With Senators

He Tells Everything About Atlantic Treaty, and Procedure Proves on Whole to Work

By JAMES RESTON
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 27—There are many ways in which a Secretary of State can present a treaty to the Senate, but the best way is to tell the Senators everything. This astonishes them, then bores them stiff, and eventually minimizes the ordeal.

This was the system adopted by Secretary of State Acheson today when he arrived in the Senate caucus room with the North Atlantic treaty. He was exhaustively precise. He was documented from Monroe to Truman. He was courteous. And he was studiously restrained.

Mr. Acheson has always had a good fast ball, but he has often lacked control. He has a tendency to score fouls, which is dangerous on Capitol Hill. He has a tendency to knock curved-ball questions out of the park, which is not popular in these parts. But today he was the model witness.

He treated flabby questions, answered five minutes before, as if they were the most penetrating and original queries of the day, and he lost his patience only once, when he requested that the photographers stop flashing their bulbs in his face. This incident passed quietly with Chairman Tom Connally's memorable dictum to the photographers: "You can snap," he declared, "but you can't bulb."

Concessions Indicated

Since assuming the first Cabinet office, Mr. Acheson appears to have made certain personal concessions to popular prejudice. He has trimmed his mustache, an unruly ornament in the past. He has curbed his tongue. And today he appeared in a blue and white tie that must have satisfied the Congressional passion for the picturesque.

Most important, however, he brought along his gift of lucidity and the strategy of candor. Both helped him immensely. In the past he has tried to finesse the difficult question of whether a vote for the North Atlantic treaty was a vote for the arms program. Today he gave his answers straight, and, on the whole, the strategy worked.

In his letter to President Truman about the North Atlantic treaty two weeks ago, Mr. Acheson gave what was regarded on Capitol Hill as a somewhat imprecise definition of the relationship between the treaty and the program of sending suplies to the North Atlantic countries.

Article III of the treaty says that the members of the pact "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

This meant, Mr. Acheson said on April 12, that "no party can rely on others for its defense unless it does its utmost to defend itself and contribute toward the defense of the others."

Details of April 12 Letter

This article, he stated, did not itself obligate any party to make any specific contribution to the defense capacity of any other party, at any particular time or over any given period of time.

The concept of "mutual aid," he added in that letter to the President, was that each party should "contribute such mutual aid as it reasonably can, consistent with its geographic location and resources and with due regard to the requirements of basic economic health, in the form in which it can most effectively furnish it, whether in the form of facilities, manpower, productive capacity, military equipment, or other forms."

The trouble with having the gift of lucidity is that when you present a definition like this you are immediately accused of evasion, and Mr. Acheson was so accused at once. It was said on the Hill, and elsewhere, that he was fogging up the issue in much the same way as the State Department fogged up the reports that the Russians had made us an offer on lifting the Berlin blockade.

Mr. Acheson, however, cleared the air today. He repeated some of the old statement, but he put the other side of the obligation as well. He stated in simple terms that a vote for the treaty did not bind the voter to the Administration's own arms program, but he rejected categorically the theory that a Senator could vote for the pact and then feel free to do nothing about assisting the other nations to build up their means to resist aggression.

Scope of Obligation

Article III of the pact, he declared, "does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance program, nor indeed to any program. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid."

The words "honest" and "honest judgment" kept cropping up repeatedly in Mr. Acheson's statement today. If an armed attack occurred on one of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, the United States was not automatically obliged to declare war, but it was obligated to do a specific thing: it was obligated to maintain and restore peace and security in the whole area and it had to do whatever in its "honest judgment" was required to achieve that purpose.

We were not automatically obliged to pass President Truman's specific arms program, but we had to be "honest" and accept the principle of helping the others get ready to help themselves.

This candor somewhat annoyed Senator Connally, the chairman of the committee, and others who would have preferred to keep the obligation fuzzy, but Mr. Acheson faced it and, in the long run, the issue will at least be clear.

In so doing he regained some of the confidence lost by the Department of State for acting as if there was no substance to the reports of the United States-Soviet conversations on lifting the Berlin blockade.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 20
New York Times, 5/19/49
Reprinted with the permission of the New York Times

Public Debate on Treaty Far Short of Expectation

General Acceptance of Pact Coupled With Ignorance of Terms Is Indicated

By JAMES RESTON
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, May 18—When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty this afternoon the question thoughtful observers here were asking was whether the lack of excitement over this legislation indicated public acceptance, public indifference, public ignorance or all three.

Even when the hearings opened three weeks ago all the seats in the Senate caucus room were not taken. This afternoon, when Chairman Tom Connally called the last dissenter to the witness-chair, only fourteen spectators were present.

For some days now the treaty has been buried in the back pages of most newspapers and most of the organized opposition outside Congress has come from Henry Wallace's supporters, from the Quakers and from individuals and organizations sympathetic with pro-Soviet or pacifist doctrine.

It has been generally agreed in the hearings that this treaty involves the most specific and far-reaching commitment taken by this country to European countries in our history.

Agreement on Three Points

Many interpretations of the commitments have been put forward, but there is general agreement on three points:

1. If an armed attack occurs against any member of the treaty, each of the others is treaty-bound to take "forthwith" whatever action it deems necessary, "including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
2. While the Congress will retain its constitutional right to declare war under the treaty, the President will be free, if he so chooses, to order the armed forces of the United States into action on his own initiative if he believes such action is necessary "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
3. Even before any such armed attack should occur, the members of the pact are obliged, under Article Three of the treaty, to accept the principle of mutual assistance, and "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, [to] maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

These obligations are of such a fundamental nature and would bind the United States for so long a time that it was expected in official quarters here, that the hearings on the treaty would provoke a national debate at least equal to the debate on the United Nations and the European Recovery Program.

Effort to Deter Soviet Favored

The hearings have now ended, without anything like the debate that was anticipated and while this pleases officials at the State Department, they are also slightly baffled by it.

This reporter has sought an explanation by asking questions of representative citizens from Boston and New York to Chicago and Minneapolis, and the result of his inquiries may be summarized as follows:

1. There is general acceptance of the idea of joining Canada and the western European nations in a combined effort to deter the Russians from making war.
2. There is, at least, no very large organized opposition to ratification of the treaty, aside from the Wallaceites and the pacifists.
3. At the same time, even in the university communities, there is less information and understanding of the full implications of the United States commitments under the treaty than one had expected to find.
4. There is a widespread assumption that signing the treaty now is all right and that we will be free to do more or less as we please about implementing it when and if an armed attack comes.
5. Specifically, there is little realization that, if the treaty is ratified, the President, in accordance with his constitutional obligation to see that the laws of the land are "faithfully executed," will be free to meet an armed attack on another treaty member with armed force if he deems such action necessary in order to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Thus, while there seems to be acceptance of the idea of collective security, there also seems to be ignorance of some of the vital parts of the treaty combined with indifference about obligations that may or may not have to be met at some time in the future.

Isolationists on Defensive

Few people venture to develop the pre-war themes about "staying out of Europe's squabbles." It is the isolationist-pacifist-pro-Soviet group that is on the defensive, and while some honest doubts are often expressed in private about various aspects of the treaty by objective nonattached citizens, they seem to hesitate to express their doubts in public for fear of being tagged with the pro-Soviet label.

This has undoubtedly limited the debate somewhat, but the main thing that seems to explain the lack of excitement is that most people appear to feel that the Government is handling the Soviet problem effectively.

Congressmen find that the public does not debate issues violently or write a lot of letters to Washington if it is in general agreement with the way a policy is going. One finds this same reaction outside of Washington. The theme heard most often goes about like this:

"I haven't studied this Atlantic treaty very carefully myself. I don't know whether it'll do what they say it'll do. But I think we have to do something about this Russian problem, and though things are in a mess, I think maybe we're beginning to make some headway."

In short, there seems to be ignorance about specific parts of the treaty, indifference or a certain fatalistic approach to the future, combined with an acceptance of the idea of "doing something" about the Russians.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 21
New York Times, 11/22/49
Reprinted with the permission of the New York Times

THE PACT RATIFIED

Rising to the responsibility which history thrust upon it, the Senate has approved the North Atlantic Treaty by the overwhelming majority of 82 to 13. It has done so after defeating by similarly decisive majorities all efforts of a small band of die-hard opponents who, from a variety of motives, sought either to defeat the Treaty or to repudiate its obligations and its promises by saddling it with nullifying reservations.

In taking this action, the Senate has justified again the democratic process which enabled the opposition to voice in prolonged debate all its objections and its fears. But by overriding these fears and objections the Senate has justified the hopes and expectations of the free world. The Treaty must still be approved by France and the Netherlands before it becomes effective. But after ratification by the United States these steps may be expected to follow as a matter of course. The way has now been cleared to the formal creation of the North Atlantic community as an alliance forged by fate and dedicated not to war but to the preservation of peace and to the defense of freedom and security against new aggression from any quarter.

The Senate vote is so decisive, and brought support for the Treaty from such large majorities of both the Republican and the Democratic parties, that it should dispel any misgivings aroused among our allies by the preceding debate. But if it is really to fulfill its purposes and become the great deterrent to aggression which it is designed to be, the Treaty will have to become more than a diplomatic paper instrument. It will have to become a living and functioning reality, ready and able not only to repel aggression, if that dire necessity arises, but to prevent aggression by making the alliance so strong, militarily, politically and economically, that not even the most reckless Power will dare to attack it.

The means for giving it this strength are provided in the Treaty itself. One such means is envisaged in Article 3, which calls for continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop the individual and collective capacity of the signatories to resist armed attack. In fulfillment of that obligation the Administration is ready to submit to Congress a military aid program to enable Western Europe to activate and develop its own defense resources. Whether this particular program is the best available, or whether a better one can be devised, is for Congress to determine. In that sense, as the proponents of the Treaty assured the doubters, every member of Congress is free to use his own best judgment.

But there can be no doubt about the obligation of the United States under the Treaty to extend such aid, just as there can be no doubt about the obligation of the other signatories to help themselves at least to the same degree. As General Bradley said, in the end Europe can be defended only by the Europeans. But the Europeans will be able to defend themselves only if their manpower can be supplemented by equipment which at present the United States alone can supply. The Senate's decisive rejection of any reservations on that point holds the promise that Congress will not shirk this obligation and will help to restore at least in part the ramparts which guarded our own security in the past.

The second means of giving the Treaty strength is provided in Article 9, which establishes a Council of the allies to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. This implementation embraces not merely military affairs, for which a special defense committee is provided; it embraces also all political and economic matters affecting the allies, for such matters are equally important in maintaining and developing their strength. It has been the tragedy and the weakness of the Western World in the past that for lack of a firm alliance each nation pursued separate foreign and economic policies which, by their divergence helped to precipitate the catastrophe of war. If the new alliance is to fulfill its noblest purpose of safeguarding the peace it will have to harmonize these individual policies into common policies for the alliance as a whole, enabling it in all vital matters to present a solid and united front. Only in this way will it be able to live up both to its responsibilities and to its opportunities.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 22

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
PAUL COVERDELL, GEORGIA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
CRAIG THOMAS, WYOMING
JOHN ASHCROFT, MISSOURI
ROD GRAMS, MINNESOTA
BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE
PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, MINNESOTA
JAMES W. NANCE, STAFF DIRECTOR
EDWIN K. HALL, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

November 10, 1997

Dear Colleague:

The Committee on Foreign Relations held five hearings in October and November on various aspects of NATO enlargement -- the strategic rationale; arguments for and against enlargement; cost, benefits, burdensharing, and military implications of enlargement; the emerging NATO-Russia relationship; and public views on enlargement.

As a result, we are more convinced than ever that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is the correct policy for the United States to pursue. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated on October 7 before our committee, "a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united." (This conclusion was echoed by other eminent witnesses.)

It is interesting that many of the most important principles upon which NATO enlargement is based were virtually uncontested in the hearings:

- Europe is a vital U.S. security interest.
- NATO is effective and essential to U.S. security efforts.
- There is a need for continued U.S. engagement in Europe.
- Article 5 should continue as the heart of NATO's security commitment.

In our committee hearings, the vitally important issues of cost and NATO's relations with Russia were examined in great detail. We are persuaded that the overwhelming weight of testimony on these points reinforces the argument for NATO enlargement.

Specifically, we view the likely costs of enlargement to be relatively small for the U.S. and affordable for new and current European allies. We also conclude that the NATO allies and the U.S. have agreed that the costs must be equitably shared, with the U.S. paying only about one quarter of NATO's common funded costs.

Moreover, the Administration testified that the costs funded out of NATO's common-funded budgets are likely to be less than the Pentagon estimated in February because the

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

military infrastructure in the three states is in better condition than previously assumed.

Finally, the hearings helped to ease concerns on various points related to relations with Russia. A basis for common understanding has been established between the Committee and the Administration by which the new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council will have no undue influence or veto over NATO's supreme decision making body, the North Atlantic Council. Testimony from Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering and others also helped establish the fact that as NATO enlargement is proceeding, Russian domestic reform and Russian cooperation on key security issues such as arms control continue to make progress.

A strong majority of the public witnesses who testified in the committee's hearing last week made clear their approval of NATO enlargement, mirroring the results of a recent national opinion survey that showed overwhelming support among the American public as a whole. (Please contact the Foreign Relations Committee should you desire copies of testimony or supporting materials from any of the hearings.)

We believe that NATO enlargement, arguably the most important foreign policy initiative for our country in many years, is an issue that transcends partisan politics. Both of us are firmly convinced that enlargement is squarely in the American national interest and we anticipate that the Senate debate before the ratification vote early next year will validate our conclusion.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms
Chairman

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 23

JEFF BINGAMAN
NEW MEXICO

703 HART SENATE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3102
(202) 224-5521
IN NEW MEXICO—1-800-443-8658
TDD (202) 224-1792
senator_bingaman@bingaman.senate.gov

United States Senate

April 29, 1998

Dear Colleague:

The issue of NATO enlargement currently under debate in the Senate has profound implications for the long-term security of the United States and its allies. One of the central questions in this debate, I believe, is how NATO enlargement relates to the Alliance's strategic mission for addressing today's post-Cold War security concerns.

Currently, however, the NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance's statement of its fundamental military mission, is under review by NATO members. The current strategic concept, last revised in 1991, predates profound changes in the security environment. It does not account for the dissolution of the Soviet Union; NATO's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia; or NATO's new special relationships with Russia and Ukraine. An updated Strategic Concept is not expected to be completed before the end of this year, well after the Senate will vote on this round of NATO enlargement.

I plan to introduce an amendment that would withhold U.S. support for inviting any additional countries (other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) to join NATO until after the Alliance has agreed to a revised Strategic Concept. This step needs to be completed before any further rounds of enlargement occur. States considering whether to seek NATO membership need to know what commitments they would be undertaking in the process.

Once a revised Strategic Concept has been agreed upon, existing and prospective NATO members will be able to judge for themselves wnether and how further expansion would serve the Alliance's effectiveness in fulfilling its mission.

Attached is a copy of the amendment I intend to offer to the resolution of Senate advice and consent on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. If you are interested in cosponsoring this amendment, please have your staff contact Wayne Glass or Bill Monahan in my office at 224-5521.

Sincerely,

Jeff Bingaman

ALBUQUERQUE (505) 766-3636 LAS CRUCES (505) 523-6561 LAS VEGAS (505) 454-8624 ROSWELL (505) 622-7113 SANTA FE (505) 988-6647

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

O:\RYN\RYN98.186 S.L.C

AMENDMENT NO. ____ Calendar No. ____

Purpose: To require a certification of United States policy not to support further enlargement of NATO (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic) until revision of the Strategic Concept of NATO is completed.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—105th Cong., 2d Sess.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

CONDITION intended to be proposed by Mr. BINGAMAN to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols

Viz.

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) UNITED STATES POLICY LIMITING NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS REVISED.—Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United States not to support the accession to

the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.

Document 24

TOM HARKIN
IOWA

202 224-3254
TTY 202 224-8621
TOM_HARKIN@HARKIN.SENATE.GOV

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE
APPROPRIATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON DC 20510-1502

April 23, 1998

Dear Colleague

The Senate will soon turn to the question of NATO expansion Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic into the alliance has many far-reaching, long-term national and international implications One of the most important issues is what NATO expansion will cost American taxpayers I plan to offer amendments that will require a complete and honest accounting of the financial costs

I have seen estimates of NATO expansion costs that range from $1 5 billion to $125 billion Although the Administration has claimed the low end of that range, with the U S share only projected at $400 million over 10 years, I find their figures highly questionable For example, current administration cost estimates include only U S contributions to "common costs" Excluded are substantial U S contributions to "national costs" through bilateral subsidies provided to new member nations for upgrading their militaries

The Harkin cost amendment would

- Require full accounting of *all* U S contributions for NATO expansion
- Include U S contributions to the three new nations' national costs when calculating the U S share of enlargement costs Would place a cap on subsidies to national costs at no more than 25% of all similar contributions by all NATO nations
- The subsidy programs named in the Harkin amendment include Foreign Military Financing grants, transfers of "excess" defense articles, no-cost leases of U S equipment, including modern aircraft, the International Military Education and Training program and loan programs for military purchases

I also plan to offer a second amendment As you know, the administration is promoting future rounds of expansion by pursuing an open-door policy I will offer language to require a cost study by CBO on potential new members (beyond the first three)

Attached please find a copy of my amendments to the resolution of ratification for the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO I would urge you to support my common sense, fiscally sound amendments If you have any questions or if you're interested in cosponsoring these amendments, please have your staff contact Peter Tyler in my office at 224-3254

Sincerely,

Tom Harkin

Tom Harkin
United States Senator

210 WALNUT ST
733 FEDERAL BLDG
DES MOINES IA 50309
515 284 4574

1611 E 4TH ST
314B FEDERAL BLDG
DAVENPORT IA 52801
319 322 1338

350 W 6TH ST
315 FEDERAL BLDG
DUBUQUE IA 52001
319 582 2130

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

O:\RYN\RYN98.168 S.L.C.

AMENDMENT NO. ____ Calendar No. ____

Purpose: To limit any United States subsidy of the national expenses of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in meeting its NATO commitments.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—105th Cong., 2d Sess.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENTS intended to be proposed by _____ to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols

Viz:

In section 3(2)(A), strike "and" at the end of clause (ii).

In section 3(2)(A), strike "(iii)" and insert "(iv)".

In section 3(2)(A), insert after clause (ii) the following:

(iii) any future United States subsidy of the national expenses of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

NATO commitments, including the assistance described in subparagraph (C), may not exceed 25 percent of all assistance provided to that country by all NATO members.

At the end of section 3(2), insert the following new subparagraph:

(C) ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED.—The assistance referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii) includes—

(i) Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Export Control Act;

(ii) transfers of excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

(iii) Emergency Drawdowns;

(iv) no-cost leases of United States equipment;

(v) the subsidy cost of loan guarantees and other contingent liabilities under subchapter VI of chapter 148 of title 10, United States Code; and

(v) international military education and training under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

O RYN RYN98.179 S.L.C.

AMENDMENT NO. ____ Calendar No. ____

Purpose: To require an analysis of costs of continued NATO enlargement.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—105th Cong., 2d Sess.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. HARKIN to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols

Viz:

At the end of section 3(2), add the following new subparagraph:

(C) ANALYSIS OF COSTS OF CONTINUED NATO ENLARGEMENT.—The Congressional Budget Office shall submit to the Senate a report containing an analysis of common-funded and national costs for the enlargement of NATO to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. Such analysis shall include an estimate of costs for—

(ii) the costs to new members to continue to restructure their militaries,

(iii) the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing NATO members, and

(iii) the costs directly related to NATO enlargement, including ensuring interoperability between the forces of current and new members.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 25

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 11, 1998

Dear Colleague:

On February 3, 1998, sixty of America's most senior former military commanders -including five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several former Chiefs of Staff of each of the military services -- issued a declaration strongly urging the U.S. Senate to ratify the enlargement of NATO.

This declaration represents an extraordinary level of consensus within America's military brain-trust that the enlargement of NATO is very much in the strategic interest of the United States and well worth the costs and challenges that come with it.

As you may know, this declaration follows on a similar statement supporting NATO enlargement that was signed last fall by a bi-partisan group of America's most distinguished foreign policy leaders -- including two former Vice Presidents, eight former Secretaries of State, six former Secretaries of Defense, eight former Senators, and five former National Security Advisors.

Together, these declarations send a powerful signal to both the' Senate and the American people that NATO enlargement is in our interest and should go forward. We commend both declarations to your attention and are attaching them to this letter.

Sincerely,

John McCain

Joseph I. Lieberman

A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement

The Senate is faced with a historic opportunity - to extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the CzechRepublic.

The outcome of this vote will in large measure determine the future of the NATO alliance and whether it will continue to be a vital force for peace and stability in the Europe of the 21st century.

We believe that NATO has been the most effective military alliance in history. It was the centerpiece of the strategy that kept Europe secure and free during the darkest days of the Cold War. Under its protection, Western Europe recovered from the devastation of World War II to enjoy 50 years of increasing stability, prosperity, and freedom. Now, in an expanded NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can enjoy similar success.

The situation in Europe is very different than during the Cold War. But the need for NATO remains. The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make for a stronger NATO. It will strengthen NATO's ability to help Europe set aside old quarrels and overcome a long history of conflict and war. It will eliminate a source of instability that contributed to two World Wars

and could again become a source of confrontation and even conflict. It will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against the security challenges of the future.

The admission of these three countries into NATO is not directed against Russia. Rather it is directed toward the stability of Europe - stability that will benefit Russia as much as anyone, and will ultimately facilitate a closer relationship between Russia and the United States.

We believe that the cost of bringing these three countries into NATO is manageable especially when compared to the potential cost of not doing so - a Europe moving not toward stability and peace but toward instability and contention.

We believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make a useful contribution to our common security. They already possess credible military capability and are engaged in adapting their armed forces to the standards of the NATO alliance. They have shown a willingness to participate in collective defense by their contributions during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of their histories, these nations know that freedom is not free. They take security seriously. They will make good allies.

The upcoming Senate vote is fundamentally a test of whether the United States will stay engaged in the Europe of the

21st century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has expended enormous effort to build a Europe of free and democratic states at peace with one another. For the first time, there is a realistic possibility of achieving this goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great project.

The lessons of history are clear. Two World Wars and one Cold one have established beyond question that American security and European security are inseparable. In the aftermath of World War I, America turned its back on Europe, only to have America's sons and daughters pay the price a generation later. We cannot afford to make that mistake again.

The creation of NATO in 1949 took foresight and determination to do what was right. Today, the stakes are just as high. We urge the Senate to reaffirm American engagement in Europe by ratifying the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO - to secure the peace, security, and prosperity on which we all depend.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 25 (p3)

General Joe Ashy, USAF (Ret)
Former CINCUSSPACECOM/CINCNORAD

General George S. Blanchard, USA (Ret)
Former CINC USAREUR/COMCENTAG

General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret)
Former Assistant Commandant, USMC

General Michael P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret)
Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

General W.L. Creech, USAF (Ret)
Former CINC AFLANT

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN (Ret)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General James Dalton, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE

General Mike Dugan, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, COMAAFCE

Admiral Leon Edney, USN (Ret)
Former SACLANT

General Ronald Fogleman, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force

General Al Gray, USMC (Ret)
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps

General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Ret)
Former AETC Commander

General Monroe Hatch, USAF (Ret)
Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret)
Former CINC SPACECOM/AD

General Andrew P. Iosue, USAF (Ret)
Former AAC Commander

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Ret)
Former Vice Chairman, joint Chiefs of Staff

General David Jones, USAF (Ret)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General George Joulwan, USA (Ret)
Former SACEUR

General P.X. Kelley, USMC (Ret)
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps

Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN (Ret)
Former Chief of Naval Operations, SACLANT

General William L. Kirk, USAF (Ret)
Former CINC USAFE/COMAAFCE

General Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret)
Former CINC US Army Europe

General William Livsey, USA (Ret)
Former CINC Combined UN FORCES KOREA

General John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret)
Former Commander, Air Combat Command

General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret)
Former CINC USAREUR

General Robert T. Marsh, USAF (Ret)
Former Commander, AFSC

General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret)
Former DCINCEUR

General Charles McDonald, USAF (Ret)
Former AETC Commander

General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force

General Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret)
Former U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee

General James P. Mullins, USAF (Ret)
Former AFLC Commander

General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret)
Former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

General Wallace Nutting, USA (Ret)
Former USCINCRED

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret)
Former Director, NSA

General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret)
Former CINC US Army Europe

Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret)
Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Binford Peay, USA (Ret)
Former CINC, U.S. Central Command

General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret)
Former Chairman, joint Chiefs of Staff

General Bernard P. Randolph, USAF (Ret)
Former Commander, AF Systems Command

General Robert H. Reed, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret)
Former VCSA/CINC UNC/USFK

General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (Ret)
Former Army Chief of Staff and SACEUR

LTG Edward L. Rowny, USA (Ret)
Former Special Advisor on Arms Control

General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret)
Former CINC USAREUR

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret)
Former CINC Central Command & Operation Desert Storm

General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret)
Former CINC Combined UN FORCES KOREA

General John Shalikashvili, USA (Ret)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General John Shand, USAF (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff, SHAPE

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret)
Former SACLANT/CINC USACOM

Admiral Leighton Smith, USN (Ret)
Former CINC US Naval Forces Europe

General Carl Stiner, USA (Ret)
Former US CINC, Special Operations Command

Admiral William Studeman, USN (Ret)
Former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff of the Army

General John W. Vessey, USA (Ret)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret)
Former Chief of Staff of the Army

General Volney Warner, USA (Ret)
Former CINC, US Readiness Command

General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret)
Former Air Force Chief of Staff

General J.J. Went, USMC (Ret)
Former Assistant Commandant, USMC

General Ronald W. Yates, USAF (Ret)
Former Commander, AF Materiel Command

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret)
Former Chief of Naval Operations and Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 26

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 27, 1998

Dear Colleague:

Few Americans have played more defining roles in United States foreign policy over the past half century than George F. Kennan and Paul H. Nitze.

Ambassador Kennan has called NATO expansion "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era." Now, Ambassador Nitze has shared equal concerns. In the attached letter, he cautions that, "If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble."

We stand on the precipice of a major decision.

Respectfully,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

John W. Warner

Enclosure

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY

SAIS
The Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies
1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington DC 20036-2213
(202) 663 5888 · FAX (202) 663 5878

Office of Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

April 24, 1998

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate
464 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Moynihan:

Your effort to introduce a more deliberate approach to the question of NATO expansion is most constructive. We are in a period of great change in the security challenges for which our country must be prepared, but it is also an era in which we would be foolish to squander the opportunities opened by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most important such opportunity is the chance to bring Russia into the community of nations. A sensible policy to support that objective would concentrate on lending political and economic support to the development of a democratic, market-oriented society in Russia. NATO expansion distracts both us and the Russians from that goal. Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a productive relationship with the United States and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending the alliance.

As you and Senator Warner have proposed, the preferable path surely lies in the direction of enlarging the European Union to embrace the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Negotiations have now begun for the accession to the EU of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, along with others. Encouraging those negotiations is the most useful emphasis the Senate could give to current trends in Europe. It makes no sense at all to enlarge NATO merely "to fill the void," as one senior administration official described the current process. We should, on the contrary, use the period while the EU is negotiating its own enlargement to demonstrate that the Partnership for Peace — which now has more than 25 partners — is the suitable relationship for European countries which are not members of NATO.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
The United States Senate

In the present security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary; it is gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble.

Sincerely,

Paul Nitze

Paul H. Nitze

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 27

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 13, 1998

Dear Colleague:

As the Senate prepares for the imminent debate and vote on the resolution of ratification to extend NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, we urge you to vote against any amendment that would impose a freeze, temporary or permanent, on the process of NATO enlargement.

As well intentioned as such a proposal may be, its acceptance would be inconsistent with the NATO treaty. It would unnecessarily limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement, should the United States determine that such enlargement would serve its national interests. It would undercut the tremendous gains for peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe, including the historic reconciliation underway between Russia and the West.

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's founding charter, states clearly that membership is open to "any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." (A copy of the Washington Treaty is attached.)

NATO has been an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain relevant and successful in the future, NATO must keep its doors open to those European democracies ready to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership.

NATO enlargement is a policy rooted in this principle and driven by moral imperatives, strategic self-interest, and objective criteria concerning military readiness and political and economic reform.

A freeze would undercut the interests and policies of the United States in four fundamental ways:

First, a freeze would reduce U.S. flexibility and leverage within the Alliance. It could reduce the Alliance's ability to respond to the unpredictability of the future.

Second, to repudiate Article 10 and its message of optimism and hope -- which is what a freeze on enlargement would do -- would be seen by the reformist governments of Central Europe as a door slamming shut. Do we really wish to send such a disillusioning message?

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a source of hope to Central Europeans during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It has motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, and Italy and Slovenia, among others. The civil and military agreements between these countries have helped

to consolidate peace and stability in Central Europe and must be protected, not undercut.

Third, a mandated pause would create a new dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only stalled, but stopped, a key incentive behind their current participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program will be eliminated. A key achievement of this program is the coordination it now fosters between their defense planning and force structure development. Thus, a freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, the remarkable development of European security around an Alliance-determined agenda.

Fourth, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over NATO enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory -- proof of their own legitimacy -- by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors. Worse, it could lead others to draw the same conclusion. A freeze would undercut the basic principle that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own security arrangements -- a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO.

The Resolution of Ratification passed 16 to 2 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 3, 1998 explicitly addresses the concerns of those accusing the Alliance of moving too fast on enlargement. It states that "the United States will not support the admission of, or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless...(I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and...(II) the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States.

The bottom line is that further expansion of the Alliance will always be contingent on Senate ratification -- the difficult hurdle of securing 67 votes.

We urge you to vote against any proposal to freeze the process of NATO enlargement. The ratification of the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO will erase destabilizing lines, which are relics of the Cold War. A freeze of this process would only be a step toward creating new, divisive lines in Europe.

Sincerely,

Bill Roth — John McCain

Barbara A. Mikulski — Chuck Hagel — Alfonse D'Amato

Mark Hatfield — Carl Levin — Dirk Kempthorne

John Breaux — Al Gore — Mitch McConnell

Ken Salazar — Joe Lieberman

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 28

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 5, 1998

Senator Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D C 20510

Dear Senator Lott

We understand that you intend to schedule a vote on NATO enlargement during the next two weeks. Changing the Alliance is a serious matter that deserves the most careful consideration. While the level of support at present for enlargement varies among us, we are united in our belief that this vote should be postponed.

If adopted, enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will commit the United States by law to the military defense of a vast new expanse of Europes territory. Because we take this responsibility seriously, we are uncomfortable voting when so many of the purposes and assumptions of NATO enlargement remain either ambiguous or contradictory:

- The military capabilities and force-level requirements of the three invited countries are currently being evaluated by NATO. This process will not be completed until late spring or early summer.

- Cost estimates vary widely, from $1.5 billion (the Administration) to $125 billion (CBO). This indicates that other assumptions about the alliance differ as well.

- NATO's role in Bosnia is now open-ended. Whatever one thinks of this, such a commitment raises questions as to whether this is a prototype for future NATO missions in other Central and Eastern European trouble spots.

- The ongoing crisis with Iraq has exposed potentially serious disagreements among current NATO partners, and with Russia, as to the severity of the crisis and the appropriate means to address it. These concerns need to be examined fully before the alliance is enlarged and its potential for internal friction increased.

- The Baltic Charter, which the Administration entered into in December, contained express and implied commitments from the U.S. to these nations, which the Senate has yet to address. Since the Baltic states clearly expect to be invited to join NATO, this accord needs to be carefully scrutinized before NATO is dramatically altered.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Senator Lott, page 2

- Political and economic integration among European democracies is the most frequent justification for NATO enlargement. This goal would also be enhanced by admitting new states to the European Union, which many NATO and non-NATO EU countries currently oppose. Opposition within Europe to *economic* integration with new nations, especially among NATO members, should be fully understood before those same nations are expected to extend *military* commitments.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the bedrock of U.S. national security and global leadership since the Second World War. NATO has enjoyed the solid support of generations of Americans and Europeans because its purpose has been clear. Like any military alliance, NATO will only survive if all of its member states and their citizens fully share and understand their commitments and expectations. It would not be wise to enter a treaty commitment that raises more questions than it answers; this, at present, is how we would characterize NATO enlargement.

To allow time for further consideration, we respectfully ask that you delay a vote on NATO enlargement until these questions are more fully answered. In our judgement, this will not be before June 1, 1998.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith

Tom Harkin

Max Cleland

John Warner

Jim Inhofe

Jim Hoods

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Pat Roberts

John Ashcroft

Jack Reed

Dick Kempthorne

Wendell Ford

Document 29

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1998

Dear John:

In the coming days the Senate will complete consideration of the proposed accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. NATO's enlargement offers our country an historic opportunity to increase America's security, improve Europe's stability, and erase the vestiges of the Cold War dividing line. For these reasons, I appreciate the support that you and a bipartisan majority of your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee gave this initiative on March 3, when the Committee voted 16-2 in favor of a resolution of ratification on NATO enlargement.

I know, however, that you and other senators have certain concerns about the process of NATO enlargement. In particular, I am sensitive to the questions you raised during the Committee's March 3 meeting regarding future rounds in the enlargement process. These same questions underlie Senator Warner's proposal for a mandated pause in the enlargement process after admission of these first new members. Let me take this opportunity to comment on Senator Warner's proposal and the issues it attempts to address.

I have long maintained that, as part of our broader strategy to make Europe more united and stable, NATO should keep its door open for other qualified states that aspire to membership. I was pleased that NATO adopted this position at the Madrid summit last July. The Alliance also declared in Madrid that it would review the process of enlargement at our next summit in Washington. Neither my Administration nor NATO has made any decision about when the next invitations for membership should be extended, or to whom.

Both the United States and or NATO will need to address many complex questions before making decisions about the admission of other new members, but I am convinced that such a mandated pause is the wrong way to address these questions. A mandated pause would reduce our own country's flexibility and leverage in Europe, and it would fracture the open door consensus we helped build within NATO. It would also undermine support for reforms in the Central European countries still aspiring to NATO membership and thereby create a new and potentially destabilizing line across Europe. In contrast, the Open Door

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

policy retains the positive incentives that have reinforced reforms and good neighborly relations throughout the region over the last five years.

For these reasons, I have urged the Senate in the strongest terms to reject any effort to impose an artificial pause in the process of NATO's enlargement, and I hope I will have your support for that position. It is not necessary for the Senate to mandate a moratorium on the enlargement process to ensure that future steps proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I consulted extensively with members of both chambers and both parties in Congress on the full range of decisions concerning NATO's enlargement, including decisions on how many and which states to support for membership. I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or making any membership commitments. Of course, the admission of any additional new members also would require the advice and consent of the Senate.

The end of the Cold War has given us an unprecedented opportunity to help build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. There are many elements in our strategy designed to achieve that goal, including our efforts to make further reductions in nuclear arms levels and to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; our bilateral programs to support reform in Russia, Ukraine, and the other new democracies; and our work with other institutions, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A strong NATO remains the foundation of our transatlantic security agenda and I am convinced that continuation of our open door policy will advance our overall interests and enhance NATO's capabilities.

I am grateful for the support and sound advice you and other senators have provided as we pursue that agenda, and I look forward to continuing our work on this and other national security issues in the days to come.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable John F. Kerry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Document 30

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was very pleased by the strong endorsement that your Committee provided to the enlargement of NATO on March 3. I want to thank you again for the leadership you have provided in ensuring a thorough examination by the Senate of this important issue, and in helping to build a consensus in support of its ratification.

I am concerned, however, by some of the discussion at the March 3 Committee meeting regarding our view of NATO's future missions and planned revisions of NATO's Strategic Concept. Given the very serious issues involved, I want to take this opportunity to try to clarify the Administration's policy and plans. I hope you also will permit me to share this letter with your Senate colleagues so that they can better understand our position as well.

First, there is no plan by the Administration or by NATO, as was suggested at one point in last week's Committee meeting, to abandon NATO's core mission of collective defense of NATO's territory, nor would the Administration permit such a change to occur. As both the Administration and NATO have repeatedly stated, the primary mission of NATO is, and must remain, the collective defense of the territory of NATO's members. Although the territorial threats to NATO's members have diminished since the end of the Cold War, they have not disappeared, and the best way to ensure they do not reappear over the long term is to keep NATO's collective defense capability strong, credible, and primary.

Second, during last week's meeting, the specter was raised of a plan by the Administration and NATO to "deploy troops around the world," such as to the Pacific Rim and Africa. In part, I would respectfully suggest that there was simply some mischaracterization of my remarks; for example, I have never stated, nor do I believe, that I see "NATO forces as being a major player in Africa in terms of the stabilization of that continent." However, it may be that my answers on these matters at the Committee's hearings on October 7 and February 24 were not sufficiently clear. Therefore, let me plainly set out our policy.

NATO's purpose is to protect the security of its members. I believe it would be imprudent and even dangerous to draw some arbitrary defense perimeter beyond which NATO would never take action, in part because NATO's core mission might well require sending forces out of area in order to defend NATO's own members. But it is safe to say that neither the U.S. nor its allies is developing any plan to turn NATO into a collective security organization that sends troops on peacekeeping missions to the distant reaches of Africa and Asia, as was suggested at the Committee meeting.

U.S. and NATO policy do permit actions by the Alliance beyond the collective defense of its own members' territory, and this has been the case for many years. At its Rome summit in November 1991, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept to respond to the transformation of the European security environment brought about by the end of the Cold War. That document reaffirmed collective defense as the Alliance's primary objective and military mission. It also noted that Allied security is linked to that of all other states of Europe, and that future NATO

missions could include contributing toward the maintenance of stability in Europe, including areas beyond the borders of its own members. Thus, NATO's declared willingness to consider so called out-of-area missions is neither new nor a product of the Alliance's decision to accept new members.

NATO's first out-of-area operation, indeed its first ever military operation, has been in Bosnia, beginning in 1992 with efforts to enforce no-fly zones and economic sanctions, and continuing with NATO's IFOR and SFOR missions. While there may be a range of opinion about these efforts, I think most people would agree that they are neither global nor unrelated to the security of NATO's own members: the republics of the former Yugoslavia lie squarely within Europe and border on two NATO allies.

NATO's decision to focus on missions beyond its own borders does not represent a radical departure from its original purposes and provisions. Rather, the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty always extended beyond collective defense and beyond NATO's own territory. Article 4 of the Treaty, in particular, specifically says that the Allies will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them there is a threat to territorial integrity, political independence, or security. In March 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made clear that this Article was "'broader than what fell within the scope of the following article, Article 5."

Third, I also want to address an implied concern at the March 3 meeting that the Administration may use NATO's upcoming re-examination of its Strategic Concept to effect some fundamental change in the Alliance's orientation, such as abandoning territorial defense and replacing it with a mission of peacekeeping. It is true that NATO has begun the process of revising the 1991 Strategic Concept. This is a normal practice in NATO, which has had four different Strategic Concepts during its history. The need for another update is clear. The last Strategic Concept was written before the collapse of the former USSR and the Warsaw Pact, before the creation of the Partnership for Peace program, and before NATO's decision to enlarge; its outdated language still refers to "the Soviet Union."

An updated Strategic Concept can ensure that the Alliance's plan for defending the security and interests of its members does everything possible to reflect new realities and to ensure an equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities with our allies. All NATO allies already have agreed that the updated Strategic Concept will preserve collective defense under Article 5 as NATO's primary function.

Finally, there was a concern expressed last week that there be adequate opportunity for congressional input as we and our allies update the Strategic Concept, decide how best to protect our common security and interests, and make other policy decisions concerning NATO's future. I take some pride in the extent of consultation this Administration has undertaken about our decisions involving NATO and its enlargement. In addition to the many hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee and other committees on this issue, we have provided well over a dozen briefings for the Senate NATO Observer Group, included members of Congress in the President's delegation at the NATO summit in Madrid, and canvassed congressional opinion prior to key decisions, such as the one last summer regarding the number of states to be invited into the Alliance.

We have every intention to continue that pattern of intensive consultation with regard to upcoming decisions on NATO policy. We also are amenable to the requirements in the resolution

of ratification, as adopted by the Committee, concerning reporting and briefing on the Strategic Concept and other issues. Moreover, Congress has many direct ways to ensure that the NATO policies of this Administration and its successors do not run counter to its wishes. Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty makes all of NATO's decisions subject to the "constitutional processes" of its members, and Congress has a wide array of means to limit or bar any missions of which it disapproves. Ultimately, it would be rash and counterproductive for any Administration to endorse a Strategic Concept that committed us to missions that would not have the support of our Congress or public, and you can be assured that we have no intention of doing so.

Once again, let me thank you for your leadership on the issue of NATO's future. I believe the work we are undertaking together on NATO's enlargement, and the broader discussion that you have helped to lead on NATO's purpose, will help lay a stronger foundation for America's security well into the coming century.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright

Document 31

THE
CARTER CENTER

March 18, 1998

To Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott

I understand that the full Senate will soon consider the amendments to the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO, to admit The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary as new members.

Given the strong bipartisan support for NATO expansion as reflected in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote, I hope that through your leadership the full Senate will give its overwhelming endorsement as well.

I was initially very concerned about the potential negative reactions within Russia. Like many, I was concerned that forces within Russia who perceived NATO expansion as a reflection of Russian weakness could marshall public opinion in opposition to close ties to the West and to further moves toward disarmament, particularly nuclear. My concerns have, however, been considerably alleviated through the open and forthright way Russia's fears have been addressed, although I realize there are still many opposed in Russia, which may be reflected in the Duma's debate over ratification of the Start II Treaty.

I believe it is vitally important to US foreign policy and security interests that NATO remain the cornerstone of cooperation on security matters in Europe, all the more as we witness the continued unrest in the Balkans. Strong, bipartisan support from the Senate would be seen in Europe as a clear indication of US commitment. I therefore encourage all Senators to view NATO expansion as very much in the US interest and give my full endorsement.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable Senator Majority Leader Trent Lott
487 Senate Russell Office Building
Washington, D.C, 20510-2403

ONE COPENHILL · 453 FREEDOM PARKWAY · ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307 · (404) 420-5151 · FAX (404) 420-5145

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 32

GERALD R. FORD

April 24, 1998

Dear Mr. Leader:

I understand the Senate will be resuming debate on NATO Enlargement in the coming days. I am delighted to hear this, because the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance will add to America's security and lead to the end of Cold War divisions in Europe.

I urge an open and vigorous debate, in which it will be made clear that NATO Enlargement is in the best interests of Americans and the European democracies, old and new, who share our values. The Senate should give its advice and consent to this measure, and send a clear signal of our renewed commitment to Europe and to the common defense of our democratic institutions.

With best wishes,

Gerald R. Ford

The Honorable Trent Lott
Senate Majority Leader
SR487
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-2403

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 33

Excerpts from Statement
of Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright
before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on NATO Enlargement

February 24, 1998

Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: it is my high honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. We view the ratification of these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is manifestly in America's own interest, and that it merits your strong support…

I want to stress today, Mr. Chairman, that from the start, the Administration's decisions have been shaped by our consultations with you, with this committee and with others, with the NATO Observer Group, and with your colleagues in both Houses of Congress and both parties. Over the last few years, and especially the last few months, you have truly put the "advice" into the process of advice and consent. Our discussions have been a model of the kind of serious, bipartisan conversation we need to be having with the Congress and the American people about our nation's role in the world…

Almost 50 years ago, my predecessor Secretary Dean Acheson transmitted to President Truman the original North Atlantic Treaty. He pointed out that if NATO was to be "fully effective" it had to be open to "as many countries as are in a position to further the democratic principles upon which the Treaty was based, to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and . . . to undertake the necessary responsibilities."…

We are here today, Mr. Chairman, because the status quo in Europe was shattered by the geopolitical equivalent of an earthquake. That earthquake presented us with a dual challenge: first, how to preserve a favorable security environment into the next century; and second, how to seize the opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.

In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would our alliance be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the Iron Curtain as something meaningful? or would it aid in Europe's reunification and renewal? Would it exclude from its ranks a whole group of qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated in the past? Or would it be open to those free nations that are willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership and to contribute to our security?

I believe NATO made the right choice. NATO's decision to accept qualified new members will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more stable and united.

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the decision to build a larger NATO has implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It involves solemn commitments. It is not cost-free. It can only be justified if it advances America's strategic interests.

Document 33 (p2)

Last October, I had the opportunity to come before you to make the case that a larger NATO will serve our interests. I will try to summarize that case today, and then focus on the questions and concerns that may still exist.

First, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less likely that we will ever be called upon to do so.

Is central Europe in immediate jeopardy today? It is not. But can we safely say that our interest in its security will never be threatened? History and experience do not permit us to say that, Mr. Chairman.

There is, after all, the obvious risk of ethnic conflict. There is the growing danger posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. There are still questions about the future of Russia. Whatever the future may hold, it is hardly in our interest to have a group of vulnerable and excluded states in the heart of Europe. It will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

A second reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has given the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring allies have strengthened their democratic institutions, improved respect for minority rights, made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, and resolved virtually every old border and ethnic dispute in the region. This is the kind of progress that can ensure outside powers are never again dragged into conflict in this region. This is the kind of progress that will continue if the Senate says yes to a larger NATO.

A third reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Our prospective allies are passionately committed to NATO. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the Alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops…

Nevertheless, I know that there are still serious critics who have legitimate questions about our policy. We have grappled with many of the same questions ourselves, and I want to address a few of them today.

Some of the concerns revolve around the potential cost of a larger NATO. The last time I was here, Mr. Chairman, we could only talk about estimates, for NATO had not yet come to agreement on this issue. Now, all 16 allies have agreed on the numbers and backed them up with commitments. We know today that the costs will be real, but also that they will be manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be shared fairly.

Some of those costs will be paid by our three new allies. I know some people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations will be modernizing their armed forces in any case, and they have told us that in the long run it will be cheaper to do so within NATO than outside it…

There are also people who worry that the cost of a larger NATO -- to us and to our allies -- will be far greater than the Alliance has projected.

That fear is partly based on a natural belief that governments tend to underestimate costs, sometimes severely, sometimes on purpose. But that is not the case with NATO. Our contributions to NATO are a budgeted line item, not an open-ended entitlement. They are funded in an annual exercise that will be fully in your own control. There is no history of running NATO on supplemental appropriations.

That fear is also partly based on an assumption that we will someday have to respond to a military threat to our new allies. If we are called upon to send troops to defend our new allies, then the cost will surely grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we enlarge NATO or not. If you believe, as I do, that we have a security interest in the fate of these countries, then the most effective -- and cost-effective -- way to protect that interest is to make them allies now. As President Havel of the Czech Republic has rightly said: "Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war."

Another concern that I want to address today is that adding new members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the Alliance and make it harder to reach decisions -- in short, that it could dilute NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the Alliance stronger, not weaker.

This is why we have insisted that any nation wishing to join NATO must meet the strict conditions that former Secretary of Defense Perry enunciated in 1995: They must be market democracies with civilian control of the military, good relations with neighbors and the ability to contribute to NATO's mission of collective defense. This is why when President Clinton went to the Madrid summit last July, he insisted that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to three, because we are determined to preserve NATO's integrity and strength.

Ultimately, what matters is NATO's effectiveness in action. We need to be confident that our allies have the resolve to stand with us when the going gets tough. So let us remember: When we asked Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join us in the Gulf, they did not hesitate. When we asked them to put their soldiers in harm's way in Bosnia, they did not hesitate. When we asked Hungary to open its bases to American troops, so they could deploy safely to Bosnia, it did not hesitate.

NATO is a military alliance, not a social club. But neither is it an inbred aristocracy. We must be prudent enough to add members selectively, but we must be smart enough to add those members that will add to our own security. These three will. Others may in the future.

And that in turn, raises another question I know a number of Senators have: namely, where will this process lead us and what about those countries that are not now being invited to join?...

Let me say very clearly that we have made no decisions about who the next members of NATO should be or when they might join. But we should also have some humility before the

future.

How many people predicted in 1949 that Germany would so soon be a member of the Alliance? Who could have known in 1988 that in just ten years, members of the old Warsaw Pact would be in a position to join NATO? Who can tell today what Europe will look like in even a few years? This is just one reason why we want to preserve our flexibility -- and that of those who will lead the Alliance in years to come.

Some now propose that we freeze the process of enlargement for some arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said, with candor, that their real aim is to freeze the process forever. Let me be absolutely clear: this Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO enlargement.

Last July, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and I had the amazing experience of traveling the length and breadth of central and eastern Europe. In those countries that were not invited to join NATO, we were met by enthusiastic crowds and by leaders who support the decisions the Alliance made in Madrid. They know they have a ways to go before they can be considered. Yet just the possibility of joining has inspired them to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past.

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would be taken as a sign that we have written these countries off and diminish the incentive they have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on its open door. It would be at once dangerous and utterly unnecessary, since the Senate would in any case have to approve the admission of any new allies. It would defeat the very purpose of NATO enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key concern: the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with that country. I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with perceptions, not reality. And while perceptions can be important, our policies must follow from what we know to be true.

For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons right up to Russia's borders, and that therefore Russia has a reason to be threatened by a larger NATO. The reality is quite different.

Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a common border since 1949 -- both Russia and Norway know this is nothing new. There are no tensions along the border between Poland and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea coast. Hungary and the Czech Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest corner of Russian soil.

As for weaponry, NATO has announced that in the current and foreseeable security environment, it has no plan, no need and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future allies the confidence to avoid arms buildups and to work constructively to establish lower limits on conventional forces. Their ties with Russia are more normal and cooperative today than at any time in history.

If we did not enlarge NATO, exactly the opposite could happen. The central European nations would feel isolated and insecure. They would undoubtedly spend more on defense and they might reject regional arms control. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would probably create their own mutual security arrangements, which might well be anti-Russian in character. Ironically, the problems Russia fears a larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will avoid.

A more worrisome perception is that Russian opposition to expansion, whether justified or not, is hurting our relationship with Moscow. But once again, the reality is different.

I have spent much time during the last year talking with my Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Primakov and other Russian leaders. I can assure you that the issue of enlargement is not a cloud that shadows these discussions. I believe our relationship is developing according to its own rhythms and priorities, and we have made significant progress in a number of key areas.

The new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is up and running. Russia is taking part in the Partnership for Peace. Our soldiers and diplomats are working together in Bosnia. Russia was a full participant at the Summit of the Eight in Denver last year, and we are helping it prepare for membership in the World Trade Organization. With our support, Russia has continued on the path of economic and democratic reform…

But let us be clear. It is a big mistake to think that every time Russia does something we do not like, it is to "punish" us for bringing Hungary or Poland into NATO…

I am confident America can build a true partnership with a new Russia. But the partnership we seek cannot be purchased by denying a dozen European countries the right to seek membership in NATO. A partnership built on an illegitimate moral compromise would not be genuine and it would not last…

Mr. Chairman, for all these reasons and more, I believe that the choice before you involves much, much more than the immediate future of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It involves the future security of the United States; the future of an undivided Europe; the future of Russia and the character of our relationship with it.

In a sense, it involves the most basic question of all in our foreign policy: how do we avoid war and maintain a principled peace?

For some people, the answer seems to revolve around catch phrases such as globalization, and the naive hope that people who trade and exchange e-mails won't fight. But I do not believe we can bet our future on such an assumption. This is still a dangerous world.

We need to remain vigilant and strong, militarily and economically. We must strive to maintain the cordial relations among major powers which has lent brightness to the promise of our age. At the same time, we cannot assume that great power diplomacy alone will achieve the peaceful conditions in the future that it has so often failed to achieve in the past.

That is why we must also strengthen the proven alliances and institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law, for nations large and small. Institutions that deter

aggression, and that give us a means to marshal support against it when deterrence fails.

That is what NATO does. That is why we decided to keep it after the Cold War ended. That is why we decided to expand it. That is why I thank you today, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, for working with us to make this day possible.

I commend you and the Committee for the time and effort you have dedicated to this vital decision. The NATO enlargement debate has not always been in the limelight. It is not about responding to the crisis of the moment; it is about the less glamorous, less headline-grabbing business of preventing the crises of the future. It calls for serious attention to be paid to the long-term challenges facing our country. And that is what you have done, with an emphasis on patriotism, not partisanship.

I thank you for helping to make this Committee, and the Senate as a whole, our full partner in the creation of a larger, stronger, better NATO. I look forward to your questions today and in the days to come.

Document 34

Statement

Of

Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick

before

committee of foreign relations

United States Senate

on

Propose enlargement of North Atlantic treaty Organization

Thursday, Oct. 9, 1997

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee today.

The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest.

Why enlarge NATO?

The case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and hungry to membership in NATO is not only strong, is essentially the same is the case for organizing NATO in 1949-to provide a security shield behind which the free institutions vulnerable these more geographically vulnerable European democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to deter aggression and discourage conflict.

Of course their differences between 1939, 1949 in 1997. There's no one major threat to peace and security throughout the region today. But if the threats of aggression, some version and conquest are less clear now, is they were after world wars I and II, the appetite for democracy and peace is greater. Still, more people understand the benefits of freedom and long to share it-and the prosperity and security of the "West." And more associate that freedom, prosperity and security, with joining NATO and the European Union.

The new members "fit" in NATO

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary share his civilization with the countries of NATO and engaged in parallel patterns of democratic development when first, Adolph Hitler's, and then Josef Stalin's expansionist policies interrupted their evolution. People in each of these countries share our culture. They demonstrated their location for freedom of heroic efforts to throw off foreign domination and regain control of her own histories.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be incorporated into NATO without creating serious disruption or without requiring re-orientation of NATO's operations. They will "fit" in

NATO.
Their inclusion will not require qualitative changes in its purposes, culture, or mode of operation. NATO has been and, after their inclusion, will be a military alliance of democratic nations united in the determination to preserve their free societies from aggression--by forces necessary.

The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for membership in the European Union and in NATO years ago (Hungary actually applied for EU membership before Soviet forces had departed). They have met all stated requirements and cooperate in all proposed project including Partnerships for Peace.

Moreover, four years have passed since President Clinton said in Prague, "let me be absolutely clear: the security if your states is important to the security of United States... The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how." But neither vein or any other country that suffered under Soviet dominance has been admitted to NATO or the EU.

"Threats" to democratic Eastern Europe

the post-Cold War period has seen numerous threats to development of a democratic era. Resurgent anti-democrats have won power in some states and threaten peace in others. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are examples.

Milosevic sponsored and organized Serbian aggression, and "ethnic cleansing" against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovenia (in that order) enacted repeatedly to destabilize Macedonia. He repeatedly violated democratic norms and the human rights of the Serbian opposition. The undermine democracy in Serbia and outside it. The violent attacks he sponsored devastated two states--Croatia and Bosnia and destabilized the region.

Is no accident, as Marxists liked to say, then democratic Czechoslovakia separation of Slovakian from Czech Republic was peaceful. And separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The different was respect for democratic decisions. There was no will to conquest in the government of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a democracy prepared to except democratic self determination of Slovakia. Serbian rulers are not committed to democratic methods.

There is, finally, one reliable guarantee against aggression--is not found international organizations. It is the spread of democracy. It derives from a simple fact that democracies do not invade one another, and do not engage in aggressive wars.

Numerous studies established beyond reasonable doubt that the best system, the only reliable system of collective security is that all the governments in an area should be democratic government. Therefore, what reinforces democracy reinforces peace. That is the reason that the top priority for the United States and NATO should be to preserve and strengthen the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and Russia is well. Preserving democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be the United States' central goal and top foreign policy priority in Europe. Membership in NATO helps achieve these goals.

The inadequacy of a purely European response

It is not graceful and perhaps not even appropriate for an American to labor the inability of the EC and WEU to protect peace and provide collective security to Europe. That failure is manifest,

more so because at the time Serbs took up arms against Slovenia Croatia, then president of the EC, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said, "This is European problem will be solved by Europeans. There's no role for Americans."

Everyone knows what happened. President George Bush and Bill Clinton a more than willing to stand aside while first Europe, then the United Nations and Europe worked on the problem.

Unfortunately, this experience provided additional timely evidence of the inadequacy of purely European security arrangements. And UNPROFOR, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided definitive evidence on the inability of United Nations to mount an effective military operation.

The passive, inadequate response of the EU, United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western European Union have testified to the ineffectiveness of a collective defense based only on these organizations. NATO has a different and better record though it was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with UNPROFOR.

The inadequacy of a U.N. response

Certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap out of the Yugoslav experience:

-- that membership in United Nations cannot be regarded as reliable guarantor of European security;

-- that global institutions cannot necessarily provide solutions to regional problems;

-- that diplomacy may not be able to forestall aggression-whether or not that diplomacy is directed from the U.N.;

-- that "peacekeeping" is not an adequate response to the determined use of military force;

-- that the "peacekeeping" rules of engagement may make "peacekeepers" hostage without deterring the aggressors or assisting the victims; and,

-- that effective force is often necessary to repel force;

-- NATO can be that force.

Why act now?

Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight and courage, told the economist magazine about a year ago that he fears the spirit of Munich has returned to Europe.

"They do not have in mind some concrete political act," Havel said, "rather I refer to a mentality marked by caution, hesitation, delayed decision-making and a tendency to look for the most convenient solutions." Havel charged the governments of NATO and the European Union with "excessive caution" and worried aloud that the opportunity to build a Europe of independent democratic nations will not last forever.

As usual, Havel was right. Years which might have been used to integrate the new democracies and extend the institutions of freedom have already been lost through indifference, procrastination and timidity.

Can we afford?

United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia several times the cost enlarging NATO.

How much more economical in money and lives it would have been to deter that conflict.

What about Russia?

NATO is a defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression.

A democratic Russia will pose no threat to anyone. Most urgent problem in U.S. relations with Russia is to help Russian Democrats defeat internal enemies of democracy. Our government working hard on that problem.

It should be remembered that President Yeltsin has repeatedly indicated that he has no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these independent European neighbors. We do not help Russian Democrats by appeasing their opponents.

Document 35

As Prepared For Delivery

Testimony of
James A. Baker, III
before the
Senate Budget
Committee

October 29, 1997

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee:

My reasons for appearing before you today are simple. As secretary of State from 1989 to 1992, I see NATO enlargement as a logical if overdue extension of the Bush Administration's outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries embodied by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

And, as a private citizen still keenly interested in foreign policy, I view enlargement as an historic opportunity to advance America's interests and values in Europe.

Let me begin with three short propositions:

(1) Enlarging NATO is good for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic;

(2) It is good for our allies in Western Europe;

(3) And, most importantly, it is good for the United States.

From the point of view of the Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO membership confers important advantages. Most obviously, it protects them from foreign aggression. True, these countries today do not confront any direct external threat. But such a threat, notably from a resurgent Russia, may arise in the future.

Simple prudence dictates that the Central Europeans take steps now, before a possible crisis, occurs, to assure that any such threat will be successfully averted. In a real sense, NATO membership represents an insurance policy for the countries of Central Europe - one that can be acquired today at far lower financial and political cost than later.

But NATO membership represents much more than a security guarantee for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It also serves an important political function. Opponents to NATO enlargement consistently ignore the decisive political role that the alliance has played from the very beginning. NATO was instrumental, for instance, in the emergence of a prosperous, democratic Germany at peace with her neighbors.

NATO can play a similar role in Central Europe. There, NATO membership will serve to consolidate the significant progress already made towards democratic government and free

markets. And it will help encourage cooperation, rather than competition, between the new member states.

From the point of view of Western Europe, the stakes in NATO enlargement are also high. if the history of this century has taught one cruel lesson to the Western Europeans it is this* they cannot isolate themselves from events to their East.

World War I, World War 11 and then the Cold War were all inextricably bound up with developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Mom recently, the break-up of Yugoslavia has prompted the largest armed conflict on European sod since 1945. Instability in Central Europe remains a possible threat to broader European security. Today, that region is at peace. By NATO enlargement it can be kept that way.

I Let me mention here that NATO enlargement is by no means the only way that the Western Europeans can enhance stability in Central Europe, Indeed, I would argue that EU membership is just as important as membership in NATO for the countries involved.

Western Europe, consumed by monetary union, has been less than forthcoming when it tomes to opening its markets to the East Even as the United States moves forward with its Western Allies an NATO enlargement, we must press them to reach out to Central Europe through trade and investment- We must nuke it clear that NATO membership for the countries of Central Europe is not a substitute for closer economic ties to the EU.

From the point of view of the United States, I have already mentioned this century's three major European wars and their links to developments in Central and Eastern Europe. All three were America's wars as well. Washington, no less than London or Paris, ignores the East to its peril. NATO enlargement reflects this simple strategic fact. The argument is simple- Enlargement enhances stability in Central Europe.

That stability in turn improves general security in Europe. And security in Europe is a vital American national interest. Some say that by enlarging NATO, we commit ourselves to intervening in a future Bosnia-type situation in Central Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth. By enhancing stability, NATO enlargement will help guarantee that similar situations do not develop 'in Central Europe.

NATO enlargement will not only advance America's national interests, It will also promote out values. - NATO is not just a defensive alliance. It is also a community of shared values. And, since its inception, it has not just defended borders, but ideals. The fall of the Berlin Walt Was not jug a victory for NATO; it was also a victory for values that Americans hold dear. By extending NATO to the new democracies of Central Europe, NATO can help ensure that those values take firm root. NATO enlargement truly conforms to the highest standards of American foreign; policy. It is grounded in both a realistic assessment of our interests and in idealistic commitment to our values.

Before I conclude, lot me address two other issues:

The first is the question of cost. This is an area Where On Specifics I defer to defense experts. Clearly, however, the sums involved with enlarging NATO are considerable. And negotiating

burden-sharing among NATO members, both new and old, will no doubt be contentious. But I am also convinced that neither of these problems is insuperable. By most estimates, the cost to the United States of NATO enlargement will represent only a modest fraction of our overall defense expenditures, And, given the stakes involved for all concerned, some satisfactory formula for burden-sharing can likely be developed.

My basic point is this: haggling over costs should not be permitted to scuttle the move to enlarge NATO. This would truly be throwing the baby out with the bath water

The second additional issue is the question of Russia's response to NATO enlargement. I mentioned earlier that some opponents to NATO enlargement stress NATO's military aspects to the exclusion of its political role. But some of enlargement's supporters also fall into the same error by casting enlargement as an effort to contain Russia militarily. It is true that NATO enlargement protects the states of Central Europe against a possible revival of Russian expansionism at some future point in time.

And, given the region's history, this only makes: sense. But by bolstering cooperation in the region, NATO enlargement also promotes Russia's own interests in Central Europe" stability - a fact often overlooked by those on both sides of the debate.

Moreover, the political logic for NATO enlargement also extends to Russian membership as well. We should make it plain that Russia too can expect consideration of possible eventual membership in NATO should Moscow meet the necessary criteria and choose to apply, Such a dual approach - of enlarging NATO now while holding out the possibility of future Russian membership - would accomplish two important goals.

It would send a dear warning to Russian reactionaries who might in the future seek to reassert Moscow's hegemony in Central Europe. At the same time, however, it would reinforce the efforts of Russian reformers to anchor their country's future more firmly in the West.

In conclusion, let me stress the vital importance of NATO enlargement. In this age of relentless media hype, the word "historic" is used so often and so loosely that it seems sometimes to have lost its meaning. It assuredly has not. The decision before the Senate on whether to enlarge NATO is, indeed, historic in the truest sense of the word. It deserves the Senate's fullest and most mature consideration.

And it demands that all of us, like our predecessors during that earlier NATO debate of 1949, rise above our partisan differences in common dedication to our national interests -and values.

Document 36

THE PROPOSAL TO ADD NEW MEMBERS TO NATO

Comment by
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

October 30, 1997

In contrast to the other persons invited to testify today, I consider the Administration's recommendation to take new members into NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed. Those are strong words, but I am convinced that they are justified, and I appreciate the opportunity to explain why I use them.

In Russia today there are somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 nuclear warheads, 22,000 of them tactical weapons, relatively easy to transport. Furthermore, there are enormous stocks of HEU and plutonium at research institutes, naval facilities, and warehouses throughout that vast country. In addition, Russia has something like 50,000 tons of chemical warfare agents and an amount which one can only guess of biological warfare agents. Equally important, it has a veritable army of scientists and engineers who are adept at turning these materials into weapons and devising ingenious delivery systems.

There is no serious danger now, or in the foreseeable future, that the Russian government intends to use any of these weapons against us, our Allies, or for that matter against any other country. It would be totally irrational to do so, and though Russian governments may sometimes see things differently from the way we do, they are not irrational. The danger these weapons pose is not that they may be intentionally used by a Russian govern ment, but that they may fall into irresponsible hands or rogue states. It is very much in Russia's interest that such weapons and the materials and know-how to make them not leak out to other quarters, but the sad fact is that the Russian authorities may no longer have an ability to insure their safety. When the people guarding them have not been paid in six months and weapons scientists literally have trouble feeding their families and heating their apartments in sub-zero weather, it is totally unreasonable to expect that all are going to resist the temptation of selling dangerous materials to local criminals, or of going to work for some unsavory regime. Let us count it a miracle that there has as yet been no documented diversion of a nuclear weapon (though we may never know for sure until one turns up in some unexpected place).

I do not use the term "vital interest" lightly. But by any definition, secure, responsible control of weapons of mass destruction has to be one of them. If any get in the hands of a rogue regime, the United States will be right at the top of the list of the terrorists they sponsor. And they could do it in a way that our deterrent force would be useless. If we didn't know where it came from, how could we retaliate? And, very likely, we would not know, until we had lost a city or two. Nor will a missile defense protect us from weapons delivered by means terrorists are most likely to choose: a ship, a small plane, a minivan, even perhaps a large knapsack two men could lift. Chemical and biological weapons are potentially equally dangerous, as the attacks on the Tokyo subway a few months ago showed. They are even easier to deliver than nuclear devices, and would not require a

suicide bomber.

What does this have to do with the question before us? Simply this: adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect us from the real threat I have described. But it does convey to the Russian nation, and particularly their military, that we still consider Russia a potential enemy, unsuited for the same security guarantees and the same degree of cooperation that countries in central and eastern Europe are being offered. Even if the Russian government is forced to acquiesce to the enlargement of NATO, there is no question that our decision to take in new members now, when no country in Eastern Europe faces a security threat from the outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to it that the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used against us or our Allies.

We are constantly being assured that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Russia are under full and responsible control. This may be correct when it is a question of ICBMs and other large missiles in the rocket forces. But smaller weapons and much weapon-grade nuclear material is much less secure. General Lebed has recently said that 84 tactical weapons were missing from Russian arsenals. His allegation has been denied by Russian authorities, but still it is impossible to be complacent about the question. Even if it is a matter of sloppy record keeping rather than actual theft of nuclear weapons, it seems most likely that neither the Russians nor we know how many weapons they have and where they are at all times. Given the prevalence of organized crime and the high prices some regimes or terrorist groups would pay for nuclear weapons or materials, the possibility of diversion is clearly the most immediate and tangible threat to American security today. The progress we have made in assisting Russia to improve security of its weapon stocks is substantial, but still inadequate.

It is going to become increasingly difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this material if our actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit Russia's current weakness, as they are by most officials in those Russian institutions responsible for weapons security. Adding new members to NATO, in what is announced will be merely the first stage in a continued process of enlargement, will inevitably undermine our ability to influence Russian attitudes on nuclear questions. This policy has already caused a delay of at least two years in the Duma's ratification of the START II treaty, and has produced pressures for the Russian Army to rely more rather than less on nuclear weapons in the future.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of this issue to the safety and well being of the American people. Although the Administration has paid some lip service to its importance, its efforts have been hobbled by bureaucratic infighting, lack of senior level attention, and most of all a failure of the President and his senior associates to give the matter the priority and the day-to-day attention it deserves. In fact, I see no evidence of an overall strategy to deal with the problem. What little we are doing came from an initiative from this end of Capitol Hill. Instead of a strategy which would enhance our ability to work in an effective partnership with those Russian agencies responsible for weapons security, we see enormous efforts to promote an ill-conceived plan that does not meet the real security dangers we face, and in fact makes it substantially more difficult to deal with them.

The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the Cold Wax, and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide Europe. It is therefore absurd to

claim, as some have, that it is necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But that does not appear to the the aim of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members piecemeal.

All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and identifiable security threat.

The effect on Russia, however, is perhaps not the most important reason for saying that the Administration's proposal is misguided. I am a strong supporter of NATO, which I believe is essential for the future stability of the European continent. And I am convinced that the process which the Administration proposes to start is going to weaken the alliance ultimately. For a decade or more we will be debating who should or should not be a member, and these debates are bound to be divisive within the Alliance. Meanwhile, these debates will distract us from dealing with the real threats that exist.

If ever there was a case of misplaced priorities, this is it.

Document 37

Testimony to the Senate for relations committee

Presented by

Professor Michael Mandelbaum

Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy,

Paul H. Nitze school of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University

Director, Project on East-West Relations,
the Council on Foreign Relations

October 9, 1997

I am grateful, Mr. Chairman and to Sen. Biden for giving me the opportunity to present my views on NATO expansion to this committee. I have submitted for the record a pamphlet I have written entitled "NATO expansion: The Bridge to the 19th-Century," in which I make at length two points that I simply wish to state here.

First, I believe that United States stands to get no benefits at all from NATO expansion. The making the public policy involves weighing advantages against disadvantages. Whenever the cost of NATO expansion, I believe that there are no offsetting advantages whatsoever.

Second, I believe that the only coherent reason for expanding NATO is to contain Russia. NATO is a military alliance. Russia might someday become a threat to its neighbors, but it is not threat now. Thus NATO expansion, as planned by the Clinton Administration is at best premature or at worst counterproductive.

Rather than expanding on these points, a would rest five other issues that I think are important for the committee and the Senate to consider; the first, the costs of expansion; second the status of the former communist countries that are not being included; third, the claim that we must proceed with expansion whatever the drawbacks because America's credibility is now at stake; fourth, some alternatives to our concourse; and, fifth, the ways this policy is being managed.

I believe that Clinton Administration has dramatically underestimated both the total costs of NATO expansion and the American share of them. The Administration's estimate of the total is $35 billion, but the Congressional Budget Office has produced figures 4 to 5 times as large. Moreover, the Administration's estimates presumed three or four new entries, but we are now, I believe, committed in one way or another to at least 8 -- Romania, Slovenia and three Baltic countries in addition to the three already formally invited. Furthermore, the Administration's estimates assume that no American troops will be stationed in any of these new member countries. I do not believe, however, it will be possible to guarantee the security of the Baltic countries without the deployment of Western troops. Whether or not this is possible is a question I hope the Senate asks the Department of Defense to answer.

Where the distribution of the burden of bringing the new members up to NATO's standards is concerned, the Administration foresees the United States paying 15 percent of the

fixed costs and six percent of the total costs. I do not believe that such a modest share is remotely plausible. The Administration foresees the new members from central Europe paying 35 percent of the total cost. But they will not be able to pay. They'll steadily reduce their defense spending since [sic] 1999 and have been cautioned by the international financial institutions not to increase it. In no public opinion poll taken in any of the three prospective new members that I have seen have more than 20 to 25 percent of the respondents said that they would be willing to spend more than they are already spending on defense. Thus, 75 to 80 percent of the citizens of these countries have indicated that they will not do what the Administration presumes they will do.

The Administration predicts that the Western Europeans will pay 50 percent of the total cost of expansion. This reminds me of a story about the great Duke of Wellington, the victor of Waterloo, who was once approached on the battlefield by a junior soldier who did not recognize him. "Mr. Smith, I believe," the soldier said. The Duke replied, "if you believe that, you believe anything."

We know that the Western Europeans won't pay anything like 50 percent of the total cost because they have said so. At the Madrid meeting in July, at which invitations were issued to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Chancellor Kohl of Germany, President Chirac of France and Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain each said, on the record, in one form or another, that his country would pay nothing for expansion. Nor is this simply political posturing, or a negotiating tactic, on the part of any of them. It is not politically possible for any of these countries to spend more money for NATO expansion. Germany and France are under enormous pressure to reduce government spending to meet the standards established for the new single European currency, a project that is far more important to them than NATO expansion. While it will not join the single currency Britain, is under similar fiscal pressure: the new labor government has promised not to exceed the overall budget of the last Conservative government while at the same time committing itself to higher spending on health and education.

All the Europeans regard NATO expansion as an American initiative, for which America will pay. Whatever the burden of expansion, no one else will share it with us. This fact-and I believe it is a fact-occasions for comments.

First, it is conceivable that expansion will not cost much. But that will be so only if there is no threat to the new members, in which case they have no need of NATO membership.

Second, costs depend on political conditions, and these can change. The potential costs of the commitment the Administration is proposing are huge. In expanding NATO, United States would be assuming what might be called the mother of all unfunded mandates.

Third, the refusal of the Europeans to bear what Americans will regard is their fair share of the burden will inevitably lead to a bitter transatlantic quarrel over burden sharing, a quarrel that would weaken the Atlantic Alliance far more than expanding NATO could conceivably strengthen it.

The fourth, given that the Europeans will spend nothing, this will raise one of two questions in the minds of the people that will have to pay for expansion-American taxpayers. First, if NATO is, indeed, a security organization, why is European security, as the Clinton Administration defines it, more important to Americans than Europeans? If, on the other hand, as the Administration sometimes claims, NATO is being turned into a social welfare organization,

then why are American tax dollars being used for social spending in Europe rather than social spending, or tax relief, in United States?

Perhaps there are good answers to these questions, Mr. Chairman but I personally have never heard them.

The second issue I would like to address is the status of the former communist countries not being included in this expansion, notably the Baltic countries-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Here expansion as planned by the Clinton Administration will present United States with a problem we can neither avoid nor solve. The Balts have been promised membership. American officials have made statements to that affect. The three countries have come to expect membership. And if Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic are entitled, by whatever standard, to join NATO, the Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are equally entitled-indeed more so. Yet all Russians, from Boris Yeltsin to the most obscure members of the Duma, have repeatedly and emphatically declared that Baltic membership in NATO is entirely unacceptable to them and that they would respond to it in negative fashion.

If they should do so, Mr. Chairman, that would confront United States with three options, each of which would leave us worse off than we would be without expanding NATO in the first place.

First, NATO could expand to include the Baltic countries, thus putting the Western military alliance squarely on Russia's border. In that case we would have to expect a sharp decrease in Western cooperation with Russia and the remilitarization, perhaps with an emphasis on nuclear weapons, of the dividing line between NATO and Russia.

Second, an American effort to include the Baltic states in NATO could fail because of a veto by Western European allies. Privately, the Western Europeans make clear that Baltic membership is unacceptable to them. In this second case, the question of Baltic membership would, like the issue of burden sharing, provoke a transatlantic quarrel that would weaken NATO, perhaps fatally.

The third, related, and most likely option for Baltic (and Ukrainian) membership is the failure to include them in NATO. This would accomplish precisely what the Administration claims its plan for NATO expansion is designed to avoid. We would renege on a promise. We would give Russia a veto over NATO's affairs. We would draw a new line of division on the continent that would make the new democracies to the east of that line second-class citizens of Europe.

Some proponents of expansion suggest privately that the issue of the Baltic countries can be avoided, that expansion can be confined to the three countries already formally invited and that the whole project can be abandoned or postponed indefinitely at that point. I do not believe that this is feasible, even if it were proper.

The United States is on record as promising membership to the Balts. They will press us on this issue and, if Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have become NATO members, they will be right to do so: the Balts' claims are as strong as, is not stronger than those of the Central Europeans. Moreover, no American president will ever be able unequivocally to rule out Baltic

or Ukrainian membership in NATO. Russians will thus have to assume that these countries might well become members. At the very least, this would mean that the issue of Baltic membership in NATO would become central to relations between Russia and the West for as far into the future as the eye can see-with absolutely no benefit whatsoever to us.

The third issue I would like to address is the argument that, whatever disadvantages there may be to NATO expansion, it is now too late to turn back. The failure immediately to ratify the NATO expansion the Clinton Administration is proposing, it is already been said, will shatter American credibility and cripple the U.S. position in Europe and the world.

I do not believe this is remotely likely. The need to maintain credibility was a powerful force in American foreign policy during the Cold War. It was the reason the United States fought a major war in Korea. It was the reason for standing firm in West Berlin, and for fighting-and continuing to fight-in Vietnam.

The argument that credibility was both all-important and fragile was persuasive because of its Cold War context. United States was engaged in a global conflict with a militant, militarized adversary. It was reasonable to fear that irresolution in one place would invite aggression elsewhere. But that context has now disappeared completely. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has collapsed. If the Senate decides that the course recommended by the Administration is not a wise one, will the Soviet army march into West Berlin the next day? The question answers itself.

Another version of the credibility argument is that NATO expansion is a test of American international commitment, and that a failure to expand NATO as the Administration desires will signal a retreat into isolationism. This is nonsense. If the Senate should decide the course recommended by the Administration is not a wise one, it would not leave United States isolated or disengaged from Europe. This country would still be central to NATO. It would still be central to the Partnership for Peace. It would still be central to the unprecedented and underappreciated arms reduction treaties designed by President Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. And would still be part of large and growing series of bilateral and multilateral political, economic, and cultural ties with Europe and the rest of the world.

This brings me to the fourth issue I mentioned at the outset: the alternatives to NATO expansion. First and foremost, there is certainly no need to do anything rapidly, if at all. By the Administration's own testimony, there's no present threat to European security and thus no urgency about expansion. Furthermore, to get an idea of the viable alternatives to NATO expansion I recommend listening to what many of those now urging expansion to Central Europe say about membership for the Baltic countries. They say there is no hurry; there's no need to rush, they advise, to bring the Balts into NATO. Arrangements other than full, formal NATO membership will suffice for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia these people say. Mr. Chairman, a good rule of thumb for American policy in Europe is that whatever security arrangements are adequate for the Balts are more than adequate for the Poles, the Hungarians, and Czechs.

In fact, an excellent European security order is already in place, it consists of NATO, and the Partnership for Peace, the Reagan-Bush arms treaties, and pan Russia that does not threaten its Western neighbors. We cannot be sure that every part of this system will always be sturdy. But as circumstances change, we can change our policy; and we'll have plenty of advance warning, and thus ample time to do so.

Instead of expanding NATO, United States should concentrate on the genuine security problems remaining in Europe: clearing up the status of Kaliningrad, the Russian finger on the Baltic; among [sic] the independence of Belarus; getting START II ratified and proceeding to reduce nuclear weapons even further; and continuing the reductions, began in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, of non-nuclear weapons in Europe. Ironically, NATO expansion is at best a distraction from, and at worst a hinderance to, making progress on these issues.

As a final alternative to NATO expansion as cuff entry planned; let me remind you of the suggestions of your distinguished former colleague, Sen. Sam Nunn, that any expansion of security guarantees in Europe be harmonized with the extension of membership in the European Union.

As I have said, I see no benefits whatsoever to expansion. I recognize that there are those, including distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee, who see things differently; who are able to detect in this policy what I cannot find: some merit. But even those who do find merit in expansion ought to be concerned, indeed alarmed, about the way it is being carried forward. The method of expansion is, I believe, a recipe for failure. This is the fifth and final issue I would like to address.

Since World War II we have learned, from bitter experience, that American foreign policies fail when they lack public support. Public support, in turn, has three requirements, none of which has been fulfilled for NATO expansion. The first requirement is clarity of goals. But in this case they are muddled. Is the Atlantic Alliance an organization to promote security or social welfare? Is expansion intended to embrace or contain Russia? Is NATO the old sturdy defensive military alliance or an entirely new organization with a different mission? The American public has not been told, plainly and authoritatively, precisely what it is being asked to support.

The second requirement for such support is a clear strategy. This does not necessarily mean an exit strategy; it does mean a plan, a clear sense of how goals are to be achieved. An old military axiom warns against taking the first step in a campaign without knowing what the last one is to be. For NATO expansion, not only do we not know the last step, we don't even know the next one. The way the issue of Baltic and Ukrainian membership is being treated by the Administration is particularly disturbing. In response to the questions of what comes next, which other countries will join, and when, Administration officials assert that the process of expansion is open-ended and they will not "name names" of new members.

Mr. Chairman that is not the answer. It is not a policy. It is an evasion. It amounts to saying to us, the American people, and you, our elected representatives, in response to what may be the most momentous questions that this issue raises: "we won't tell you." That means either that these officials know but won't disclose the answers to these questions, or that they won't disclose the answers because they don't know them. The first possibility is constitutionally dubious; the second strategically alarming.

The third requirement for mustering public support for any major American international undertaking is candor about cost. As I have said, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the discussion of costs is characterized by an almost total absence of candor.

The failure to fulfill these three requirements led to failure for the United States in Vietnam in the 1970s, in Lebanon in the 1990s, in Somalia in the 1990s and I fear in Bosnia in the future. Failure in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia was and would be costly and tragic. But failure where NATO expansion is concerned-at the heart of Europe, and involving the two greatest European powers, Germany and Russia, and most destructive weapons on the planet, nuclear weapons -- failure here, Mr. Chairman could be far worse.

Document 38

Opening Statement by Senator Jesse Helms
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on NATO Expansion
With Sec. Albright, Sec. Cohen and General Shelton
February 24, 1998
[Extracts]

[Madame Secretary,...] "First I asked that you identify a strategic rationale for the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, and you responded that the expansion of NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. I believe that, and I am confident that the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs will work with us to that end.

Second, I emphasized my view that all NATO allies -- old and new -- must bear a fair burden of any cost related to expansion, a requirement that will be partially met through the cost sharing formula that has since been agreed to by the members of the alliance. Under that formula the United States' share will be even less than the Pentagon's original projection.

But we must bear in mind that this is only part of the burdensharing equation. The majority of the cost of making and keeping NATO militarily effective will be the responsibility of our allies, a point that this Committee will emphasize in the resolution of ratification. It is assumed, of course, that the Administration will continue its insistence that all NATO members must meet their commitments to the common defense.

If not, the expansion of NATO this year, may be followed shortly thereafter by NATO's collapse - and nobody wants that to happen.

And lastly, I asked that you reassure the Senate that the NATO-Russia relationship will neither disrupt NATO decision-making nor diminish the security of the alliance. You made crystal clear that "Russia will never have a veto over NATO policy", which pretty much says it all.

On this point, I recognize that all of us have our work cut out for us in making the U.S.-Russian relationship work better. This does not imply that we will forgo building closer relations with Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, - of course we must do that while building closer ties with Russia.

But this is a matter not entirely under our control. Russia must signal its willingness to engage in a constructive relationship with the United States. Unfortunately, Russian intimidation of its neighbors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by Russian companies, and the Russian government's support of Saddam Hussein are scarcely encouraging.

Madam Secretary, since your appearance before the Committee in late 1997, the Foreign Relations Committee met six times to hear from over 30 supporters, skeptics and opponents of this expansion proposal. In my view, as well as that of many other Senators, your responses have successfully withstood the test.

In recent weeks, unprecedented support of NATO expansion has been received by the Committee. In addition to distinguished leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Lech Walesa, and Vaclav Havel we have received endorsements from every living former U.S. Secretary of State, numerous

former Secretaries of Defense and national security advisors, and more than sixty flag officers and general officers including five distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

More important, we have heard from the leaders of organizations representing literally millions of average Americans including the diverse ethnic community, religious groups, civic organizations, veterans organizations, and business groups. All of this is reinforced by the recent polling, showing a substantial majority of Americans in support of NATO expansion.

That said, I should perhaps mention for the record that Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution makes the Senate the final arbiter in the extension of treaty commitments.

We have heard all sides; now we are called upon to fulfill that responsibility. As the Senate takes up the resolution of ratification most likely in the next two weeks, I do hope that the vote will be overwhelmingly positive...."

Document 39

The following statement was issued today by a right-left coalition that has just been formed to oppose NATO enlargement -- Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE).

The groups thus far endorsing the statement are:

On the right:
Free Congress Foundation
Eagle Forum
American Defense Institute
Media Research Center

On the left:
Council for a Livable World Education Fund
Peace Action
Center for Defense Information
Union of Concerned Scientists

An advisory council endorsing the coalition is also being formed and now consists of:
Ted Galen Carpenter
Amb. Jonathan Dean
Senator Gordon Humphrey
Dr. Fred Ikle
Amb. Jack Matlock
Prof. Richard Pipes

FOUNDING DECLARATION OF THE COALITION AGAINST NATO EXPANSION

We, the undersigned organizations, as members of the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE), are deeply concerned that this country may soon make a strategic decision of enormous importance with little thought and even less debate. We refer to the proposal to expand the NATO alliance, initially with three new members, later, most probably, with many more.

The expansion of NATO has broad, long-term implications for America. The implications are strategic, political, and financial. Yet the Senate, which will vote this year on the proposed treaty, has held few hearings, and those few have been stacked with witnesses who favor expansion. Most Senators have not been exposed to the large and growing number of thoughtful arguments opposing NATO expansion. More importantly, the American public has yet to be engaged in discussion of a matter that involves its vital interests: its commitments, its tax money, and potentially the lives of its children, which may soon be pledged in defense of up to 12 more countries.

The Coalition Against NATO Expansion has been formed to call for and compel the serious national debate the proposed treaty demands. The Coalition includes organizations from across the political spectrum, organizations which normally find themselves on opposite sides of an issue. We find ourselves in agreement on this matter, not only in our belief that NATO expansion is bad for all Americans, regardless of political outlook, but also in the conviction that a matter of this importance should not be railroaded through the United States Senate in a rush to judgment. America does not need a Tonkin Gulf Resolution for central and eastern Europe.

The expansion of NATO contradicts vital American interests of three kinds: strategic, political, and financial.

Strategically, the expansion of NATO into central and eastern Europe risks restarting the Cold War. By its nature, a military alliance is directed against someone. The geography of NATO expansion makes its target Russia.

In the course of this century, Western civilization has fought three terrible civil wars: The First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War. The cost in lives, treasure, and moral capital has been immense. With the fall of communism in the former Soviet Union, the West was finally granted an opportunity to heal its fatal breaches and put an end to its tragic internecine conflicts. The opportunity is historic, but it has been met with contempt. The proposal to expand NATO tosses it away by telling Russia in unmistakable terms that it remains excluded from the community of Western nations.

The fact that Washington has been able to cajole and coerce the current Russian government into keeping its objections to itself does not change this reality. Again, the geography of NATO's proposed expansion cannot be disguised: it cannot be directed against anyone but Russia. The large majority of politically aware Russians understand this fact, and within Russia, opposition to NATO expansion reaches across the political spectrum. Today, Russia is too weak to oppose NATO expansion effectively, so she has chosen to remain officially silent. But Russia understands. She will remember, and ultimately, she will react, either from a position of renewed strength or out of desperation.

The last great unfinished business of the 20th century is the reintegration of Russia with the West. With the proposal to expand NATO, we have turned our back on it. The future will not forgive us; nor will the more than 50 million people who died in Europe's previous wars in this century.

Politically, the proposed expansion of NATO represents the growing split in our country between ordinary Americans and Washington insiders. NATO offers Washington insiders a cornucopia of opportunities for career advancement and prestige. It is no surprise to those who know official Washington that it wants NATO expanded -- or that Capitol Hill is currently swarming with lobbyists from the defense industry, offering campaign contributions and jobs for constituents in return for the new, multi-billion dollar weapons contracts NATO expansion will bring (with the American taxpayer paying the bill).

Outside of the beltway, however, it is difficult to find much enthusiasm for additional foreign military commitments. America has grown tired of 'cabinet wars,' of conflicts and commitments to conflict -- for that is what NATO expansion involves -- to serve the interests of Washington gameplayers.
Administration officials and other proponents of NATO expansion have declined to explain to the citizens of America that the expansion of NATO involves this nation in more overseas military commitments. Central and eastern Europe are rife with long-standing ethnic-conflicts. If NATO is expanded into those regions, those conflicts will become ours.

There is no evidence that Americans desire to make such a commitment. Yet, in a nation that preaches democracy to the rest of the world, our own public has been left uninformed and uninvolved in this most critical of debates. NATO expansion is being treated as merely another 'insider deal' to be rushed through the Senate with few hearings and little debate. No doubt this benefits Washington. But does the rest of America count for so little that it should be treated with such contempt? Surely those who gave the Senate a role in the treaty process thought otherwise.

Even more is at stake here than in the strategic blunder of excluding Russia from a new and united Europe. Railroading the NATO treaty through the United States Senate is a blow to the very system of participatory government that should be at the heart of American democracy.

Financially, the expansion of NATO lays a new and potentially heavy burden on the American taxpayer. The candidates for admission into NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have little money available for defense. The European members of NATO have made it clear their unwillingness to bear any significant additional financial burden. Yet the costs of admitting these three nations to NATO have been estimated as high as $125 billion. The new planes, tanks and other equipment the lobbyists are hawking on Capitol Hill must be paid for. Who will pay? Inevitably, the American people.

It is an advertisement for the cynicism with which NATO expansion is being promoted that the details backing up NATO's own estimate of the cost of expansion have been classified. Who does Washington fear will find out this information? The American public. So those all-important details are now secret. Is this the way business should be done in the world's greatest advocate of democratic government?

Any serious proposal for NATO expansion must contain the best possible estimate of its full costs, with a realistic explanation of who will pay the bill. Absent such information, the Senate should refuse to bring the matter to the floor.

In view of these and other serious objections to the expansion of NATO, the Coalition Against NATO Expansion demands that the Congress of the United States do its duty.

First, both Houses of Congress should debate every aspect of NATO expansion extensively and exhaustively. The principal responsibility lies with the Senate. There, the Foreign Relations Committee should schedule sufficient additional hearings that the American people are drawn into the debate. And debate it should be; the opponents of NATO expansion should be represented equally with its advocates, and the advocates, including the State Department, should be compelled to address the opponents' arguments, not merely ignore them. Extensive hearings should also be held in other committees whose areas of jurisdiction are involved: Armed Services, Budget and Appropriations. Again, all sides should be heard, not just voices for the Administration. Major treaties are too important to be left to the diplomats.

Because tens of billions of dollars in taxpayers' money is involved in this decision, the House of Representatives also has a role to play. Any implementing legislation would have to pass the House as well as the Senate. At the very least, hearings should be held by the House Budget and Appropriations committees.

Second, the Senate should allow sufficient time to debate NATO expansion on the floor after adequate hearings have been held. A vote on final passage should be preceded by at least a week of serious debate and should not be held until an informed American citizenry can make its voice heard. This means that no vote should be scheduled before the summer, at the earliest. Any plan for an earlier vote is railroading the issue.

Third, a series of debates should be held around the country on the merits of the proposed expansion of NATO. The Coalition Against NATO Expansion challenges the US Department of State, the principal advocate of expansion, to such debates. We will provide a politically balanced team of opponents to meet a State Department team in the major cities of America, in a series of debates between now and the coming summer. By debating NATO expansion across America, instead of treating the matter as a Washington beltway 'insider deal,' the advocates of expansion can answer the objection that the American people are not being consulted on a mater of overwhelming importance to their interests. If the State Department rejects such debates, it also rejects the participation of the people in this question. In that case, let us hear no more from this Administration on the world-wide merits of democracy.

The Coalition Against NATO Expansion is confident that careful, thoughtful and thorough consideration of the merits of NATO expansion can only benefit this country. Deals done in the dark have a way of going bad. Nor, if the American public is effectively excluded from this decision, does that public have a stake in it. When the time comes that the treaty must be backed-up with money and personnel, there is no reason the American people should agree to do so. A treaty rushed through the Senate with perfunctory debate would indeed be a scrap of paper. Our nation, and the other nations of the world which will be affected by this historic decision, deserve better than that.

The Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE)

January 26, 1998

Document 40

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington DC, 4th April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in Peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces or any or the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 7

The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification or the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duty certified copies will be transmitted by that Government go the governments of the other signatories.

Document 41

Brussels
16 Dec. 1997

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland

Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Pologne

---

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Poland to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

Les Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, signé le 4 avril 1949 à Washington,

Assurées que l'accession de la République de Pologne au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord permettra d'augmenter la sécurité de la région de l'Atlantique Nord,

Conviennent ce qui suit:

Article I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Poland an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Poland shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

Article II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each

such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transsmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Article I

Dès l'entrée en vigueur de ce Protocole, le Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord enverra, au nom de toutes les Parties, au Gouvernement de la République de Pologne une invitation à adhérer au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Conformément à l'Article 10 du Traité, la République de Pologne deviendra Partie à ce Traité à la date du dépôt de son instrument d'accession auprès du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Article II

Le présent Protocole entrera en vigueur lorsque toutes les Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord auront notifié leur approbation au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique informera toutes les Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord de la date de réception de chacune de ces notifications et de la date d'entrée en vigueur du présent Protocole.

Article III

Le présent Protocole, dont les textes en français et anglais font également foi, sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Des copies certifiées conformes seront transmises par celui-ci aux Gouvernements de toutes les autres Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Signed at Brussels on the 16th day of December 1997.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires désignés ci-dessous ont signé le présent Protocole.

Document 41 (p3)

In witness whereof,
the undersigned plenipotentiaries
have signed the present Protocol

En foi de quoi,
les plénipotentiaires désignés ci-dessous
ont signé le présent Protocole.

Signed at Brussels on
the 16th day of December 1997

Signé à Bruxelles
le 16 décembre 1997

For the Kingdom of Belgium:
Pour le Royaume de Belgique:

For Canada:
Pour le Canada:

For the Kingdom of Denmark:
Pour le Royaume du Danemark:

For the French Republic:
Pour la République française:

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
Pour la République fédérale d'Allemagne:

For the Hellenic Republic:
Pour la République hellénique:

For the Republic of Iceland:
Pour la République d'Islande:

For the Italian Republic:
Pour la République italienne:

For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg:

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Pour le Royaume des Pays-Bas:

For the Kingdom of Norway:
Pour le Royaume de Norvège:

For the Portuguese Republic:
Pour la République portugaise:

For the Kingdom of Spain:
Pour le Royaume d'Espagne:

For the Republic of Turkey:
Pour la République de la Turquie:

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord:

For the United States of America:
Pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique:

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

"Let's Be Sure To Make Good On This Part Too, Huh?"

ATLANTIC PACT
PREAMBLE
.....FAITH IN THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS...
.. SAFEGUARD FREEDOM..
...PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW...
WESTERN STATESMEN
HERBLOCK

Copyright 1949 by Herblock in The Washington Post

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

"UNINTENTIONAL 'CUPID"



"ON THE RECORD"

Crawford in The Newark News

Reprinted with Permission

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 24, 1949.

TWO VIEWS ON THE ATLANTIC PACT AND ARMS FOR EUROPE

"Lightning attractor?"

"Now the debate on the size of the ammunition."

"CHANGING WORLD"



Reprinted with Permission

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

. . . from Herblock: A Cartoonist's Life (Times Books, 1998)

"I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHERE IT'S GOING BUT I MADE IT"



...copyright 1998 by Herblock in The Washington Post

Copyright 1997 National Review, Inc.
Reprinted with permission

EAST EUROPEANS PREPARE TO JOIN NATO


YOU'LL NEED NATO CAPS, NATO SHIRTS, NATO BELT BUCKLES, NATO WHISTLES...
... AND A FEW NATO FIGHTER PLANES AT 25 MILLION A POP
TWEET
NATO
NATO
NATO
ARMS
DEALERS
WASSERMAN ©'97 BOSTON GLOBE DIST BY L.A. TIMES SYND

Copyright Los Angeles Times Syndicate
Reprinted with Permission

BEST COPY AVAILABLE